



# Access to Education for Young People Displaced by the Syrian Crisis

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## Abstract

Learning continuity and engaging young people in supportive schooling environments are often overlooked in research, policy and aid sector responses to displacement. With increasing numbers of long-term displaced people, states and families must consider long-term planning for young people. This paper contributes to the understanding of household factors that influence whether a young person of school age displaced from Syria to Lebanon in 2010-2016 was in school or not by quantitatively analysing survey data collected by the World Bank in 2015-16. The head of household's (HoH) years of education was shown to have the greatest effect with each additional year of HoH schooling increasing the likelihood the youth was in school by 11.5-14.8 per cent. The length of displacement increased the likelihood of the youth being in school by 1.6-2.1 percent per additional month the HoH had been in Lebanon. An increase in the HoH's exposure to violence in Syria pre-displacement decreased the likelihood the youth was in school by 1.9-2.1 per cent. Pre-displacement socio-economic factors did not have a statistically significant effect, though this is likely due to imperfect measures. These results support identification of at-risk displaced youths in host countries to support more effective learning continuity strategies and targeted engagement in the education system.

## Keywords

Syria, Lebanon, Conflict, Education, Policy, Refugee, Displacement, Basic Education, Parent, Opportunities, Equity

## JEL Classification

I24, I25, I26, I28, I38 and J24

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## 1 Introduction

In 2024, an unprecedented 123 million people were forcibly displaced (Action Against Hunger Canada, 2025; UNHCR, 2024). Displacement is increasingly long term, with persistent conflicts, hunger, collapsing state structures, and economic crises identified as key causes (Abel & Sander, 2014; Action Against Hunger Canada, 2025; Carling & Talleraas, 2016). The spread of prolonged crises means that more countries and people are affected. Fleeing families and host communities must contend with immediate impacts of loss of life, health, living standards, interruptions to economies and political institutions, and also the disruption of long term plans for their families and populations (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Vesco, Baliki, Brück, Döring, Eriksson, Fjelde, Guha-Sapir, Hall, Knutsen, Leis, Mueller, Rauh, Rudolfsen, Swain, Timlick, Vassiliou, von Schreeb, von Uexkull, & Hegre, 2025). Within current humanitarian responses to conflict and displacement, little attention is paid to young people's access to schooling, with only 2.6 per cent of humanitarian aid focused on this need, creating challenges for learning continuity and human development (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2025).

Armed conflict systematically disrupts young people's education, both in conflict and in host countries (Hausler, Urban, & McCorquodale, 2020). Schools are destroyed or repurposed, teachers may be killed or forced to flee, and families face serious risks in sending their children to class (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2024). Host nations and school age refugees struggle with overcrowded classrooms, unfamiliar curricula, strained public services, and increasing social tensions, often while armed conflict also occurs in the host countries (UNESCO Institute for Statistics & UNICEF, 2015). Global agreements including the *UNHCR's Global Compact on Refugees*, *Safe Schools Declaration* and *Education Cannot Wait* consortium have been developed to address these constraints. However, without greater prioritisation, displaced young people will face fewer years of schooling, lower literacy levels, and worse education outcomes, especially in already marginalised groups (Jalbout & Winthrop, 2013).

This study uses data from a comprehensive survey undertaken by the World Bank in 2015-16 of groups displaced from Syria to Lebanon to understand the factors that influenced whether school aged youths were attending school, or not. This paper addresses three inter-related research questions: *1) how does the education level of senior members of the household shape school attendance of displaced youths?; 2) how does timing of flight and exposure to violence shape school attendance of displaced youths? and; 3) how do the household socio-economic conditions before displacement shape school attendance of displaced youths?*

Syrians are one of the largest forcibly displaced groups globally, highlighting the impacts of massive displacement on both individuals and societies. Between 2011-2024, the Syrian civil war displaced 6.1 million refugees and asylum seekers abroad and 7.4 million people internally (UNHCR, 2024). Before 2010, Syria had seen steady gains in enrolment and completion rates of mandatory basic education, but this scale of conflict and displacement have reversed decades of progress (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2025). While some people have begun returning to Syria in 2025, the World Bank estimates physical reconstruction costs from the conflict at roughly US216 billion (World Bank, 2025) illustrating the long road ahead for a

country that has already experienced 15 years of internal challenges.

## 2 Previous Research

Conflict severely disrupts both the demand and supply of education. Poverty, health shocks, child soldiering, and trauma reduce families' ability to send their children to school, while destruction of infrastructure, displacement, and resource shortages limit the availability of schooling (Justino, 2016). In the section below, I provide a brief summary of relevant literature to situate the three questions asked by this study, noting this is not a systematic review of all literature on refugees and education.

The education of a young person is strongly influenced by household factors, including the characteristics of their head of household. Heads of households are often parents, or figures who play a parental or guardian role for young people in displaced contexts, especially when their parents are living elsewhere or have died. Parental education is commonly used as a predictor of children's school achievement. Higher levels of education are associated with higher likelihood of enrolment, higher achievement, and also association with other family related factors such as quiet environments and study support (Saasa, 2018; Tamayo Martinez, Xerxa, Law, Serdarevic, Jansen, & Tiemeier, 2022; Vo, Vo, & Ho, 2023). In a study of 363 countries, Huisman and Smits (2015) found that children whose parents had never attended school were enrolled in school 87.7 per cent of the time, compared to children from families with primary education background who were enrolled 94.9 percent of the time.

However, conflict has been shown to almost always worsen educational attainment and deepen inequalities, with effects compounding over time (Omoeva, Moussa, & Hatch, 2018). The long-term consequences include reduced literacy skills, fewer opportunities for higher education, and weakened employment prospects, which can fuel grievances and increase risks of future violence (World Bank 2018). Previous research in Liberia, Rwanda, and Timor-Leste have illustrated how war and violence create lasting educational setbacks. In Liberia, prolonged conflict forced students out of school, leaving them with poor economic prospects and limited chances for remedial education, which weakened democratic participation after the war (Liu, 2022). Young people exposed to the Rwandan genocide lost significant schooling during critical developmental years and affected education institutions long term (Akresh & de Walque, 2008). Violence in Timor Leste led households to sacrifice education to support other needs resulting in a loss of human capital development, especially for young boys (Justino, Leone, & Salardi, 2014).

Certain groups are believed to be affected during conflict more than others. Existing inequalities in the society along gender, ethnicity, and income divisions, or other areas of disadvantage, have been shown to lead to greater education inequality (Omoeva, Hatch, & Moussa, 2016). Notwithstanding, the importance of education as a powerful investment remains relevant as individuals are expected to earn an average extra 9 per cent lifetime earnings due to every additional year of schooling minus their direct expenses (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2018), a key determinant of reducing inequalities between groups.

With an increasing number of displaced people globally and more complex crises leading to longer periods of displacement (UNHCR, 2024), displaced peoples and host countries are more affected by the accessibility of public services. As of 2013, approximately 60 per cent of people displaced globally had been displaced for more than five years, and the average displacement period for refugees was seventeen years (Jalbout & Winthrop, 2013). The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 22, states that states “shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education”. However, discrimination from host communities, state-based restrictions, requirements to secure or access documentation to register for school and language barriers can create practical challenges, leading to the exclusion of displaced young people from schooling (Ferris & Winthrop, 2010). Research on the effectiveness of interventions to improve access to education for refugees and displaced groups is also an emerging field (Palik & Østby, 2023), with a need for greater focus to ensure resourcing is used effectively for these groups.

Exposure to violence before displacement can also be an important factor in both household and youth decisions to enrol in schooling. Pre-displacement stressors are understood to indirectly affect mental health for displaced groups (Assaf, Nuwayhid, & Habib, 2024). Girls and boys of school age in conflict affected regions are less likely to enrol or complete their mandatory schooling. Shemyakina (2011) found a more prominent effect for girls, resulting in fewer enrolments, while case studies in Turkey (Kibris 2015) and the West Bank (Brück, Di Maio, & Miaari, 2019) identified links between conflict exposure and poorer performance on university entrance exams, leading to structural exclusion from higher education.

This study builds on this existing knowledge on education attainment, and research on refugee and displaced groups to explore the circumstances of the displaced groups in Lebanon in 2015-16. By increasing the understanding of the first five years of a significant displacement event, and the trajectory of affected young people, it contributes to the wider understanding of the critical importance of education for displaced groups.

### 3 Syria-Lebanon Education Context

There is a growing focus on understanding the effects of the Syrian crisis on groups internally and internationally displaced from Syria, including on health and education outcomes (see Abu-Amsha and Armstrong, 2018 for summary). In the years before the conflict, schooling trends in Syria were improving for the majority of Syrian children, with a 95.6 per cent completion rate (94.7 per cent for female children) of primary school in 2006 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2025). Though even in pre-crisis Syria, many students left school before finishing compulsory lower secondary education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2025). Welker et al (2021) used 2006 data, and found that 40.8 percent of surveyed adolescents (aged 14+) whose parents never attended school were enrolled in school, compared to 90.6 percent of adolescents whose parents attended a higher education institution. Very few Syrian children attended early childhood education or pre-school, with only 9.9 per cent of children (9.6 per cent for female children) enrolled in 2006, indicating either a limited accessibility or interest in early childhood education.

In Lebanon, which hosted between 1.1-1.6 million displaced people by the end of 2014 (European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), n.d.), public schools account for approximately 44 per cent of schools, and predominantly serve lower income students (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025). Lebanon is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention, so is not compelled to follow international law on provision of public services to refugees and asylum seekers. However, until 2024, the Ministry of Education in partnership with INGOs ran the Reaching all Children with Education (RACE) Initiative which enabled displaced students to enrol in primary schooling and above where places were available, regardless of legal status (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025). Schools most often worked on a two-shift school system where the morning shift was majority Lebanese students and the afternoon shift was majority non-Lebanese students (Kelcey & Chatila, 2020). Educators who had been displaced from Syria were not permitted to work in schools, and so some continued to teach in non-formal education centres though with less salary and job security (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025). Many schools in Lebanon offered schooling from kindergarten to Grade 6, though secondary schools are usually further away, expensive to reach, and thus led to drop out of students after Primary School (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025).

In addition to public schools, subsidies for private schools, and non-formal education, there have also been options to undertake accelerated classes to prepare young people for entering the formal education system in Lebanon (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025). Many households and young people preferred the non-formal education system, in order to be around people with shared experiences, and also to learn in languages they were more familiar with (ERICC Helpdesk, 2025). Similar trends were identified with Syrian refugees living in Jordan. Cohen (2023)'s research with Syrian refugees in Jordanian accelerated learning programs highlighted the importance of socio-emotional in-school practices, namely building relationships, attending to the student as a whole person, and teaching through a student-centered approach. These approaches can be limited in effectiveness though when teachers show difference-blindness to the experiences of students, remain silent on key topics or show prejudice towards students. Cohen's research identified that teachers of displaced youths need to see social, structural, and systemic power dynamics that shape Syrian refugees' experiences, in the education system but also in environments outside of the school (Cohen, 2023). These complex policy and classrooms environments were the background to displaced groups experiences, and provide important context to the survey data examined through this study.

## 4 Research Design

To study the impact of displacement on education, the study uses a household level dataset provided by the World Bank (2019). A total of 2,039 displaced youths of school age (3-18 years old) were included in the surveyed sample. This sample is not representative of the displaced school-aged population in Lebanon, due to information limitations on the sample frame (see Russo Riva, Krishnan, Sharma, and Vishwanath, 2020 for more detail on the survey sample and sampling approach). However, it provides data on young people from households living across multiple governorates in Syria in 2010, and Lebanon at the time of the survey.

The outcome variable for all models is school attendance. The variable is coded 1 if the young person of school age is reported as currently in any school or coded 2 if the young person is currently not attending any school, or is recorded as either previously having or not having attending schooling. This focuses on the young person retaining a current connection to any education system, including those that focus on skills outside of the formal curriculum or language which may be more useful for skills-based roles or those who intend to return to their country of origin. A generalised linear model with a binomial link is applied, using household-clustered standard errors to account for shared characteristics. As seen in Table 1, approximately half of the surveyed youth population was reported as attending school at the time of the survey.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Median	N
Youth age	10.31	4.39	4	18	10	2,039
HoH age	40.61	9.71	15	80	39	2,039
Household size	6.52	2.18	2	20	6	2,039
HoH months displaced	40.08	13.32	5	72	40	2,039
HoH years of education	5.36	3.98	0	17	6	2,020
BRD ('000s) lagged t-1	12.77	10.27	0.00	32.78	14.31	2,039
Youth sex (F = 1)	0.49	0.50	0	1	0	2,039
HoH sex (F = 1)	0.11	0.31	0	1	0	2,039
HoH Employed at Flight (Y = 1)	0.70	0.46	0	1	1	2,039
HoH Secure Housing (2010) (Y = 1)	0.99	0.11	0	1	1	2,037
HH Met Basic Needs (2010) (Y = 1)	0.73	0.44	0	1	1	2,039
1+ pers in HH UNHCR reg (Y = 1)	0.11	0.31	0	1	0	2,039
Youth in school now (Y = 1)	0.47	0.50	0	1	0	2,039

To address the first research question, whether the education level of senior members of the household influence school attendance among displaced school-aged individuals, I examine the Head of Household's (HOH) years of education. This variable is measured on a scale of 0-17 years of education where 0 years means the head of household has never attended school, and 17 years means the head of household has completed higher education or university. HoHs who answered 'don't know' for their highest grade of education completed were excluded from the sample to avoid assigning them an incorrect number of years. The mean HoH years of education in the surveyed sample was 5.36 years (SD = 3.98) as seen in Table 1.

To study the second question –if the timing of flight and exposure to violence shape school attendance of displaced school-aged people– two operationalisations are used. The first is how many months the head of household has been displaced, calculated based on the month and year the head of household reports leaving Syria until 1 March 2016. The mean HoH months displaced is 40.08 months (SD = 13.32). The second is the battle-related deaths recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in Syria in the quarter before the head of household was displaced (four quarters per year). Battle related deaths in the UCDP dataset are defined as “deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat” (Pettersson, 2024). Battle-related deaths are measured in thousands with a three month lag to align with the time of




Figure 1: Count of head of households in survey sample displaced by month, and count of battle-related deaths in the previous quarter in all of Syria by 3-month periods (2010-2016)

displacement in the dataset. The mean battle-related deaths were 12.77, or 12,770 fatalities, per three month period ( $SD = 10.27$ ). These operationalisations rely on the HoH's displacement as the reference as some children were born in Lebanon as a result of the displacement, and thus do not have a data entry for the month and year they left Syria. As seen in *Figure 1*, the number of HoH leaving Syria per quarter is reasonably constant between 2011 and 2014, while the exposure to violence is much higher per quarter for households that were displaced after 2012. While much of our understanding of displacement is focused on displacement *during* conflict (Carling & Schewel, 2018; Ruhe & Kuhnt, 2025), this implies that many heads of households left Syria before the increase in battle related deaths per quarter.

To study the third question on the effect of socio-economic conditions pre-displacement, I conceptualised socio-economic conditions using three available variables in the dataset: if the HoH lived in secure housing in 2010, if the household reported earning enough to meet their basic needs in 2010, and if the HoH was employed or in business at the time of flight. Secure housing was recoded into a binary variable for consistency with the other operationalisations of socio-economic conditions, where living in a house or apartment was considered secure, and living in other housing options (such as informal settlement/tent, worksite/unfinished home, farm building and others) were considered insecure housing. This definition is built off the UN OHCHR concept of adequate housing with adequate availability of services (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2025). The household reporting earning enough to meet their basic needs was collected as a binary (yes/no) response in the original survey. This reflects personal living expectations adjusted for income, though is limited in validity due to the long

time between when it is asked in 2015-16, and the household's experience in 2010. Finally the variable focused on the HoH's employment or business at the time of flight was also collected as a binary (yes/no) answer in the original survey. Though as the households were displaced any time between 2010-16, the strength of Syria's economy and job sector is a critical confounder that weakens the validity of this measure.

In addition, a set of common control variables is included in all models to reduce residual variation and improve the precision of estimates. These controls comprise: the sex of the youth (female = 1), the sex of the head of household (female = 1), the youth's age band corresponding to the appropriate level of schooling (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary), whether the household has at least one member registered with UNHCR (yes = 1), the household's location in Syria in 2010 (fixed effects by anonymised governorate), and the household's current location in Lebanon at the time of the survey (fixed effects by Qadha). By incorporating these controls, the models account for demographic and geographic heterogeneity that could otherwise confound the relationship between household characteristics and school attendance.

## 5 Results and Discussion

After running analysis on the six operationalised independent variables, three key factors are identified as having a significant impact on the likelihood of a young displaced person being in school in Lebanon.

In answering the first question, I looked at the HoH's years of education. In *Figure 2*, the coefficients show that for each one year of schooling the HoH has completed, there is a 11.5 per cent to 14.8 per cent increase in the odds that the youth is in school, holding all other factors constant. This is in line with previous research on household factors contributing to decisions about education, showing the importance of the intergenerational education outcomes. This relationship is stable across the model specifications, including location fixed effects. To further review this relationship and if it holds across all levels of education, in *Figure 3*, I look at the marginal effects of this relationship, disaggregated by the youth's age-expected level of schooling and sex (using Primary Controls model). In this figure it is clear that Primary School aged students are most likely to be in school at any amount of HoH years of education. Youth of Pre-Primary Education and Secondary School ages are the least likely to be in school at all HoH years of education, following similar characteristics to the 2006 Syrian education trends, though with even lower likelihood of youths being in school, even at high levels of HoH education. Parity of access across the sexes is also visible in *Figure 3*, with almost no difference between the likelihood of male and female participation rates.

To examine the second question of the study, I looked first at the effect of months displaced, then of the exposure to violence pre-displacement. As seen in *Figure 2*, for each month that a head of household has been displaced, there is between 1.6 per cent and 2.1 per cent increase in the odds that the youth is attending school, holding all other factors constant. This result suggests that when the system allows displaced groups to access schooling, once households have become settled, they may seek to enrol their youth in schooling. The effect is consistent




Figure 2: Coefficient Plot showing the odds ratios for the effect of months displaced, HoH years of education, and exposure to conflict on displaced youth schooling attendance in Lebanon (2015-16).

Baseline models include no control variables. Partial Controls include: sex of youth, sex of head of household, age band of youth, age of head of household, and log of household size. The months displaced and exposure to conflict models also includes if the head of household lived in secure housing in 2010. The Full Control models include all partial controls, plus the location in Syria in 2010, and location in Lebanon.

and stable across model specifications. In the period of analysis, some policy changes within Lebanon in response to significant inflation from the rapid increase in population and following a severe drought in 2014 may have affected the conditions for both displaced people and host communities in accessing schools. In addition, the results also may not hold in later years, due to further policy changes such as requiring refugee registration to access schooling.

Conflict exposure represents a key driver of educational outcomes; accordingly, the analysis next examines pre-displacement exposure to violence. The coefficient for this model shows that for every 1,000 deaths per quarter in Syria, the youth is between 1.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent less likely to be attending school in Lebanon, holding all other variables constant. Again, the clustered standard errors and confidence intervals are small and consistent across model specifications. This effect is in line with earlier research that increased exposure to conflict pre-displacement may affect the household or the youth's mental health, concern for the youth's wellbeing, or align with households with fewer resources to leave Syria and requirements for the youth to work (Assaf, Nuwayhid, & Habib, 2024; Shemyakina, 2011). This finding adds to this literature, and demonstrates the importance of continued research and initiatives that discern the explicit effects of conflict on young people, and potential inter-generational impacts from




Figure 3: Marginal effects plot showing the predicted probability of school enrolment of displaced youths (2015-16) by the HoH years of education, disaggregated by the expected schooling level (by age) and sex of the displaced youths in Lebanon (2015-16).

The results show that Primary School aged youths are the most likely age group to be in school, across all levels of HoH education. There is very minor difference between the two sexes in school participation.

their reduced engagement with schooling.

To explore the third question of the study, I show the results of the three operationalisations of socio-economic status in *Figure 4*. Due to data limitations in the survey, introduced to protect respondent anonymity, these operationalisations provide imperfect and imprecise measures of socio-economic conditions. This imprecision stems primarily from the use of binary measurements and from substantial omitted variables, particularly those capturing the effects of conflict within Syria on economic conditions and living standards. Nonetheless, they represent the best available measures in the dataset. Each of the analyses resulted in statistically insignificant results, with large confidence intervals and standard errors. There appears to be no consistent relationship between secure housing in 2010 and the outcome of interest, suggesting confounding rather than a robust association. The relationship between socioeconomic status and educational attainment is well established in the literature (Saasa, 2018; Tamayo Martinez, Xerxa, Law, Serdarevic, Jansen, & Tiemeier, 2022; Vo, Vo, & Ho, 2023), and the analyses below do not provide sufficiently strong evidence to challenge these existing findings.




Figure 4: Coefficient Plot showing the odds ratios for the effect of HoH secure housing, household meeting basic needs, and HoH employment status at flight on displaced youth schooling attendance in Lebanon (2015-16).

Baseline models include no control variables. Partial Control models include: sex of youth, sex of head of household, age band of youth, age of head of household, log of household size, and months the head of household has been displaced. The Full Control models include all partial controls, plus the location in Syria in 2010, location in Lebanon, and if the youth is in a household with at least one member registered with UNHCR.

## 6 Conclusion

This study sought to increase knowledge on the factors affecting young people's access to schooling after displacement. Using the World Bank's 2015-16 survey of people displaced from Syria to Lebanon, it analysed how the education levels of senior members of the household, timing of flight and exposure to violence, and pre-displacement socio-economic conditions shape school attendance of displaced school-aged youths.

The analysis found that the HoH years of education have a strong impact on the likelihood the youth is attending school, though this is conditional on the age band of the youth, with differing outcomes at each level of education. The length of time displaced and the pre-displacement exposure to violence were also found to have a statistically significant relationship to likelihood of the youth attending school.

This topic requires greater attention from research and policy to ensure that the inter-generational affects of reduced schooling do not propel these young people into a continuing loop of disadvantage. These findings show that programs supporting education and schooling for displaced groups should focus attention on groups already facing inequalities, and supporting those who

have been surrounded by traumatic events. The focus of this paper has been the first 5 years of significant displacement from Syria, though with many heads of households leaving Syria before the increase in violence, there is a need to focus on the differing experiences of households affected by the crisis in different ways.

This topic would benefit from increased focus on the longitudinal affects of prolonged displacement, as well as incorporating education outcome measurements in the analysis, and voices of displaced groups directly. A limitation of this study has been the single point in time that the survey was completed, though combining this information with the later surveys from the World Bank would provide a more comprehensive picture, and also illuminate the impacts of Lebanon's policy shifts. A further limitation has been the lack of displaced persons in this analysis due to the nature of the research. Future research that draws on this lived experience and expertise would improve the accuracy of the analysis. Finally, this study has focused on retaining access to schooling of any kind, though a focus on the education outcomes achieved, and acknowledging the many barriers from access, to achievement, to matriculation from schooling would be a useful extension of the study.

## **7 Data availability statement**

Data is available through application to the World Bank Microdata Library and from the UCDP website. Replication code will be provided by the author upon publication.

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## 9 Appendix: Regression Results

Table 2: Regression results for HoH Years of Education, Months Displaced and Exposure to Conflict in previous Quarter before displacement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	HoH YoE			Is the young person in school now?			BRD		
	Baseline	Partial	Full	Baseline	Partial	Full	Baseline	Partial	Full
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
Years of Education (HoH)	0.115*** (0.018)	0.148*** (0.022)	0.118*** (0.025)						
Female Youth		0.015 (0.101)	0.008 (0.107)		0.031 (0.098)	0.021 (0.105)		0.015 (0.098)	0.0002 (0.105)
Female HoH		-0.236 (0.257)	-0.093 (0.284)		-0.517** (0.258)	-0.293 (0.279)		-0.448* (0.253)	-0.241 (0.271)
Age HoH		0.0005 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)		-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
Household size (log)		-0.735*** (0.239)	-0.525** (0.262)		-0.875*** (0.236)	-0.583** (0.258)		-0.843*** (0.237)	-0.559** (0.258)
Lived in Secure Housing (2010)					0.131 (0.823)	0.034 (0.865)		0.040 (0.831)	-0.062 (0.871)
Months Displaced (HoH)				0.016*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)			
BRD (Scaled, Lagged)							-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.008)
Constant	-0.722*** (0.115)	1.442*** (0.495)	1.340** (0.577)	-0.741*** (0.203)	1.691* (0.950)	1.202 (1.022)	0.140 (0.104)	2.761*** (0.935)	2.319** (1.010)
Observations	2,020	2,020	2,020	2,039	2,037	2,037	2,039	2,037	2,037
Log Likelihood	-1,348.135	-1,125.348	-1,042.343	-1,399.468	-1,183.606	-1,069.581	-1,401.194	-1,188.083	-1,076.571
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,700.271	2,268.696	2,162.686	2,802.935	2,387.212	2,219.162	2,806.388	2,396.166	2,233.143

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at the household level) in parentheses.

Note: Fixed effect coefficients for age band, 2010 Origin Governorate (Syria), Current Location (Lebanon) are not included for space. These results are available on request. Baseline models include no control variables. Partial Controls include: sex of youth, sex of head of household, age band of youth, age of head of household, and log of household size. The months displaced and exposure to conflict models also includes if the head of household lived in secure housing in 2010. The Full Control models include all partial controls, plus the location in Syria in 2010, and location in Lebanon.

Table 3: Regression results for HoH Years of Education, Time Displaced and Exposure to Violence in previous Quarter before displacement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Is the young person in school now?								
	Basic Needs Baseline	Basic Needs Partial	Basic Needs Full	Employment Baseline	Employment Partial	Employment Full	Sec Housing Baseline	Sec Housing Partial	Sec Housing Full
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Met Basic Needs (HH) (2010)	-0.119 (0.147)	-0.124 (0.169)	-0.091 (0.180)						
Female Youth		0.033 (0.098)	0.028 (0.105)		0.038 (0.098)	0.030 (0.105)		0.031 (0.098)	0.024 (0.105)
Female HoH		-0.505* (0.258)	-0.306 (0.280)		-0.442 (0.292)	-0.272 (0.318)		-0.517** (0.258)	-0.311 (0.279)
Age HoH		-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)		-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)		-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
Months Displaced (HOH)		0.020*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)		0.020*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)		0.020*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)
Household Size (log)		-0.876*** (0.237)	-0.605** (0.261)		-0.878*** (0.237)	-0.609** (0.260)		-0.875*** (0.236)	-0.604** (0.260)
Child of UNHCR Reg HH			0.185 (0.228)			0.182 (0.227)			0.176 (0.228)
Employed (HoH) (At Flight)				0.152 (0.145)	0.113 (0.184)	0.067 (0.201)			
Lived in Secure Housing (2010)							-0.105 (0.700)	0.131 (0.823)	0.011 (0.868)
Constant	-0.014 (0.127)	1.909*** (0.513)	1.180* (0.618)	-0.208* (0.124)	1.764*** (0.507)	1.072* (0.610)	0.000 (0.697)	1.691* (0.950)	1.095 (1.026)
Observations	2,039	2,039	2,039	2,039	2,039	2,039	2,037	2,037	2,037
Log Likelihood	-1,410.015	-1,183.590	-1,069.721	-1,409.493	-1,183.779	-1,069.865	-1,409.198	-1,183.606	-1,069.016
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,824.029	2,387.179	2,221.441	2,822.986	2,387.557	2,221.729	2,822.397	2,387.212	2,220.032

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at the household level) in parentheses.

Note: Fixed effect coefficients for age band, 2010 Origin Governorate (Syria), Current Location (Lebanon) are not included for space. These results are available on request. Baseline models include no control variables. Partial Control models include: sex of youth, sex of head of household, age band of youth, age of head of household, log of household size, and months the head of household has been displaced. The Full Control models include all partial controls, plus the location in Syria in 2010, location in Lebanon, and if the youth is in a household with at least one member registered with UNHCR.