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Angry men and Civic women?
Gendered effects of conflict on political participation

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Abstract We study the effect of the 1998-99 Kosovo war on current levels of political participation, disaggregating our analysis by the type of conflict experience, namely death or injury to self or a family member, or displacement, and by gender. We show that conflict is associated with more political participation, but with important distinctions between genders in terms of the form of participation and the experience itself. Displacement is associated with more voting among women, but not among men, and with more demonstrating by men but weaker or no effects for women; death and injury are associated with more political party membership for men, but not women. We argue that while experiences of conflict do generally increase levels of political participation, the form that this takes varies by gender, with effects on private, civic, action among women, and effects on direct, public, active, arguably more emotionally heightened engagement among men.

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Introduction

The literature on the impacts of traumatic experiences suggest that victimisation can lead to either political apathy or to an increased willingness to engage with political processes.[1] Empirical analyses focusing on conflict have overwhelmingly supported the latter: political participation is bolstered by war victimisation.[2] This effect is generally explained by post-traumatic growth (Blattman, 2009) or an instrumentalisation of victimisation in political claims (Freitag et al., 2019).

However, these findings seem disconnected from the broader literature on political participation which has emphasised important gender differences. Women have often been shown to participate less in politics than men (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010, Paxton et al., 2021) from voting and membership of different groups, to representation in political parties and in elected positions. But conflict has the potential to shake gender norms and open new opportunities for women (Petesch, 2018), warranting an investigation of the gendered impact of conflict on political participation. The literature is however mostly silent on the gendered effects of conflict on political participation.

We bridge this gap with an analysis of political participation in post-war Kosovo, paying particular attention to econometric challenges of identification. Our gendered analysis makes several contributions to the literature on the relationship between war victimisation and political participation. Firstly, there is much to gain from a gendered analysis: the drivers of political participation differ along gender lines. Secondly, other strands of literature can be used to suggest that the impact of conflict on political participation should differ along gender lines, including qualitative investigation of the impact of victimisation or macro-quantitative studies of the impact of different forms of peace settlement (e.g. Bakken and Buhaug, 2021).

Finally, in the context of Kosovo, it appears particularly fruitful to distinguish different forms of conflict victimisation, with in particular displacement having radically different consequences than having experienced death or injury during the war, when these different forms of victimisation have often been investigated jointly in other contexts (e.g. Bellows and Miguel, 2009). Our results are robust to specification choices, including different fixed effects, and also following Oster (2019), to selection on unobservables.

We also highlight a key data gap: the ability to trace respondents who have moved after the conflict turns out to be important for the results presented. Estimations focusing on a sample of non-movers only suggest that there is no effect of victimisation on voting in the mixed-gender sample. Women are however over-represented in the sample of movers (as in traditional societies like Kosovo, they are more likely to move closer to their in-laws for example) and yet movers are often excluded from empirical analysis (e.g. Child and Nikolova, 2019).

Conflict in Kosovo

From the 1970s, Kosovo was a relatively autonomous region within Yugoslavia, but increasingly discriminatory and discretionary policies against the Albanian majority of Kosovo fuelled by the rise of Serbian nationalism (Carter, 1993, Ogden, 2000; RIINVEST, 2007) escalated in the so-called 'Kosovo War' of 1998–1999.

Intense ethnic violent confrontations between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces consisting of Serbia and Montenegro led to an 11-week North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign in spring 1999 against Serbian forces, which in turn led a counter-insurgency against civilians before capitulating and

withdrawing armed forces from Kosovo in June 1999, bringing the official end of the war and the creation of the United Nations administered province of Kosovo that same month (Oxford University, 2000). In the lead up to the war, civil protests had become increasingly violent and as recently as 2015/2016 (the period of the survey data we use in this paper) ongoing ethnic tensions could still erupt into violence.[3]

Despite the brevity of the Kosovo war compared to the earlier Bosnian and Croatian Yugoslavian wars, its impact was severe, marked by attacks on civilians and massive movements of people (see Alva et al., 2002) and resulted in dramatic losses in physical, human and social capital as well as insecurity over ownership of land and other assets (Smit, 2006). Approximately 70% of the populated area was affected by the NATO air strike (European Commission, 1999). Between 10,000 and 12,000 Albanians and over 3,000 Serbs lost their lives, mostly during confrontations between the Yugoslav military, Serbian police and Serbian paramilitary forces on one side and the KLA on the other (Sklias and Roukanas, 2007).[4] The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that half a million ethnic Albanians were displaced within Kosovo during the conflict and an additional 800,000 moved to neighbouring countries, from a pre-conflict population of 2 million (World Bank, 2001; p. 15).[5]

The immediate impact on citizens' lives and livelihoods was immense. Ogden (2000) and Westley and Mikhalev (2002) document the severe constraints facing households while Douarin et al. (2012) also evidence some limited opportunities on livelihood choices in Kosovo in the aftermath of the conflict.

Evidence of victimisation can be found in numerous reports. The United States Department of State (1999) summarises evidence collected from extensive field interviews, noting the

extent of violence and trauma experienced by the population overall. However, the report especially emphasises violence against women, as Serbian forces were encouraged to rape and abuse civilian women. It is estimated that several thousand women may have been abused during the conflict, with figures varying widely due to the stigma attached to this form of victimisation and the victims' silence on the topic (RFE RL, 2014).

After the war, Kosovo was administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).[6] UNMIK was the UN and NATO mandated mission with the aim to secure peace in the region according to Security Council Resolution 1244 (United Nations, 1999). On 17 February 2008 the Kosovo Assembly declared the country independent, supported by the International Court of Justice in 2010.

Today Kosovo is recognized as an independent country by 115 countries. According to its constitution, it has a democratic parliamentary system, consisting of 120 members, with 20 seats reserved for minorities (ten for the Serbian minority and ten for other minorities). Elections are held every four years. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections has hovered around 42-48% since the early 2000s, around 10 percentage points lower than neighbouring Albania and North Macedonia (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021). Gender representation in parliament is secured through legislation that requires electoral lists and the overall parliament to have 30% female candidates, although in the recent 2021 elections, women won almost 40% of the seats. These quotas have been in place since 2000 and have led to a more inclusive representation of minorities and often under-represented groups in decision-making. However, women's participation in grassroot activism and political actions remains low, as we illustrate below.

Literature review

Conflict and political participation

One of the paradoxes of conflict is that it can be both a destructive and a creative force for development. Conflict is often portrayed as "development in reverse", destroying lives, livelihoods and infrastructure and with long legacies (Collier et al ,2003; Gates et al,2012). Yet conflict can also challenge economic, political and social norms and create opportunities for change.[7] Some of these new opportunities arise through formal, negotiated peace-settlements which reform or create new democratic institutions, power sharing and territorial representation. Although there is contested evidence from cross-country studies about the extent to which these contribute to peace (Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017) or development (Stewart and Daga, 2017), their success relies on the ability and willingness of ordinary citizens to engage and participate in them.

There are several cross-country studies which explore the impact of conflict on political participation and suggest that conflict provokes higher levels of political participation, more collective action, more prosocial behaviour and higher degrees of altruism. Grosjean (2014) explores the impact of World War II and more recent civil conflicts on social and political preferences in thirty-five European countries. Using self-reported data from the 2010 Life in Transition survey on whether survey respondents were themselves injured or had a parent or grandparent who was injured or killed in conflict, she finds evidence of increased degrees of political participation. Victims, or their close relatives, of conflict were more likely to be members of a political party, to join collective groups (religious, educational, professional) and to participate in strikes, demonstrations, or petitions.

Similarly, other studies generally support the finding of an increase in political participation post-conflict. Bellows and Miguel (2009) focus on Sierra Leone, using a similar concept of victimhood as Grosjean but adding in forced displacement, and find significant positive effects of victimhood on collective action such as attendance at community meetings, group membership, and political group participation, as well as higher political engagement, such as registering to vote, and greater contribution to public goods, for example helping with road maintenance and sitting on school committees. Blattman (2009) focusing on former combatants, including young men who were abducted[8] and forced to fight in the Lord's Resistance Army, in Uganda, finds that abductees had higher levels of voting and community leadership than other combatants.[9]

Further evidence is found in studies relying on local measures of conflict intensity. De Luca and Vertoorten (2015a) use data on conflict events in Uganda and find that people exposed to a higher degree of conflict had higher levels of some forms of political participation, from engaging in political discussions and attending meetings, but were less likely to vote. Adhvaryu and Fenske (2013) use locality-level battle deaths to explore the impact of conflict on political behaviour for seventeen African countries and find that exposure to war decreases collective action (for men) although an increase in interest in politics is also found.

Bauer et al. (2016) report on a meta-analysis of 16 distinct studies and find small but positive effects of conflict on voting and interest in politics, and larger positive effects on social group participation, community leadership and participation and pro-social attitudes.

Despite this apparent consistency, the validity of these results is sometimes debated, as victimhood is often measured through self-reporting, and without information on pre-war political participation. Self-reported victimisation could lead to biased results if victims are

"selected" based on their pre-war engagement, or if self-reporting is affected by measurement error or recall bias. To alleviate the former concern, contextual presentation of the conflict and the patterns of victimisation is useful. In Kosovo, the indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Serbs can credibly be argued to have been orthogonal to pre-conflict political engagement once ethnicity and location are accounted for. Some authors have presented evidence of the absence of selection into victimisation (Blattman, 2009) or use pre-war characteristics and analyse subsamples less likely to suffer from selection bias, namely young men and remote communities (Bellows and Miguel,2009).

Child and Nikolova (2020) suggest a way to address the concern about self-reported data and measurement error. They use the same survey data as Grosjean (2014) but data from Ellis (1993) on World War II battles and frontlines. Their analysis shows that substituting the self-reported victimization data with Ellis's arguably more objective, external data leads to a reversal of conclusions. While the self-reported measures show a positive correlation with political participation, the opposite is true for the external measures of conflict. They also show that the positive relationship reduces substantially upon inclusion of individual characteristics that are likely correlated with the reporting errors, calling into question the reliability of self-reported data. However, Blattman (2009) underscores the importance of personal experience over local incidence of conflict, by explaining the effect of victimisation on political participation as a reaction to heavy trauma leading to a growth mindset. Similarly, Grosjean (2014) emphasises the non-trivial personal experiences analysed and supports her findings by showing a high level of correlation between self-reported data and more objective local measures of conflict intensity.[10]

We present an up-to-date review of the field in Table A1 in Supplementary Material, where we have listed the key findings and information about whether victimisation was self-reported or measured from an external source. We note that conflict victimisation seems more often associated with positive change in political participation when it is measured as individual-level self-reported victimisation, credibly implying that it is personal experience that matters rather than exposure to contextual conflict. Table A1 also reports how gender has been dealt with in the literature to date, highlighting a clear gap. Gender is often addressed through only a dummy, and only a handful of papers comment on its sign and significance. Only two studies discuss explicitly whether the effect of victimisation differ by gender (Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2013, and Garcia-Ponce, 2017), both reporting differential effects.

Political participation and gender

Female political participation has lagged behind that of men in most countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Paxton et al., 2021), and explanations have often centred on differences in endowments or resources.[11] But gender norms might also play a role (Verba et al. 1997). Cross-country differences in the gender gap in political participation are linked to modernisation, with post-industrial societies displaying more gender-equal attitudes and smaller participation gaps (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

Accordingly, a more recent scholarship has evidenced a tendency for women to engage in voting (more frequently than men in some contexts) or in other forms of "private" political activism, such as signing a petition, donating or raising funds, or boycotting specific goods, while men appeared more likely to engage in public collective action (for example

demonstrating) or direct contact activities (such as discussing politics in public forums, contacting politicians or the media) (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). This relative specialisation by gender could reflect differences in preferences or may align with social expectations of activities for which men and women gain social recognition differentially (Cruz and Tolentino, 2019).

Some have suggested that the egalitarian stance promoted within the communist ideology should, or could, have led to women being relatively more engaged and interested in politics in post-communist countries, to a smaller gender gap in engagement, and in their preferred forms of engagement (de Vries and O'Brien, 2020). However behind the discourse of gender equality promoted under communism, household chores and child-raising duties were still very much born by women, often generating a "double burden" (Gal and Kligman, 2000), while at the same time politically active women were often relegated to non-decision roles, filling token or "milkmaid" positions (Hanley, 2003). In fact, political interests and participation tend to be low overall in the post-communist region (Hutcheson and Korosteleva, 2006), but are even lower among women (Coffé, 2013), possibly reflecting a "retraditionalization" of gender roles following the fall of communism (Motiejūnaitė, 2010).[12]

Conflict and gender roles

The literature on the micro-level consequences of conflict has often focused on men (McKay 2004, Annan et al. 2009) fuelling an accepted narrative of men as fighters and women as passive victims. As a result, many studies on the impact of conflict on collective action and social cohesion either explicitly focus on men (Blattman, 2009), or limit their analysis of gender to the inclusion of a dummy variable controlling for gender in their specification (Bellows and Miguel, 2009, Bauer et al., 2016 among others, see Table A1).

The gendered experience of conflict has consequently been ignored or oversimplified. But efforts to change the narrative exist, for example evidencing that women have played active roles in conflicts, as fighters, supporters and protestors (Annan et al. 2011, Garcia-Ponce, 2017, Henshaw, 2016). But quantitative evidence on the consequences of conflict is often still silent on potential gendered differences, with the exception of studies focusing on the economic consequences of conflict.[13]

For political participation, this oversight is problematic as women tend to be under-represented and less politically active than men. Furthermore, there is support for the notion that female political empowerment is important for peace, especially grass-root civil society engagement (Dahlum et al., 2020), and that gender-based inequality is associated with a greater likelihood of conflict (Bjarnegård et al., 2015). It is key to understand therefore whether conflict contributes to closing or widening existing gaps in participation.

There is a rich social science literature positing that conflict experience could challenge social norms (Petesch, 2018), and integrating these insights into the quantitative study of the consequences of conflict seems overdue, especially for outcomes outside the realms of economic activities. Bakken and Buhaug (2021) set out pathways through which conflict might affect women's empowerment, from a demand-effect as women take on larger roles in families, enterprises and government, as well as in combat, through a pathway of increased mobilisation via grass-roots projects and self-help groups during and after conflict, and through changing normative perceptions of the roles of women. Tripp (2015) suggests that women's rights greatly advanced in post-conflict states in sub-Saharan Africa, while Burnet (2008) explains that women's groups were given greater space to develop in post conflict Rwanda. However, these elements of progress have not always led to long term changes.

Kindervater and Meintjes (2018) present them as short-lived, with specific gains in participation and representation being lost in the medium run once competitive electoral politics resumed. Webster et al. (2019) present a cross-country analysis suggesting that changes in gender norms are more likely when gender roles are challenged during conflict and if conflict had ended with a regime change. Bakken and Buhaug (2021), in their study of conflict in 160 countries between 1975 and 2017, suggest that negotiated settlements, and those with specific gender provisions, yield the biggest impacts. [14]

The evidence on Kosovo and the broader Balkans region is limited. The literature suggests both a gendered experience of conflict and a gendered impact on political participation. Kellezi and Reicher (2014) present evidence from 38 in-depth interviews suggesting that personal experience of war victimisation in Kosovo was potentially more traumatic for women, as female experiences were more likely to affect their identity through the prism of social norms, and because women were generally more strongly psychologically affected by trauma than men. Regarding conflict and political participation, presenting results from an experiment conducted in Bosnia, Hadzic and Tavits (2019) demonstrate that when conflict is made salient, men express more desire to engage in politics, while women express a reduced desire to do so, suggesting a contrasting impact of the conflict on political engagement along gender lines.

Methodology

Empirical strategy

We examine the impact of war victimisation during the Kosovo war in 1998-99 on individual levels of political participation in 2016. We use an empirical approach typical of the quantitative literature (see Bauer et al., 2016) as summarised in Equation 1.

Specifically, we regress indicators of different forms of political participation (PP_{ij}) against a set of respondents' characteristics (X_{ij}), their self-reported war experience (C_{ij}), and a set of ethnicity and location-specific fixed effects, reflecting either primary sampling units or municipalities (L_j), as explained below. Departing from the extant literature, we split our sample between female and male respondents to discuss differential impacts along gender lines (see Equations 2 and 3 respectively).

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \;\; if \; gender = F \quad (2)$$

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \; if \; gender = M \quad (3)$$

The survey data we use include a rich set of political behaviours, allowing us to investigate gender differences regarding voting, participating in different forms of protest or joining a political party. We are also able to measure conflict experience along several dimensions including being displaced during the conflict or having a family member killed or injured during the war.

To address issues relating to endogeneity, we adopt three strategies, exploring selection on observables, measurement error in the war experience variables, and possible omitted variable bias using the method suggested by Oster (2019), described below.

Data and key variables

We use the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS3), a large household survey fielded between 2015 and 2016 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 34 countries. The Kosovan sample includes 1500 households randomly selected within 75 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), by means of stratified sampling clustered by region and level of urbanity. These PSUs are small and "are electoral districts, polling station territories, census enumeration districts or geo-administrative divisions" (Child and Nikolova, 2020, page 4). Small rural municipalities will typically include one PSU, while larger urban municipalities might include more than one.

In each household, a primary respondent was selected randomly among the eligible adults (18 years old or more). This selection criteria is conveniently also appropriate for a study focusing on political participation as all respondents are legally eligible to vote in Kosovo.

Political Participation variables

The survey includes six questions capturing political participation: two of which might be considered "private" in the typology suggested by Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010), namely voting in local and in parliamentary elections, and a set of more active, collective "public" forms of participation, namely membership of a political party, taking part in a strike, signing a petition and joining a lawful demonstration.

Whether the respondent is a member of a political party, has voted in the more recent local elections or has voted in the most recent national (i.e. parliamentary) elections are coded simply as yes/no binary dummies.

For the other three questions, respondents were asked if they would take part (hypothetically), have taken part or would never take part. Because the responses to these

questions capture both actual and hypothetical actions, we construct two dummies for each. The first dummy groups actual participation and a stated willingness to participate, with the reference being would never take part, thus capturing willingness to participate (hypothetical or real) versus unwillingness (called strike1, petition1 and demonstration1 in Table 1). The second set captures actual participation versus non-participation, regardless of whether the respondent says they hypothetically might take part (called strike2, petition2 and demonstration2 in Table 1). We use this more explicit definition of actual participation (i.e. strike2, petition2 and demonstration2) in our main analysis, and test the robustness of our results using the broader "willingness" definition.

[Table 1: Political participation by gender]

We summarise these variables by gender in Table 1. We note that for all forms of political participation, women participate significantly less than men, with relatively smaller gaps found in voting. The differences between men and women are smaller for the more explicit definition of participation in strikes, petitions and demonstrations, providing a more rigorous test of gender differences.

War experience variables

The LiTS3 survey asks respondents about their experience of the war with three questions: (i) whether or not the respondent or a family member was injured during the conflict, (ii) if a family member was killed or (iii) whether the family was displaced during the conflict. These questions are in line with those used elsewhere in the literature to construct measures of conflict victimisation (e.g. Blattman, 2009 or Cassar et al., 2013).

It is possible that the experience and effect of displacement differs from other forms of victimisation. Displaced people may return home with new values reflecting experiences they have had while abroad. Exposure to different institutions abroad may explain changes in political participation, rather, or in addition to, the trauma of experiencing war. Ivlevs (2021) finds that migrants who stay in more democratic host countries, acquire, and sometimes transmit to their peers, values that are more democratic. Rather than create a single variable capturing any war experience, we explore the separate effect of these two forms of victimisation (see Table 2). [15]

[Table 2 War Experiences]

Controls

We present two models, one with arguably only exogenous variables that should not have been affected by the conflict, namely age, gender and ethnicity, parental education, [16] and a second which includes the respondent's own education, noting that this might have been affected by the war for some of the respondents. These models are presented by way of a robustness check.

Descriptive Statistics

Further descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Nearly as many women as men were interviewed in the LiTS3 survey in Kosovo. Respondents are on average 43 years old. About 50% of the respondents have reached secondary education, just under 20% have some tertiary education. Women are less educated than men, and similarly the reported education of the mothers of respondents is lower than that of their fathers. Women are also less likely to work illustrating the fairly conservative and traditional values prevalent in Kosovo.

Importantly, the level of victimisation does not differ significantly across gender: men and women are as likely to report having a household member that was killed or injured during the conflict, and as likely to have been displaced. However, as already noted their experience of the conflict is likely to have been very different, with victimisation likely to trigger differing responses.

[Table 3 Descriptive Statistics]

Location-specific fixed effects and dealing with movers

Our specifications differ in terms of sample and fixed effects. Specifications 1 and 2 are based on the full sample of respondents (excluding only those with missing data) and include fixed effects for the municipality of residence at the time at which they took the survey. Some of the largest municipalities include several PSU, so specifications 3 and 4 disaggregate these fixed effects and include PSU dummies instead. These regressions control for the local context in which current political participation is taking place and are shown in columns 1-4 of each table.

In the survey, 1227 people out of 1500 report living today where they were living during the conflict. Among the remaining 273 respondents, the questionnaire allowed us to establish that 209 (150 of which are women) had relocated to their current place of residence after the conflict had finished and had reported having moved from their place or birth. Hence, we were able to establish the place of residence during the conflict of 1436 respondents, as being their place of birth or their current place of residence. In specifications 5 and 6, we restrict our sample to the non-movers, i.e. who lived at the time they took the survey in the same location as during the conflict: this sample is smaller and in particular excludes a disproportionately large number of women. But in these specifications, the PSU-level fixed

effects absorb both information pertaining to the local conflict intensity and the context in which respondents are currently politically active.

Finally, specifications 7 and 8 include the additional 209 respondents (three-quarters of whom are women) who moved after the conflict but for whom we can identify their place of residence during the conflict, but only at the municipality level, capturing respondent's exposure to conflict intensity at the municipality level (which we refer to as location in the tables). Finally, in all cases standard errors are clustered at the PSU-level (at current location).[17]

Endogeneity

To be able to argue that we are estimating a causal effect of victimisation we need war experiences to be randomly distributed across the population. We address this by examining selection on observables, measurement error in the war experience variables and selection on unobservables.

Selection on observables

In Kosovo, conflict violence was reported to be indiscriminate, as the Serbs engaged in violence against civilians purely based on their ethnicity. According to the OSCE (1999), "No-one, it seems, was immune, as people of all ages, including women and children, were killed in large numbers". Similarly, during the NATO air-strike, the extent of the bombing and the small size of the country led to extensive and broadly distributed damage, with civilian casualties arising "by mistakes" rather than through any form of targeting. Overall, this supports the idea that within ethnic groups and within locations of residence during the war, victimisation should be orthogonal to pre-conflict political participation. However, there is some evidence in other contexts that displacement is not random (Engel and Ibañez, 2007

and Ibáñez et al, 2019): it is possible that displacement reflects a weighing up of the expected economic, social and psychic costs of moving versus staying.

We assess the likelihood of selection into victimisation by estimating models using the controls and fixed effects described above. The results are shown in Table A2 and suggest that selection on observables is not an issue: none of our controls are significant beyond age, once we control for ethnicity and location fixed effects. We note that it is reasonable for older respondents to be more frequently found among the war victims. Indeed, whether we look at the determinants of (i) being displaced, (ii) reporting a household member as injured or killed during the conflict, or (iii) both (i.e. conflict affected- any) there is no sign of selection on observables.

Measurement error

Another concern regarding causality is that victimisation is "self-reported" and potentially subject to reporting biases. We however analyse victimisation within narrowly defined PSU or (slightly larger) municipalities. As data on objective measures of conflict intensity can only be aggregated at the municipality level, the effects that we will report are finer-grained, and imply that any effect identified for victimisation is measured *given* the objective level of exposure to conflict intensity experienced within a small locality, in other words: we are measuring the effect of being personally directly affected by the conflict rather than exposed to a certain contextual intensity of violence. Implicitly, we are assuming that any noise in measurement is orthogonal to political participation today, in keeping with the majority of the literature (e.g. Bellows and Miguel 2009 or Cassar et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, we illustrate the reliability of the self-reported measure of victimisation. Figure 1 plots the correlation between self-reported victimisation aggregated at the municipality of

residence during conflict and a measure of conflict intensity derived from the Housing Damage Assessment Survey (European Commission, 1999), an exercise conducted between February and July 1999 to evaluate the extent of damage inflicted on towns and villages during the war.[18] We use weights reflecting the number of respondents by location to account for the likely lower precision of the aggregate in areas were few respondents were interviewed. We find that municipality-level victimisation is significantly and positively correlated with damage.

[Figure 1 Correlation between self-reported and objective measures of conflict]

Selection on unobservables

We use Oster (2019) to assess whether unobservable variables could explain some of the effect of conflict victimisation on specific forms of political participation, and so discuss the robustness of our findings to potential omitted variable biases. For example, it is plausible that prior political activity increases the likelihood of conflict victimisation, although the literature for Kosovo suggests otherwise. Oster (2019) is a statistical method whereby a reasonable threshold of explanatory power (R-max) is set and then asks, given that threshold, how large the effects of unobservables would need to be in order for the confidence interval of the coefficient of interest to contain 0. Oster recommends R-max to be set at 1.3*R, where R is the R-square of the specification of interest. For completeness, we also present results for a more conservative thresholds of 2*R. We show the results of this analysis below.

Results

Voting and victimisation

We first present our results regarding voting in local and parliamentary elections. Table 4 presents the determinants of voting in local elections for the whole sample of respondents (men and women) with conflict victimisation being captured through two indicators, one for displacement and one for reporting someone was killed or injured in the household. In the odd-numbered specifications, we keep our controls to pre-war controls only and include age, age-squared, gender, education of the father and education of the mother, and ethnicity (note that the coefficients estimated for ethnicity are not reported in the tables). In the even numbered specifications, we add the respondent's own level of education, as it is usually an important driver of political participation, recognising that own education is a “dirty control” for at least some of the respondents.

Table 4 reveals that local voting is driven by parental education, with increasing levels of education of the father in particular being associated with a greater propensity to vote, men are significantly more likely to vote, and voting propensity has an inverted-U shape relationship with age.

Conflict victimisation seems only weakly relevant to voting, with our two conflict victimisation dummies being positively associated with voting in all specifications, but only displacement having any statistically significant effect, and that at only the 10% level, and in only two specifications (namely 1 and 2). While this small and weakly significant effect is in line with the literature (see the meta-analysis by Bauer et al., 2016), it is intriguing however that it is present here only in the specifications which include a larger number of female respondents.

[Table 4 Voting in Local Election – Full Sample]

Tables 5 and 6, reproduce Table 4, but for 2 distinct sub-groups. Table 5, in line with Equation 2, presents results for female respondents only, while Table 6 focuses on male respondents

(Equation 3).

Without presenting an overly detailed discussion of the controls in these tables, we note that the drivers of local voting are different, emphasising the importance of recognising the distinctly gendered prisms through which decisions regarding political participation are taken (see for example Cruz and Tolentino, 2019).

In addition to this, conflict victimisation is in fact only relevant for women, with larger, and more precisely estimated effects of displacement in all our specifications for women (Table 5), and much weaker, less precise and less robust results for male respondents (Table 6).

[Table 5 Voting in Local Election – Women Only]

[Table 6 Voting in Local Election – Men Only]

We repeat the analyses for parliamentary voting but for conciseness, we present only abridged tables from hereon in, with a single table divided in 3 panels for the full sample, women only and men only. We report only our key coefficients of interest, i.e. those pertaining to reporting a household member as killed or injured, or being displaced during the conflict.

The results in Table 7 regarding parliamentary voting show similar patterns to those reported for voting in local election: weakly significant positive effects are noted for the full sample, but only in models with a larger number of female respondents. The women-only sample shows consistently positive and statistically significant effects of displacement on voting, although these are weak.

[Table 7 Voting in Parliamentary Elections – varied samples]

Party membership, strikes, petitions and demonstrations

Regarding political party membership (Table 8), war victimisation seems to have bolstered this type of political engagement. However, in contrast to the more private and civic acts of voting, the effect is due this time to experiencing death and injuries in the household, and the effect seems to be born entirely from the male sample: men experiencing a war death or injury in the family are between 10 and 15 percentage points more likely to be party members than men who did not, and this is precisely estimated across all specifications.

For participating in demonstrations (Table 10), we find that men who have been displaced are more likely to demonstrate, the increased likelihood being of about 10 percentage points, and significant at least at the 5 percent level in all specifications presented. No significant effect is detected for women.

Two other forms of political participation were also analysed, namely taking part in a strike or signing a petition, the results are presented in Table 9 and Table 11 respectively but we will limit our discussion of these to saying that we find either no impact of conflict victimisation, or impacts that are weak and not robust across specifications.[19]

Tables 8, 9 , 10 and 11 about here

The main results relating to both the differences in effect identified by gender and the distinct role of different forms of victimisation of interest are summarised in Figure 2. For each sub-graph, the underlying specification is specification 7, that is, the specification with pre-conflict controls only, ethnicity fixed effects, and fixed effects at the municipality of residence during

the conflict.

Figure 2 about here

Robustness to omitted variable/unobservable bias

Using the same specification 7, we also implement Oster's method to investigate the degree to which unobservables can credibly threaten to overturn our results. The results are presented in Table 12. The first line of results focuses on the estimated effect of displacement on local voting on our sample of women only, and we see that unobservables would need to have a nearly five-time greater explanatory power as our observables overall, to explain away the positive effect we find for displacement on voting, using Oster's preferred threshold of Rmax=1.3*R. Results for the higher threshold of 2*R are consistent and show that unobservables would need to be 1.6 times more important than observables. We see similarly large and implausible values for the effect of conflict on other outcomes for women and for men. We can thus be confident that our results are robust to omitted variable biases, with the role of displacement on local voting and demonstration by women being particularly strong.

[Table 12 – Omitted variable bias]

Discussion

Our analysis has revealed effects which overall are in line with the results reported elsewhere in the literature (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009). In particular, the coefficients we have estimated for our mixed gender sample are fairly compatible with the average results in

this literature, as reported in Bauer et al. (2016). But our gendered analysis allows us to nuance these findings in important ways.

Regarding voting for example, we find that war victimisation is associated with a greater propensity to vote, but this effect is due to an increase in women's participation only. In contrast, the increase in demonstrating and in political party membership is exclusively driven by men. Hence, at least as recently as 2015/2016, the effects of conflict played out differently across men and women in line with the broader literature on political participation and gender.

While illustrating these distinctions is very important for our understanding of the link between victimisation and political participation, these results are however not surprising and reflect expected patterns of gendered specialisation in political engagement. They suggest that while victimisation can bolster political participation, in the case of Kosovo it does not appear to have been in a way that has challenged gender norms.

Building a broader comparative view of the effect of war victimisation on gendered patterns of political participation is a worthy research agenda. Are there contexts where conflict has had more equal effects across gender? Or are there specific conflicts that have challenged gender roles more and led to greater advancement of women' participation in more rebellious forms of political participation (such as demonstrating or protesting) or more active engagement in politics (i.e. such as joining a political party)?

Not all forms of conflict victimisation are the same. Displacement is likely to differ from death and injuries. First, although displacement in the context of Kosovo appears to have been orthogonal to respondent's characteristics, there may be contexts where displacement is partly driven by pre-conflict political engagement. Second, when displacement is to another

country, to conflict-associated trauma is added a layer of new experiences which might have different impact on political participation. Overall the mechanisms through which killed or injured versus displaced will impact on political participation may be different. In the context of Kosovo, it is particularly striking that displacement rather than other forms of victimisation is what has mattered for increasing political participation of women (both in local and parliamentary voting). While men who have experienced death and injuries are more likely to take part in the domestic political process (being a member of a political party), those who have been displaced appear more likely to express discontent (i.e. demonstrate).

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Figures

Figure 1 Correlation between self-reported victimisation aggregated at the municipality of residence during the conflict and weighted by the number of respondents (LITS3, 2016) and the extent of damage (EC, 1999)



Figure 2: Summary findings – Plots of coefficients estimated from specification 7 in tables (constant, controls, location and ethnicity fixed effects not reported).



In-text tables

(Tables 1-12)

Table 1: Political participation by gender

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men	(3) Difference
Voting (local)	0.719	0.812	0.093***
	(0.450)	(0.391)	(0.000)
Voting (parliament)	0.658	0.751	0.093***
	(0.475)	(0.432)	(0.001)
Political party member	0.064	0.137	0.072***
	(0.246)	(0.344)	(0.000)
Strike1 (yes and willing)	0.431	0.649	0.218***
	(0.496)	(0.478)	(0.000)
Strike2 (yes only)	0.058	0.151	0.094***
	(0.233)	(0.358)	(0.000)
Demonstration1 (yes and willing)	0.515	0.728	0.213***
	(0.500)	(0.445)	(0.000)
Demonstration2 (yes only)	0.105	0.224	0.120***
	(0.306)	(0.418)	(0.000)
Petition1 (yes and willing)	0.614	0.805	0.191***
	(0.487)	(0.396)	(0.000)
Petition2 (yes only)	0.176	0.313	0.136***
	(0.381)	(0.464)	(0.000)
Observations	765	735	1,500

Notes: strike1, demonstration1 and petition1 are defined such that actual participation in the past or a willingness to participate in the future are coded as 1, 0 otherwise; whereas strike2, demonstration2 and strike2 are defined such that only actual past participation are coded as 1, 0 otherwise.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: War experiences

Victimisation	Displaced		
Killed or injured	Yes	No	Total
Yes	237	112	349
No	202	949	1,151
Total	439	1,061	1,500

Table 3- Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLES	Sample Mean	Sample St. dev.	Women mean	Men mean	difference
Conflict affected (any)	0.367	0.482	0.370	0.365	-0.005
Killed or Injured	0.233	0.423	0.242	0.223	-0.019
Displaced	0.292	0.455	0.294	0.291	-0.003
Gender	0.490	0.500			
Age	43.161	16.235	42.784	43.554	0.769
Employment	0.527	0.499	0.302	0.761	0.459***
Own education (Secondary)	0.512	0.500	0.435	0.592	0.157***
Own education (Tertiary)	0.185	0.388	0.135	0.237	0.102***
Hh income (ln)	4.642	0.737	4.629	4.655	0.026
Father education (Secondary)	0.308	0.462	0.315	0.302	-0.013
Father education (Tertiary)	0.084	0.277	0.076	0.093	0.017
Mother education (Secondary)	0.177	0.382	0.184	0.170	-0.013
Mother education (Tertiary)	0.27	0.162	0.022	0.033	0.011

Table 4: Voting in Local election – Full sample

VARIABLES	(1) Local	(2) Local	(3) Local	(4) Local	(5) Local	(6) Local	(7) Local	(8) Local
Killed or Injured	0.024	0.023	0.041	0.039	0.023	0.023	0.032	0.031
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Displaced	0.054*	0.052*	0.014	0.015	0.029	0.030	0.046	0.046
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Age	0.016***	0.015***	0.017***	0.016***	0.018***	0.017***	0.015***	0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender	0.078***	0.064***	0.077***	0.056**	0.096***	0.078***	0.083***	0.069***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Own Education (Secondary)		0.022		0.050*		0.043		0.023
		(0.022)		(0.027)		(0.030)		(0.021)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.106**		0.133***		0.101**		0.101***
		(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.043)		(0.037)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.074***	0.057**	0.076**	0.055	0.062*	0.047	0.076***	0.059**
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.122***	0.093*	0.119**	0.086*	0.121**	0.095*	0.109***	0.081*
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.056	-0.065	-0.052	-0.060	-0.064	-0.067	-0.038	-0.046
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.229***	-0.244***	-0.207**	-0.223**	-0.211**	-0.220**	-0.244**	-0.256***
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.090)
Constant	0.174**	0.123	0.203*	0.182	0.188	0.178	-0.257**	-0.254*
	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.133)
Observations	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,142	1,142	1,339	1,339
R-squared	0.122	0.127	0.200	0.207	0.217	0.221	0.151	0.157
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Voting in Local election – Women only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local
Killed or Injured	-0.035	-0.037	-0.005	-0.009	-0.061	-0.065	-0.026	-0.029
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Displaced	0.152***	0.147***	0.130**	0.125**	0.188***	0.189***	0.134***	0.131***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Age	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.012*	0.013	0.014*	0.007	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		-0.016		0.025		-0.011		-0.021
		(0.032)		(0.045)		(0.052)		(0.030)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.125*		0.193**		0.147		0.102
		(0.069)		(0.075)		(0.110)		(0.066)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.132***	0.118**	0.110**	0.081	0.096	0.080	0.124***	0.115**
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.187**	0.150*	0.181**	0.120	0.193*	0.151	0.161**	0.128*
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.093	-0.110	-0.116**	-0.134**	-0.164**	-0.180**	-0.078	-0.093
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.365**	-0.394**	-0.343**	-0.378***	-0.435**	-0.460***	-0.366**	-0.389**
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.156)	(0.157)
Constant	0.272**	0.203	0.195	0.137	0.112	0.083	-0.049	-0.025
	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.183)	(0.191)	(0.181)	(0.186)
Observations	714	714	714	714	533	533	672	672
R-squared	0.160	0.168	0.256	0.268	0.311	0.319	0.182	0.188
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Voting in Local election – Men only

VARIABLES	(1) Local	(2) Local	(3) Local	(4) Local	(5) Local	(6) Local	(7) Local	(8) Local
Killed or Injured	0.057	0.057	0.077*	0.076*	0.056	0.058	0.059	0.060
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Displaced	-0.046	-0.045	-0.084*	-0.079	-0.075	-0.071	-0.037	-0.035
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Age	0.022***	0.021***	0.027***	0.026***	0.023***	0.021***	0.020***	0.018***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Age squared	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		0.055		0.076*		0.102**		0.065
		(0.036)		(0.043)		(0.044)		(0.040)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.108**		0.116**		0.103**		0.120**
		(0.043)		(0.050)		(0.045)		(0.047)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.021	0.004	0.062	0.045	0.055	0.043	0.035	0.016
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.048	0.026	0.083	0.063	0.108	0.094	0.057	0.033
	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.012	-0.015	0.019	0.019	-0.006	-0.002	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.109	-0.119	-0.057	-0.065	-0.082	-0.079	-0.153*	-0.161**
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Constant	0.330**	0.313**	0.174	0.153	0.269	0.238	-0.590***	-0.604***
	(0.145)	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.145)	(0.153)
Observations	686	686	686	686	609	609	667	667
R-squared	0.116	0.122	0.271	0.277	0.278	0.286	0.155	0.163
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Voting in Parliamentary election – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Parliament	(2) Parliament	(3) Parliament	(4) Parliament	(5) Parliament	(6) Parliament	(7) Parliament	(8) Parliament
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.018	0.017	0.034	0.032	0.020	0.020	0.033	0.032
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Displaced	0.074*	0.073*	0.016	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.066*	0.066*
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	-0.017	-0.017	0.000	-0.004	-0.047	-0.050	0.004	0.003
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Displaced	0.147**	0.140**	0.105*	0.102*	0.110*	0.112*	0.123*	0.118*
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.033	0.033	0.051	0.051	0.047	0.049	0.039	0.040
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Displaced	-0.016	-0.015	-0.059	-0.055	-0.058	-0.054	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Political Party Membership – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Party	(2) Party	(3) Party	(4) Party	(5) Party	(6) Party	(7) Party	(8) Party
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.078***	0.078***	0.051**	0.051**	0.048*	0.047*	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Displaced	-0.003	-0.004	0.003	0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.000	0.000	-0.015	-0.016	-0.021	-0.021	0.009	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Displaced	0.003	0.001	-0.025	-0.028	-0.050*	-0.051*	-0.012	-0.014
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.147***	0.147***	0.103**	0.103**	0.101**	0.102**	0.152***	0.153***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Displaced	-0.005	-0.005	0.027	0.029	0.024	0.026	0.005	0.006
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Participation in Strike – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Strike	(2) Strike	(3) Strike	(4) Strike	(5) Strike	(6) Strike	(7) Strike	(8) Strike
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	-0.002	-0.004	0.012	0.011	0.002	0.001	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Displaced	0.003	0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.019	0.017	0.001	-0.001	-0.008	-0.009	0.015	0.013
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Displaced	-0.008	-0.008	0.003	0.000	0.012	0.011	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	-0.032	-0.031	0.020	0.019	-0.004	-0.002	-0.028	-0.026
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Displaced	0.006	0.007	-0.010	-0.003	0.014	0.019	0.019	0.021
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Participation in Demonstration – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Demo	(2) Demo	(3) Demo	(4) Demo	(5) Demo	(6) Demo	(7) Demo	(8) Demo
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.014	0.012	0.018	0.017	0.012	0.010	0.018	0.017
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Displaced	0.065**	0.066**	0.055**	0.055**	0.077**	0.076**	0.072***	0.074***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.037	0.034	0.016	0.013	0.028	0.025	0.042	0.038
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Displaced	0.013	0.014	0.026	0.023	0.007	0.005	-0.002	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	-0.024	-0.024	0.025	0.025	-0.006	-0.005	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Displaced	0.114**	0.115**	0.089**	0.093**	0.125**	0.129**	0.136***	0.137***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Signing a Petition – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Petition	(2) Petition	(3) Petition	(4) Petition	(5) Petition	(6) Petition	(7) Petition	(8) Petition
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.010	0.010	0.021	0.021	0.005	0.005	0.013	0.012
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Displaced	0.032	0.032	0.051*	0.051*	0.044	0.044	0.035	0.035
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	-0.001	-0.001	0.007	0.007	0.004	0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Displaced	0.029	0.025	0.086	0.082	0.041	0.041	0.012	0.009
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.005	0.005	0.033	0.032	0.018	0.020	0.022	0.023
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Displaced	0.029	0.030	0.036	0.040	0.053	0.056	0.048	0.049
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12. Omitted variable bias: thresholds on importance of unobservables relative to observables to explain away the key coefficients in Figure 3

Coefficient tested	Threshold: Rmax=1.3R	Threshold Rmax=2R
Effect of displacement on Local voting (women only)	4.975	1.697
Effect of displacement on Parliamentary voting (women only)	3.027	0.989
Effect of "Injured or killed" on Political party membership (men only)	3.068	1.25
Effect of displacement on Demonstration (women only)	4.695	1.47

Note: Authors' calculations based on Oster (2019).

Appendix

Table A1: Summary of the Literature on Conflict and collective action/political participation

Paper	context	Main data sources for analysis	Conflict victimisation variable	Finding on impact of conflict	Gender treatment	Finding on gender
Adhvaryu and Fenske (2013)	17 sub-African countries	Diverse	Locality-level battle deaths	Exposure to war decreases collective action for men, but increases interest in politics. However, the effects estimated are very small. No effects for Women.	Analysis based on local-level measure of intensity, not own-experience, shows no effect for women on voting or collective action or interest in politics.	Different effects for men versus women are discussed with conflict having no effects on women's political participation and small effects on men.
Alacevich and Zejcirovic (2020)	Bosnian ethnic civil war 1992-1995	Voter turnout data 1990-2014 Household survey data 2006 (LITS1)	Municipality level measure of war intensity	Decreases voter turnout, caused by violence against civilians rather than against soldiers.	Not controlled for in municipality level analysis. Not reported in household level analysis.	n/a
Bellows and Miguel (2009)	1991-2002 Sierra Leone Civil war	Household data collected in 2005 and 2007 Chiefdom level attacks and battles	Self-reported victimisation of household members (index: based on HH members killed injured or displaced) Chiefdom conflict intensity	HH victimisation increases likelihood of attending community meetings, being a member of a social or political group	Gender is controlled for in HH level analysis, and women are less politically active. In an analysis of heterogenous effects (not reported), an	While women are as likely to be victim, they are less likely to be politically active after the conflict than men. The effect of conflict on men and women

					interaction term between gender and victimisation is included and "not generally statistically significant".	is stated not to be significantly different.
Blattman (2009)	Uganda		Ex-combatant (abducted so not self-selected) – self-reported	Increased political participation of ex-combatant (voted, community mobilizer, any community group membership)	The study focuses on male combatant only	n/a
Cassar et al. (2013)	1992-1996 Tajik Civil war	Experiments and HH survey fielded in 2010.	Self reported victimisation in the HH (injured or killed)	Reduces trust and willingness to exchange beyond kin Increases participation in groups and community meetings.	Gender controlled for in trust regressions and group membership regressions.	Female respondents are as likely to report victimisation, but gender is not a significant driver of trust in the analysis. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict. Gender is controlled for but not reported in the group participation analysis.

Child and Nikolova (2020)	WW2 in Europe and more recent civil conflicts – 15 countries.	HH survey collected in 2010 (LITS2)	Self-reported (as injured or killed in the HH) and external source exposure (location-specific – 15 km radius)	While protest, party membership, voting and social capital increase with self-reported victimisation, effects are negative or insignificant when an external source of data is used to measure objective conflict exposure.	Gender dummy	Men are more likely to protest and be a party member. No significant differences for voting or social capital. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict.
De Juan and Pierskalla (2016)	Civil war in Nepal 1996-2003	HH World Health Survey 2003 – with geo-location of each household	NGO-collected data on killings by rebel and government forces.	Political trust (national government) decreases with exposure to conflict violence	Gender dummy (significant)	No gender differences in political trust. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict.
De Luca et Verpoorten (2015a)	Protracted violence in Uganda 1996-2006	4 rounds of HH survey (2000, 2005, 2008, 2012)	District-level LRA violent event days from ACLED	Increases civic participation (attend meeting) but not electoral participation (voting in presidential election) in communities affected by violence.	Gender is controlled for but not reported, and no analysis into heterogeneity by gender is reported.	n/a
De Luca et Verpoorten (2015b)	Uganda	4 rounds of HH survey (2000, 2005, 2008, 2012)	District-level LRA violent event days from ACLED	Decreases association contemporaneously,	Gender is controlled for but not reported, and no analysis into	n/a

				but recovery in the medium term	heterogeneity by gender is reported.	
Freitag et al. (2019)	1998-199 Kosovo war	HH survey collected in 2010 (LITS32	Self-reported victimisation in the HH (injured, killed or displaced) Use PCA to generate an indicator of victimisation	They find that war victimisation increases the propensity of protest (demonstrating or striking) and to sign petitions, but as no significant effects on voting or political party membership	Gender dummy	Women appear less likely to protest or sign petitions, but no discussion of a possible differential effect of war across gender.
Garcia-Ponce (2017)	1980- mid 1990s Shining Path insurgency, Peru	Election data in 1995 and 1998 and HH survey data for 2008	Being born and raised in a conflict-affected municipality.	Being born and raised in a conflict-affected municipality has a significant impact on women's participation but no effect for men.	Gender dummy and split sample.	Women exposed to violence in childhood more likely to be politically active but no effect for men; author suggests this is driven by behavioural response of women, specifically coping strategies involving grass roots, local organisation to cope with adverse effects of violence.

Gilligan et al. (2014)	1996-2006 Nepal civil war	Experiment fielded in 2009	Conflict-affected community (objective)	Affected community exhibit higher levels of political and community level mobilization, as well as higher trust and pro-sociality	Political and community mobilisation only computed at community level.	n/a
Grosjean (2014)	WW2 in Europe and more recent civil conflicts	HH survey collected in 2010 (LITS)	Self-reported victims of WW2 in the family: parents, grandparents or self (injured or killed). Self reported victims of civil wars in the HH (injured or killed)	Conflict spurs collective action: more group membership and political party membership But less general trust and less trust in institutions	No control reported for gender.	n/a
Rohner et al. (2013)	Ethnic conflict in Uganda 2002-2005	HH survey (Afrobarometer) 2000 and 2008, HH are georeferenced	County-level measure of exposure based on ACLED data of fighting events.	Intense fighting decreases general trust	Gender (dummy) controlled for but not reported	n/a
Voors and Bulte (2014)	Several periods of civil war in Burundi	HH and community surveys collected in 2007	HH level victimisation as death of a HH member, theft, ambush, forced labor, intimidation, destruction of assets. A community-level measure was then created by aggregating HH	Cooperation increases with victimisation measured at the village level, but not at the household level. No effect on generalised trust.	Gender dummy	No discussion of a possible differential effect of victimisation across gender.

			responses at the community level			

This table updates and builds on Bauer et al. (2016), reporting findings from analysis on the impact of conflict on individuals or households, but here we focuse on outcomes which are strictly about political participation (so voting, association, political party membership, community engagement, etc.) and we thus exclude articles about cooperation or trust games.

Table A2: Determinants of victimisation

VARIABLES	(1) Conflict affected (any)	(2) Conflict affected (any)	(3) Injured or killed only	(4) Injured or killed (only)	(5) Displaced (only)	(6) Displaced (only)
Gender	-0.005	-0.005	-0.028	-0.034	-0.001	-0.007
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Age	0.002**	0.007*	0.002***	0.009**	0.000	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Age squared		-0.000		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		-0.047		-0.009		-0.042
		(0.044)		(0.029)		(0.047)
Own Education (Tertiary)		-0.043		0.005		-0.033
		(0.053)		(0.045)		(0.058)
Father Education (Secondary)	-0.021	-0.025	-0.023	-0.025	-0.030	-0.024
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.019	0.008	0.025	0.027	0.020	0.038
	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.062)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.020	-0.017	-0.002	0.001	-0.037	-0.058
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.069	-0.041	-0.057	-0.014	-0.094	-0.114
	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Constant	0.226***	0.149	0.166**	0.010	0.215***	0.150
	(0.082)	(0.125)	(0.074)	(0.118)	(0.078)	(0.107)
Observations	1,438	1,171	1,438	1,171	1,438	1,171
R-squared	0.101	0.113	0.058	0.067	0.111	0.130
region and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes

[1] See Bateson (2012) for analysis based on an exhaustive set of data sources and focusing on crime victimisation.
[2] See Bauer et al., 2016 for a recent review of the field focusing specifically on violent conflict victimisation.
[3] See media coverage https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-protests-idUSKBN0L01JX20150127 and https://www.rferl.org/a/NATO_Police_Separate_Violent_Protesters_In_Kosovo/2057007.html and https://balkaninsight.com/2016/08/29/kosovo-serbia-condemn-albanian-protest-against-serb-pilgrims-08-29-2016/. More recently, there has been a move to more peaceful protests, with fewer arrests and generally less engagement from security forces. See this report for example that documents a number of recent peaceful protests https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2019/08/07/ethnic-tension-flares-protest-take-place-kosovo/ and https://www.voanews.com/europe/protesters-kosovo-oppose-presidents-nominee-prime-minister
[4] Judah (2000) reports that there were approximately 15, 000 deaths, of which 9000 were civilians.
[5] It is also estimated that about 200,000 Serbs had left the province by the end of the war (World Bank, 2001; p. 129).
[6] Kosovo was divided by UNMIK into five 'Areas of Responsibility' roughly equivalent to the former regions (American – Southeast, British – East including Pristina, French – North, German- South, Italian – West).
[7] War has been credited for building strong states in modern Europe: (Tilly and Ardant, 1975; Tilly, 1985.
[8] And hence arguably less likely to have been self-selected.
[9] Blattman ascribes this to the greater intensity of violence witnessed by abductees.
[10] Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová and Henrich (2014) deal with young children and investigates their propensity to cooperate after experiencing war violence. In this context, they cross-checked children's self-report with their teachers.
[11] See for example the paper by Schlozman et al., 1994 highlighting the role of income in explaining part of the gender differences in engagement in the US.
[12] That said, positive attitudes towards women's political engagement appear much more common in Eastern than Western Germany 30 years after reunification (de Vries and O'Brien, 2020), suggesting at least some localised positive legacies.
[13] See Justino (2018) for a review.
[14] Stockemer and Wigginton (2020) also offer examples where the gender gap in voting has been reduced following conflict.
[15] Results from creating a single aggregated war experience variable are broadly consistent with those we present here and are available from the authors.
[16] These are the odd numbered regressions in our tables.
[17] Estimations with region-level fixed effects are available upon request.
[18] Douarin et al. (2012) use this data to build an index capturing the degree of damage at the municipality level to relate conflict intensity to livelihood choices after the war.
[19] Regarding strikes, demonstration and signing a petition, we reproduced the analysis but with an indicator equal to 1 if the respondents had participated or would consider participating in these actions and 0 if had never done so (see discussion in the data section). Results are available upon request.