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Power-sharing versus Power-grabbing in the Aftermath of Civil War: Evidence from Public Opinion in Mosul, Iraq

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Abstract Power-sharing is a widely recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements to civil wars with center-periphery and identity-based cleavages. However, in practice, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side exploits windows of opportunity for power-grabs. We examine public support for power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of sectarian and center-peripheral power struggles over control of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a survey experiment conducted with over 1000 respondents in both Mosul and Baghdad, we explore whether individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of Islamic State (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under varying power-sharing versus power-grabbing treatments. With respect to policing, we find that both Iraqi Sunnis in Mosul and Shia in Baghdad regard one-sided power-grabs as security-enhancing and opposing-side power-grabs as security reducing relative to joint power-sharing. Overall, our results underscore the challenges of finding common ground on power-sharing mechanisms for peacebuilding after insurgent violence.

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Introduction

If power-sharing is conducive to peace, why is it often difficult to achieve and unstable in practice? Seemingly intractable identity and center-periphery cleavages are a widespread and recurrent problem in civil war and insurgent violence (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Power-sharing arrangements are one mechanism for mitigating tensions that fuel pernicious violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019). However, power-sharing can be an unstable solution due to attempts by belligerents to use windows of opportunity for entrepreneurial power-grabs (Mukherjee 2008). In the absence of strong or credible institutions to apply constraints on such behavior, power-grabbing is likely to result in renewed conflict spirals (Walter 1997; Hartzell et al. 2001). Given that conflict often hardens war-related cleavages and cements divisions (Bauer et al. 2016), motivations for one-sided power-grabbing over joint power-sharing could be especially tempting, with potentially dire consequences for long-term security.

Our research explores whether publics in post-conflict environments see value in power-sharing as a solution to security concerns in the aftermath of civil war. To what extent do publics support power-sharing solutions to enhance security after divisive civil conflict? Public opinion matters in part because it can signal to elites what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior during interactions with political adversaries (Chong and Druckman 2011). Public opposition to power-sharing can limit the range of peace agreements that are politically viable (Walter, 1997; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mattes & Savun, 2010) or undermine the implementation of power-sharing arrangements (Paris, 2004). If publics condone taking opportunities to seize power from rivals, elites can more easily justify power-grabs to bolster political support. But if publics affirm the value of cooperative power-sharing with former adversaries, it could keep entrepreneurial elites in check and discourage exploiting wartime cleavages for political gain. Through examining public

opinion towards control over local police and security services in Mosul, Iraq, we investigate whether post-war institutions are perceived as opportunities for power-sharing or arenas for power contestation in the public eye.

In the aftermath of ISIS occupation, we inquire how residents of Mosul, who are predominately Sunni Arabs, and residents of Baghdad, who are largely Shia, regard the distribution of power within local police and security forces in post-ISIS Mosul. Several prominent studies underscore how representation and power distribution within police forces are critical to post-conflict security stabilization (Samii 2013; Karim 2020; Karim et al. 2018; Nanes 2020), and we build upon existing research in the Iraq case. Using a survey experiment with power-sharing and power-grabbing treatments as part of a case-comparison study design, we find that respondents perceive same-side power-grabbing actions as more security-enhancing, and opposing-side actions as security-reducing, than joint sectarian and center-peripheral power-sharing in the conduct of local policing. Our treatment effects are also moderated by conflict exposure and victimization, where victims are less likely to regard power-sharing as security enhancing than one-sided power-grabs.

Our results provide further evidence of the challenges of building foundations within public opinion for power-sharing arrangements to mitigate prospects of future violence. We make the following specific contributions. We identify two sets of preferences regarding power-sharing that citizens are likely to hold when dealing with rivals and adversaries on security matters: "stag hunt" preferences in which the out-group is expected to refrain from a power grab, and "prisoner's dilemma" preferences where in-group members expect the outgroup to grab power. Existing research has examined public support for or opposition to power-sharing. But it has not compared support for power-sharing relative to in-group/out-group power-grabs. We argue that power-grabs

are a realistic alternative to power-sharing arrangements, and that a complete understanding of public attitudes needs to explicitly consider these alternatives. Second, building on the existing literature, we theorize scope conditions under which citizens are more likely to hold prisoners' dilemma or stag hunt preferences regarding power-sharing, power-grabbing, and security. We apply these scope conditions to the case of Iraq to expect that preferences in this context will reflect prisoner's dilemma preferences. This framework could be used to study other post-conflict settings to generate predictions about the prevalence of the two preference types, which in turn could influence assessments of how likely power-sharing arrangements are to succeed or fail. Third, we introduce a generalizable experimental approach that allows us to compare support for power-sharing to the realistic alternatives of power-grabs. Finally, we explore fruitful areas for future research on public support for power-sharing and power grabs. One avenue concerns how wartime victimization moderates the effects of power-sharing and power-grabs. We find that victims of violence regard power-sharing as highly security-reducing compared to nonvictims. Instead, we find that victims regard one-sided power-grabs (either side) as security-enhancing compared to the volatile and unstable mixing of groups. We argue that such behavior among victims illustrates a plausible mechanism for how violence destroys public confidence in cooperative power-sharing in the provision of security.

Literature

Power-sharing is an enduring fixture among institutional arrangements for mitigating political tensions in diverse democratic societies (Lijphart 1968, Andeweg 2000; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010), and it also plays a prominent role among mechanisms for peacebuilding after violence (Sisk 1996; Hartzell and Mehler 2019; Hartzell and Hoddie 2020). Power-sharing takes different forms, including political, territorial, military, and economic, and operates at different levels: national, regional, and local. According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), the more dimensions of power-sharing, the greater chances of durable peace. Gates et al. (2016) conceptualize power-sharing along different inclusive, dispersive, and constraining dimensions, and argue that it is the elite-constraining features of power-sharing that protect minorities and reduce the onset and recurrence of civil war. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) also find that territorial and military based power-sharing are more effective at promoting peace than political power-sharing, where agreements are more likely to be violated. Hartzell and Hoddie (2019, 2020) show that power-sharing can encourage adherence to the rule of law and advance at least minimalist forms of democracy after violence. However, political power-sharing may induce stability in authoritarian regimes as well (Magaloni 2008) though it has also been found to promote rent-seeking and corruption in some cases (Haass and Ottman 2017).

Despite recent advances, the literature still demands a better understanding of support for power-sharing at the micro-level, especially in everyday local contexts and across different dimensions. Evidence regarding public appraisals of power-sharing in many post-conflict societies where these institutions have been implemented is surprisingly limited. The handful of existing studies reveal heterogeneous and often negative public responses to power-sharing arrangements, broadly construed. In Northern Ireland, for example, Hayes and McAllister (2013) find that women

are less favorable toward the 1998 "Good Friday" Agreement because its consociational power-sharing arrangements did not include concerns about gender equity, while Brewer and Hayes (2013) show how victims of violence are more supportive of power-sharing than non-victims. In Bosnia, Jung (2012) reveals disenchantment with power-sharing arrangements under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, as many Bosnians felt the agreement sacrificed too many long-term goals of democratic peacebuilding to satisfy warring parties. In Lebanon, Vaughan (2018) emphasizes that power-sharing under the Ta'if Accords benefited Lebanese Shia but left many religious groups disaffected with democracy and the country's political institutions. And in Iraq, although several public opinion studies are currently underway (ex. Revkin and Kao 2018; Mironova and Whitt 2020), researchers are only beginning to address questions of public support for power-sharing across sectarian or center-peripheral divides (Nanes 2020).

Scholars are increasingly drawing attention to the impact of representation and power distribution within police forces on security and peacebuilding (Bayley 2008; Perito 2009; Bayley et al. 2010; Felbab-Brown 2016; Karim 2020). Karim et al. (2018) argue that more inclusive police forces in terms of gender and ethnicity work to enhance security by increasing unit cohesion, operational efficiency, promoting egalitarian norms, and ensuring institutional legitimacy (see also Ball and Brzoska 2002; Peters 2002; MacCoun et al. 2006; Millet and Murray 2010; Samii 2013; Karim and Beardsley 2017). We argue that more focus is also needed on how local police forces are structured not only horizontally in terms of symbolic inclusiveness (for example, representation by ethnicity and gender) but also vertically between locals and outsiders, especially at the national and international level, if applicable, via peacekeepers. In this vein, Nanes (2020) shows how priming the public with information about police integration reduces support for anti-government violence in a recent Baghdad survey. We also raise concerns about the rise of paramilitary policing

and how it could undermine prospects for local level cooperation on security (Felbab-Brown 2019) and is emblematic of growing challenges posted by hybrid, fragmented sovereignty arrangements (Doyle and Dunning 2018). At all levels, more work is needed to understand whether publics perceive local police services as potential common ground for power-sharing or arenas for power contestation.

Our research contributes to the literature on power-sharing in three ways. First, existing research has analyzed the degree to which publics support or oppose power-sharing arrangements. However, this work has not directly considered how the possibility of power grabs might influence such support. We develop a typology of preferences regarding power-sharing based on the degree to which outgroups are expected to abide by agreements and refrain from engaging in opportunistic power grabs. Second, our research helps fill an important gap in this critical case and along a vital dimension of power-sharing: the structure of the local police forces and security services after violence. The few studies of public attitudes towards power-sharing arrangements emphasize the overall structure of such agreements, focusing heavily on national-level arrangements rather than local institutions that impact the daily lives of citizens. It is not clear how support for power-sharing at one level travels to another. Finally, our study is unique in its ability to assess the impact of conflict exposure and victimization on support for power-sharing, which has shown to have mixed effects on other forms of trust and social cooperation (meta-analysis by Bauer et al. 2016).

In summary, more research needs to engage the impact of conflict exposure on public willingness to defect from cooperative power-sharing arrangements to acquire more power for their respective cleavage groups. We aim to test this proposition directly through a novel experimental design in Iraq, where we offer subjects the opportunity to reflect on the security-enhancing or security-reducing qualities of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context

of local policing in post-ISIS Mosul. We now provide theoretical foundations to explain how the characteristics of a conflict influence public perceptions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in relation to security.

Theory

Given the brutality of many civil wars and insurgent campaigns, why would publics ever support power-sharing with former rivals and adversaries? Under what circumstances might publics favor opportunistic power-grabbing over power-sharing to enhance security? How does conflict exposure and victimization impact those preferences? At both the individual and group level, these are fundamental questions of cooperation. Social identity theory underscores how individuals seek out meaningful social and political group identities, reducing uncertainty in interactions with others (Hale 2008), but in-group identification can also facilitate conflict with out-groups (Tajfel et al. 1979; Huddy 2001). Conflicts involving social identity (ethnicity, sectarianism) and center-peripheral cleavages (regional separatism, irredentism) emerge out of, and are exacerbated by, realistic competition over scarce resources (Sherif 2015), greed and/or grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cederman et al. 2013) and inter-group security dilemmas (Posen 1993). We anticipate that the willingness of publics to support power-grabbing over power-sharing will be intensified by identity conflict where non-cooperative preferences in dealing with out-groups could be amplified by conflict exposure and victimization (Bauer et al. 2016).

Our theoretical framework focuses on the security dimensions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing motivations, with the understanding that security ranks highly among post-conflict public priorities (Krause and Jütersonke 2005). If publics are primarily motivated by security concerns in the aftermath of violence, then support for power-sharing vs. power-grabbing is ultimately a question of which strategy, if either, is more likely to be security-enhancing versus

security-reducing? More specifically, how do these motivations affect power-sharing in relation to local police forces and security services? We argue that support for power-sharing can be characterized by two competing types of "stag hunt" versus "prisoner's dilemma" beliefs and preferences illustrated in figure 1.

Figure 1. Stag Hunt vs. Prisoner's Dilemma Preferences

Stag Hunt	Power-Sharing	Power-Grabbing
Power-Sharing	3,3	0,2
Power-Grabbing	2,0	1,1

*players incentivized to cooperative power-sharing

Prisoner's Dilemma	Power-Sharing	Power-Grabbing
Power-Sharing	2,2	0,3
Power-Grabbing	3,0	1,1

*players incentivized to non-cooperative power-grabbing

"Stag hunt" beliefs, in which security cooperation—in this context, support for power-sharing—is viewed as the best outcome if the other player (representing an out-group) is trusted to reciprocate (Skyrms 2004). Individuals who hold stag hunt beliefs about the cooperative intentions of the out-group will prefer power-sharing over an in-group power grab, which is preferable to an out-group power grab or joint power-grabbing, where the outcome of mutual struggle is uncertain. Any benefits of an in-group power grab are likely to be suboptimal to joint power-sharing, as the outgroup will respond by defecting in repeated play, ending the joint benefits of cooperation and perhaps renewing armed conflict between the groups.

The second set are "prisoner's dilemma" beliefs that the out-group is untrustworthy and likely to exploit opportunities to engage in a power grab. Conflict has been shown to amplify distrust in out-groups (Balliet et al. 2011). Prisoner's dilemma beliefs lead individuals to prefer an in-group power grab over power-sharing, which is preferred over an out-group power grab. This preference ordering is sensible if the out-group cannot be trusted to engage in cooperation.

Prisoner's dilemma beliefs about the out-group's strategy creates strong incentives to support a pre-emptive power grab by the ingroup, which will make it more difficult for the out-group to engage in its own power grab.

There are good reasons to think that, under certain conditions, individuals should regard power-sharing with rivals and adversaries as security-enhancing, consistent with stag hunt beliefs. From an institutional perspective, power-sharing agreements provide a credible institutional mechanism to promote cooperation by establishing the 'rules of the game' (North 1991; Knight 1992; Fearon and Laitin 1996). This 'institutions as rules' perspective lends optimism to power-sharing arrangements to induce cooperation and promote security. If publics view cooperation across conflict-cleavages as security enhancing, then they should favor power-sharing over entrepreneurial power-grabbing, which represents a clear defection from cooperation. This logic should apply to how publics relate to the distribution of power within institutions broadly construed, but also specifically to local police services where conflict-based identity cleavages as well as core-peripheral, local-national power distribution might otherwise limit cooperation. We test the following hypothesis:

H1 (Power-sharing): Publics will view joint power-sharing arrangements as more security-enhancing than one-sided power-grabbing.

As a counter-hypothesis, individuals might also regard power-sharing with rivals as highly unstable and security-reducing, consistent with prisoner's dilemma beliefs. In contrast to the 'institutions-as-rules' perspective, power-sharing's security-enhancing qualities could be highly endogenous to pre-existing norms (Greif and Kingston 2011). This later 'institutions as equilibria" approach cautions about the cooperative benefits of power-sharing. It is well-established that conflict often amplifies parochialism, increasing distrust and social distance across groups (Choi

and Bowles 2007; Balliet et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2016). If there is not a sufficient reservoir of cooperative norms to revert to after violence and if institutions are weak rule enforcers, then publics might favor defection over cooperation. This might be especially true in local police and security services, where units could be potentially staffed and led by groups that ostensibly fought against one another during the conflict, where identity-cleavages provide rationales for distrust, and where administration is hampered by competing local vs. national goals and agendas. The equilibrium that results from such institutions may not be conductive to cooperative power-sharing.

Under these conditions, power-grabbing offers one means of defection from cooperation to enhance security. In the context of local police forces and security services, power-grabbing likely implies purging of out-groups from units or unit leadership or failure to abide by shared guidelines for policing or shared chain-of-command and accountability structures. However, this behavior could result in tit-for-tat escalations. Conflict-driven parochialism implies that security is enhanced when power is being seized by the in-group, but power-grabbing attempts by out-groups should be regarded as highly threatening to security, which is why reciprocal power-grabbing behavior is likely to result in conflict spirals. While mutual defection is likely to be a sub-optimal strategy compared to cooperative power-sharing for resolving conflict, there may foundations within public opinion for elites to pursue defection strategies consistent with prisoner's dilemma logic. We test the following hypotheses:

H2 (In-group Power-grabbing): Publics will view attempts at in-group power-grabbing as security-enhancing relative to joint power-sharing arrangements.

H3 (Out-group Power-grabbing): Publics will view attempts at out-group power-grabbing as security-reducing relative to joint power-sharing arrangements.

Finally, what effect does conflict victimization have on power-sharing preferences? We consider three possible effects based on the literature. First, conflict victimization has been shown in some cases to produce positive effects on social cooperation consistent with post-traumatic growth (Calhoun and Tedeschi 2014; Bauer et al. 2016). This perspective lends support to victimization enhancing stag hunt preferences about power-sharing consistent with H1. Second, victimization has also been shown to amplify parochialism (Bauer et al. 2016) which could increase in-group power-grabbing preferences due to heightened mistrust of out-groups consistent with the prisoner dilemma logic of H2-3. Finally, a third perspective focuses on how traumatic stress can heighten fear and anxiety about future threats (Shvil et al. 2013). As such, victims of violence should place a premium on avoidance of re-traumatization. They may regard power-sharing as inherently risky due to the inclusion of members of rival ethnic or religious outgroups, which they are more likely to perceive as threatening (Hall and Kahn, 2020; Hall et al. 2021). Power-grabbing (even by out-groups) may be regarded as security-enhancing if groups are not deemed capable of cooperation. Collectively, all three perspectives indicated that victimization could moderate power-sharing vs. power-grabbing preferences. We test the following moderating hypothesis.

H5 (Victimization) Power-sharing preferences are moderated by experiences of war-related victimization and trauma.

Scope Conditions

What drives power-sharing versus power-grabbing preferences? We do not evaluate mechanisms directly in the manuscript, but we offer scope conditions regarding power-sharing vs. power-grabbing incentives based on existing research regarding the outcomes of power-sharing arrangements. We focus on how conflict characteristics influence aggregate citizen preferences.

These characteristics influence trust in the outgroup to live up to the terms of a power-sharing arrangement.

The first condition concerns the degree to which social identities overlap with conflict cleavages. When this overlap is high, individuals are more likely to have prisoner's dilemma preferences regarding power-sharing with rivals. In such conflicts, the in-group worries that an out-group power grab will allow the police and security services to engage in collective targeting, extrajudicial retribution or the denial of effective policing. This general distrust of the out-group is exacerbated when such actions have been taken by the out-group during the conflict. Trust will be weakened, for example, when an out-group incumbent purges in-group members from the military and security forces or has engaged in prior collective targeting of in-group members. In-group members will be especially wary of out-group rebel or paramilitary groups that have committed violence against the in-group. Actions such as these provide information that allow in-group members to update their beliefs about the out-group's likely behavior. A history of targeting or betraying the in-group will lead in-group members to believe that the out-group is unlikely to abide by the terms of a power-sharing agreement.

Second, support for power-sharing depends on how the conflict terminated. Mukherjee (2008) argues that power-sharing after one-sided military victories, where the victor offers power-sharing to the loser as a concession, provide better security than power-sharing arising out of negotiated settlements from military stalemates. Such a concession allows citizens who favored the losing side to update their beliefs about the winning side. Offering power-sharing is a risky and costly signal by the winner. The winner risks that the loser may exploit the concession to re-mobilize their forces or to launch a power grab, and it is costly because the winner must share

some power with the loser. Stag hunt beliefs are more likely when a clear victor offers power-sharing arrangements to the losing side.

Third, research also suggests that the failure to demobilize both insurgent forces as well as state-sponsored militias could exacerbate security problems that undermine power-sharing among groups (Oppenheim et al. 2015; Staniland 2015). We expect that the continued mobilization of such forces by the out-group would lead to prisoner's dilemma preferences among the ingroup. Such mobilization provides the in-group with credible information that out-group power-grabbing intentions are high. They could justify this conclusion in two ways. First, they might suspect that paramilitary forces are engaging in power-grabbing to circumvent any pledges of restraint from formal military action by the out-group leadership. They may also conclude that while the out-group leadership is genuinely committed to power-sharing, it nevertheless lacks the power to enforce compliance on its constituencies. If this is the case, it is possible that para-military forces beyond the out-group leadership's control engage in violence to spoil any power-sharing arrangement or to exploit windows of opportunity to power grab (Stedman 1997). We now explain how these conditions map onto our case.

Rationale for Case Selection and Empirical Expectations

Based on the scope conditions outlined above, security integration in Iraq is a useful, though arguably hard case – a stress test for the tensions surrounding power-sharing and power-grabbing. First, the conflict with the Islamic State involves both inter-sectarian divisions, pitting some Sunni Iraqis against the Shia-dominated state, as well as intra-sectarian violence among Sunnis (Hashim 2011; Berman et al. 2011; Hadded 2013; Al-Qarawee 2014). Long-term horizontal inequalities favoring Iraqi Sunni control during the Saddam era, and then reversed in

the post-Saddam era favoring Shia control, exacerbated sectarian grievances (Blaydes 2018).[1] Sectarian tensions can also be attributed to provocative and spoiling behavior on the part of insurgent groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Fishman 2006), the Islamic State (Abulrazaq and Stansfield 2016), and various Shia-led paramilitary groups (Thurber 2014, Dodge 2020) who have worked to deepen division among Sunni and Shia Iraqis. After 2009 until the Islamic State captured much of the west of Iraq in 2014, the Shia-dominated government reneged on promises to include Sunni Iraqis in the security services and engaged in widespread repression of members of the sect. These conditions helped facilitate the rapid rise of ISIS, which occupied Mosul and great swathes of Iraqi territory between 2014 until 2017, where it targeted Iraqi Shia, Christians, Yazidis as well as many moderate and secular Sunni Arabs for reprisals (Abulrazaq and Stansfield 2016; Johnstan et al. 2016; Laub and Masters 2016; Knights 2018).

Second, there has been no negotiated settlement between the Iraqi government and ISIS, which often result in concessions in the bargain for peace (Finley 2013; Kaplow 2016; Huang 2016). In the absence of negotiations, Baghdad's response to ISIS has been characterized as a 'campaign of revenge' to include widespread human rights violations in the detention and adjudication of suspected ISIS supporters (Human Rights Watch 2017, 2019; Taub 2018). Public opinion studies show that publics are highly retributive toward punishing higher-level ISIS members, though more willing to consider rehabilitation of ISIS rank-and-file supporters (Kao and Revkin 2018). However, retribution-seeking has likely created an environment of mistrust between ISIS supporters and opponents, many of whom cleave along sectarian and regional lines. Overall,

[11] Sectarianism is only a partial reflection of Iraq's social and political climate. See the online appendix for further discussion.

the transitional justice process may be impeding the ability of groups to share power by further eroding rather than repairing trust.

Third, ISIS has not demobilized and remains a largely covert but still powerful force in the region. Shia paramilitaries also play an important role in the provision of security in Mosul and other areas of Iraq (Felbab-Brown 2019; Dodge 2020). Sunni Iraqis may worry that Shia militias could violate the terms of any power-sharing agreement, and the covert nature of ISIS means that Shia Iraqis may view any efforts by the group to compromise as either an insincere bargaining strategy or unlikely to be followed through on by the group members who do not favor cooperation. These power-sharing challenges are playing out specifically in the local police and security services in Mosul, particularly regarding the incorporation of Shia militias like Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi (colloquially known as 'Hashds') into the policing and security structure (Rached 2019; Jahanbani 2020). Integration of paramilitaries and militia groups have posed problems for policing in other conflict-areas including Afghanistan (Perito 2009; Felbab-brown 2016). Hence, Iraq is representative of cases where power-sharing is taking place between local police and government-backed militias and paramilitary groups who are often brought in for policing the local population (Hansen 2013). This reinforces how Iraqi security structures represent a hard case for cooperative power-sharing, involving center-peripheral and sectarian divisions, outside paramilitary and local police and security components, among groups with questionable loyalties to the state and to insurgency. It is also representative of security conditions in many post-conflict environments where impediments to power-sharing are likely high.

Research Design

To evaluate public opinion toward power-sharing versus power-grabbing, we employ a randomized survey experiment and a case-comparison sampling design. The survey experiment

utilized three treatments to test our hypotheses: an inter-group power-sharing treatment, an in-group power-grabbing treatment, and an out-group power-grabbing treatment. Our key dependent variable captures beliefs about prospective security, crime, policing, and economic conditions in Mosul which are all integral to the broader security structure and depend upon the functioning of local police forces (Brinkerhoff 2005; Erhart and Schnabel 2005). We estimate the effects of these power-sharing and power-grabbing treatments on beliefs about security in Mosul using a simple post-treatment as well as difference-in-difference design.[2] Our basic post-treatment empirical model can be summarized as follows:

$$(1)\ Y_i = \beta_0(\textit{Power-sharing})_i + \beta_1(\textit{In-group Power-Grabbing})_i + \beta_2(\textit{Out-group Power-Grabbing})_i + \beta_i X_i + e_i$$

Where Y_i is an ordinal dependent variable that measures individual *i*'s prospective evaluations of security in Mosul. We estimate power-sharing and power-grabbing treatment effects with respect to local police forces using ordinary least squares (OLS) in the manuscript and ordered Probit regression as a robustness check reported in the appendix. Our key treatment variables are the following survey vignettes, which were randomized within two samples or blocks: one for Mosul residents and one for Baghdad residents. $B_{0\text{-}2}$ capture the effects of our three randomized treatments. The constant term in the model, β_0, assesses support for power-sharing utilizing the following vignette:

[2] Alternate designs could focus on predicting who supports power-sharing as a dependent variable (see online appendix). In contrast, we examine whether people regard power-sharing as enhancing or reducing security in relation to tangible alternatives. We believe this design is more essential to understanding power-sharing support in the context of other options.

[Power-Sharing] Today, the Iraqi Police Service in Mosul is comprised of approximately 60% Sunni Arabs and 40% minority groups (like Kurds, Yazidi, Shabaks, Christians). There are also "Hashd groups" from Baghdad operating in Mosul. How does that make you feel about the security situation in Mosul?

The power-sharing vignette captures the de facto status quo in Mosul at the time of our study where security is provided by a combination of local police forces with oversight from Baghdad to include Shia paramilitary groups. We treat this as a power-sharing vignette because neither local Mosul police nor Shia paramilitary groups had complete autonomous control over security services in Mosul, and their relationship could be characterized as co-determinant of security policy. Our design also factors in the impact of paramilitary policing on support for power-sharing, a status quo which is believed to compromise security (Oppenheim et al. 2015; Staniland 2015; Felbab-Brown 2019).

Of our remaining two vignettes, β_1 captures attitudes toward potential power-grabs on behalf of local Sunni authorities in Mosul and reads as follows:

[Sunni Power-Grab] Today, the Iraqi Police Service in Mosul is comprised of approximately 60% Sunni Arabs and 40% minority groups (like Kurds, Yazidi, Shabaks, Christians). There are also so-called "Hashd groups" from Baghdad operating in Mosul. What if the local government in Mosul were to remove Hashd groups from Mosul, giving more power to the Iraqi Police Service? How would that make you feel about the security situation in Mosul?

This vignette explores the possibility that local elites would purge Hashd groups from security forces in Mosul, who are represented by Shia Iraqis from outside Mosul, and enhance the power of the Iraqi police service, which is comprised primarily of locals from Mosul. We consider this a

clear power-grab in terms of gaining more local control over security from the Iraqi government in Baghdad, which was responsible for deploying Shia paramilitary groups to Mosul during the liberation and has allowed them to remain in place during reconstruction. Such a move would clearly signal a defection from cooperation with Baghdad and serve to enhance local police autonomy. Due to the sectarian majority status of Sunni Arabs in Mosul and in the local police forces, the vignette also functions as a de facto Sunni power-grab.

Finally, β_2 examines the effect of our Shia power-grab vignette on security, where Baghdad steps in and asserts more control over local policing in Mosul. The vignette is as follows:

> *[Shia Power-Grab] Today, the Iraqi Police Service in Mosul is comprised of approximately 60% Sunni Arabs and 40% minority groups (like Kurds, Yazidi, Shabaks, Christians). There are also so-called "Hashd groups" from Baghdad operating in Mosul. What if the Iraqi government were to reorganize the Iraqi Police Service under the control of these Hashd groups, taking away power from the Iraqi Police Service? How would that make you feel about the security situation in Mosul?*

Here, the vignette clearly signals a defection from power-sharing, with Baghdad asserting greater authority over local police services by placing them under the control of Shia paramilitary leaders rather than coordinated activities between the local police services and paramilitaries as was the norm when our study took place. Like the previous vignette, this also functions as a dual sectarian and center-encroaching power-grab, as Hashd groups are understood to be entirely Shia and derive their authority from the Iraqi government in Baghdad and are not locally representative.

Collectively these three vignettes allow us to evaluate our inter-group power-sharing and in-group/out-group power-grabbing hypotheses by comparing their effects on perceptions of security. Finally, $\beta_i X_i$ is a vector of extended individual controls and group-level fixed effects (ex.

Mosul vs. Baghdad). Although extended controls should not be necessary if the randomization process is done correctly (Montgomery et al. 2018), they may be useful as a robustness check for imbalances across treatment groups or to focus on variation in treatment effects across sub-samples of interest, such as the effects of the treatments on the Mosul sample versus the Baghdad sample. They will also be useful for exploring causal mechanisms through mediators and moderators of treatment effects.

Finally, we measure our dependent variable, Y_i, based on present versus prospective evaluations of the security situation in Mosul. Prior to the survey vignette, we ask all respondents to assess the evolving security situation. The question reads: "Do you expect the following in Mosul to get better, stay the same, or become worse over the next 12 months?" Items include [1. "security from militant attacks" 2. "occurrence of criminal activity" 2. "treatment of residents by police and security services" and 4. "economic conditions"] with responses options ranging from 1. become a lot better 2. become a little better, 3. stay the same, 4. become a little worse and 5. become a lot worse. We then randomize the three survey vignettes and follow-up with a second prospective appraisal question of the same format, only changing the introductory wording in the power-grabbing treatments such that: "If this plan were to occur, do you expect the following in Mosul to get better, stay the same, or become worse over the next 12 months?" while in the power-sharing treatment, the item reads "Knowing this, do you expect the following in Mosul to get better, stay the same, or become worse over the next 12 months?" Response options in these items are the same, which allows us to analyze post-treatment evaluations of security as well as to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of changes in security evaluations from before and after hearing the randomized vignette. The difference-in-difference design yields the following model

$$(2)\ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\textit{Power-sharing x Pre-Post})_{it} +$$

β_2*(In-group Power-Grabbing x Pre-Post)*$_{it}$ +

β_2*(Out-group Power-Grabbing x Pre-Post)*$_{it}$ + e_i

where β_0 estimates the pre-treatment security baselines, while $\beta_{1\text{-}3}$ predict the post-treatment effect of each experimental vignette on security evaluations. The advantage of the difference-in-difference design is that we can control for omitted variable bias concerning unit-specific, time-invariant confounders (Hsiao 2014). Hence, extended controls, $\beta_i X_{i,}$ are omitted from the model in the difference-in-difference analysis that already controls for time invariant fixed-effects. With these basic models in place, we now turn to sampling and data collection.

Ethics of Field Research, Sampling and Data Collection

Conducting field research in conflict environments is challenging for many logistical reasons, but it also requires those who conduct research to be ethically responsible in providing for the safety and well-being of participants as well as the field research team (Wood 2006; Campbell 2017; Cronin-Furman and Lake 2018). In designing this study, we followed APSA recommended protocols on ethical conduct of field research. We relied on well-trained local enumerators with practical field experience to conduct the study. One of the authors was in Iraq to oversee data collection, including leading a training session for enumerators on ethical conduct of research and protocols for adverse events. All respondents in the study received a consent form indicating their participation was voluntary and that they may refuse to answer questions or stop participating at any time. While respondents were provided with a financial incentive to participate in the study ($5), they knew they would be paid this amount regardless of whether they refused to

answer questions or failed to complete the study. Our research protocols received Institutional Review Board approval, and no adverse events were reported during data collection.[3]

We begin by providing an overview of our sampling protocol. First, we did not conduct a nationwide sample in Iraq because we were mainly interested in sectarian and center-peripheral tensions between Mosul and Baghdad in relation to security. Nationwide samples would have limited our ability to focus on these groups of interest due to under-sampling. Instead, we focused on sampling within Mosul and Baghdad using similar sampling methods. However, sampling in Mosul was especially challenging due to massive population upheaval during and after ISIS occupation. There is not reliable population data from which to draw a random sample in that region. Many neighborhoods were destroyed or sparsely inhabited, especially in the Western part of the city, which experienced the worst fighting. There were also challenges of random route sampling due to the presence of unexploded ordinance and some sectors of the city closed off by security services for that reason. Excluding neighborhoods that were destroyed and/or largely uninhabited, we randomly sampled from remaining populated neighborhoods in Eastern and Western Mosul. In Baghdad, the sampling process was more conventional and we used random neighborhood selection as the primary sampling unit (see the maps in the appendix for Mosul and Baghdad sampling locations). Within each neighborhood, enumerators selected a random starting point and then followed a random route, interviewing no more than 5 respondents on a given route, before selecting a new random starting point. We also purposefully sampled Arabs and Sunni, Shia

[3] See online appendix for further discussion of ethics, where we show that our experimental treatments did not have emotionally traumatizing effects on respondents based on post-treatment emotional response batteries.

religious groups to focus on sectarian divisions among the dominant ethnic and religious groups. The average number of respondents sampled in each neighborhood was 25.8 (SD = 17.6) across 21 neighborhoods in Mosul and 19 in Baghdad. Data collection took place in Mosul from July 23-August 18 and in Baghdad from August 24-September 22, 2019. The lead field coordinator was the same for each project, but enumerators were always local.

Table 1 provides a basic demographic overview of the data from Mosul and Baghdad samples. First, approximately one-third of respondents were randomly distributed across each treatment group within Mosul and Baghdad. Balance tests, provided in the appendix, indicate slight imbalances across treatments in Mosul on age, gender, and income assessment and on age, education and income assessment in Baghdad. We control for these variables in robustness checks reported in the online appendix.

Among demographics, women are underrepresented compared to men in both samples, which is not uncommon for surveys in the region (Benstead 2018), but we have enough female representation to offer a meaningful controlled comparison to men.[4] The average respondent in both Mosul and Baghdad is 30 years old (ranging from 18-66) and has completed secondary education. More people are unemployed in the Mosul sample compared to Baghdad (25% vs. 21%) but the difference is not as large as we might have expected. However, far more people in Mosul cannot meet basic expenses compared to Baghdad (16% to 1%). Both Mosul and Baghdad samples

[4] We lacked enough female enumerators to stratify sampling (50/50) by gender on a large scale and we worried that achieving parity in female-to-male recruitment would be challenging especially in Mosul.

are almost entirely Arab, and in terms of religion, the Mosul sample is almost exclusively Sunni Muslim, while the Baghdad sample is majority Shia Muslim with a sizable Sunni Muslim minority.

In summary, we have a remarkably rich dataset from which to assess the impact of power-sharing on security concerns and a wide range of observable covariates which we can explore as potential moderators of power-sharing and power-grabbing treatment effects. We now present our main results.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mosul Obs	Mosul Mean	Mosul Std. Dev.	Baghdad Obs	Baghdad Mean	Baghdad Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Treatment								
Power-sharing	537	0.32	0.47	493	0.33	0.47	0	1
Sunni Power Grab	537	0.33	0.47	493	0.33	0.47	0	1
Shia Power Grab	537	0.35	0.48	493	0.33	0.47	0	1
Demographics								
Female	537	0.27	0.44	493	0.37	0.48	0	1
Age	537	30.06	8.42	492	30.75	8.41	18	66
Education	537	3.34	0.65	493	3.29	0.73	1	4
Employment								
Professional worker	537	0.16	0.37	493	0.15	0.36	0	1
Office worker	537	0.14	0.34	493	0.10	0.30	0	1
Manual worker	537	0.18	0.38	493	0.17	0.37	0	1
Agricultural worker	537	0.00	0.04	493	0.01	0.09	0	1
Armed forces, security	537	0.01	0.11	493	0.03	0.17	0	1
Unemployed	537	0.25	0.43	493	0.21	0.41	0	1
Student	537	0.17	0.38	493	0.25	0.43	0	1
Pensioner	537	0.00	0.04	493	0.02	0.14	0	1
Other	537	0.00	0.06	493	0.01	0.08	0	1
Household Income								
Significant difficulty meeting expenses	537	0.16	0.37	493	0.01	0.08	0	1
Some difficulty meeting expenses	537	0.28	0.45	493	0.21	0.41	0	1
Meet expenses without difficulty	537	0.39	0.49	493	0.59	0.49	0	1
Meet expenses + save	537	0.18	0.38	493	0.20	0.40	0	1
Religion								
Sunni	537	0.97	0.17	493	0.41	0.49	0	1
Shia	537	0.01	0.09	493	0.59	0.49	0	1
Christian	537	0.02	0.15					
Ethnicity								
Arab	537	0.95	0.22	493	0.99	0.08	0	1
Kurd	537	0.05	0.21					
Turkmen	537	0.01	0.07	493	0.01	0.08	0	1

Results

We begin with a pre-treatment analysis of the dependent variable as outlined in the research design. All respondents were asked "Do you expect the following in Mosul to get better, stay the same, or become worse over the next 12 months?" on items related to security, crime, policing, and the economy with response options range from 1 = become a lot better to 5 = become a lot worse. Overall, the mean responses to all items in both Baghdad and Mosul are unremarkable and highly consistent in the range of 2 = "becoming a little better" over the next year, with greater response variation in Mosul than in Baghdad (see Appendix Figure 1). In general, pre-treatment assessments of future security are in the cautiously positive direction in both Mosul and Baghdad. Principal component factor analysis indicates that responses to each of the four security-related items line up strongly on a single dimension in the Mosul and Baghdad samples (see online appendix for results), suggesting that the items are all capturing a latent security variable. To simplify the analysis, we create a combined latent security index based on the interim covariance of all four items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.88) and report the results for each index component in the appendix. The index ranges from predictions that security, crime, policing, and economic conditions will 1 = become a lot worse to 5 = become a lot better. A two-sample t-test indicates that respondents in Mosul respond more negatively on the security index than respondents from Baghdad ($t = 6.39$, $p < 0.0000$), but substantively the average response is in the cautiously optimistic range for both Mosul (mean = 3.41, SD = 0.85) and Baghdad (3.81, SD = 1.18).

Next, we provide a simple post-treatment analysis of security conditions. Figure 2 reports average post-treatment responses to our security index for the Mosul and Baghdad samples. First, we observe clear variation in post-treatment security assessments across treatments. If respondents held stag hunt beliefs, then the average treatment effect for power-sharing would be less than the

other treatments, being the most security-enhancing. However, this is not the case in either Baghdad or Mosul.

In Baghdad, there is a strong negative reaction to the Sunni power-grab treatment, where Mosul effectively purges Shia paramilitaries from the police forces, relative to the other treatments. This result appears consistent with the proposition (H3) that respondents hold prisoner's dilemma beliefs regarding the security-reducing effects of out-group power-grabbing attempts relative to joint power-sharing. Consistent with H2, there is also an in-group power-grabbing effect in the Baghdad sample, where a Shia power-grab has a greater security-enhancing effect relative to power-sharing, though the effect is much smaller than the out-group power-grabbing treatment.

In Mosul, the Sunni power-grabbing treatment has a strong positive effect on security assessments relative to other treatments, consistent with security-enhancing beliefs about in-group power-grabbing attempts (H2). Finally, the out-group power-grabbing treatment in Mosul has only a marginal negative effect on security perceptions relative to power-sharing. One possible explanation for this is that Mosul residents view the status quo presence of Hashd paramilitaries within the security structure as tantamount to a power-grab, diluting treatment effects. In either case, paramilitary policing does not appear to enhance security prospects inside Mosul, consistent with expectations from the literature (Oppenheim et al. 2015; Staniland 2015; Felbab-Brown 2019). We discuss this in more detail in the conclusion.

Figure 2. Post-Treatment Assessment of Security Conditions in Mosul over the Next Year (means, 95% CI)



Building on observations from Figure 1, we now turn to regression models to estimate the average treatment effects for each treatment group in Mosul and Baghdad respectively. Table 2 provides the results of OLS regression on security assessments for Baghdad and Mosul samples separately. The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 with increasing security about the future. Models 1 and 3 reports the basic treatment effects on the post-treatment Baghdad and Mosul samples, respectively. In Baghdad, the Shia power-grab treatment (the in-group treatment) is more security-enhancing, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Also, the Sunni power-grab treatment (the out-group treatment) is significantly security reducing, consistent with Hypothesis 3. In Mosul, the difference between the power-sharing and Shia power-grabbing treatment (the out-group treatment) are not significant. However, in line with Hypothesis 2, the Sunni power-grab treatment (the in-group treatment) has a significant positive effect on security assessments.

Models 2 and 4 offer a robustness check on post-treatment effects, using difference-in-difference analysis to assess changes in security assessment from pre to post-treatment. Individual-

level fixed-effects eliminate the potential confounding effects of time-invariant confounders. Compared to pre-treatment security assessments, the post-treatment Shia power-grabbing treatment effect loses significance in Baghdad, but other post-treatment effects remain robust.

In summary, we find little support for H1 and greater support for H2-H3. Subjects in Mosul and Baghdad see greater or equal security enhancing prospects from attempts at one-sided power-grabbing compared to joint power-sharing, though both view opposing-side power-grabbing as highly threatening to the security environment in Mosul.

Table 2. Pre- and Post-treatment effects of Power-sharing vs. Power-grabbing on Security (OLS regression)

	Model 1 Baghdad Post Treatment	Model 2 Baghdad Pre-Post Treatment	Model 3 Mosul Post Treatment	Model 4 Mosul Pre-Post Treatment
Shia power-grab	0.198***	-0.0974	-0.119	-0.140
	(0.0466)	(0.0611)	(0.0888)	(0.106)
Sunni power-grab	-2.112***	-2.712***	0.756***	0.778***
	(0.0696)	(0.109)	(0.0873)	(0.0864)
Power-sharing (constant)	4.450***	3.721***	3.201***	3.888***
	(0.0391)	(0.0191)	(0.0748)	(0.0190)
Pre-treatment baseline		1.027***		0.686***
		(0.0493)		(0.0764)
Observations	493	986	537	1,074
R-squared	0.785	0.688	0.206	0.338
Individual fixed effects	No	493	No	537

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To what extent are the treatment effects we observe from the survey experiment driven by concerns about power-sharing versus one-sided power-grabbing as opposed to other observable factors? In the online appendix, we perform internal validity checks which indicate how attitudes and preferences for power-sharing vs. power-grabbing are strong mediators of experimental

treatment effects. We also explore how treatment effects are sensitive to the inclusion of control variables measuring demographics, social distance toward Sunni and Shia Muslims, social distance toward people from Mosul and Baghdad in general, inter-group contact, incentives for material gain, the importance of ethnic identity and religiosity, as well as emotions related to fear, anxiety, anger, and satisfaction in response to our treatments. While many of these items are correlated with feelings of insecurity, they function primarily as independent correlates rather than strong treatment moderators or mediators.

The strongest moderating effects we observe on power-sharing/power-grabbing treatments comes from ISIS-related victimization in the Mosul sample (Figure 3). Nearly half or our Mosul sample (47%) indicated that they received some form of punishment from ISIS during the 2014-2017 period of ISIS rule. Less than 10% also reported having family members injured, killed, or imprisoned by ISIS or having their homes and property confiscated by ISIS during that time. In contrast, far more respondents reported victimization by ISIS during the 2017 liberation in the form of personal injury (39%), family members being injured (39%) or killed (37%), homes damaged or destroyed (27%), property looted (42%), and 34% reported being detained/imprisoned by ISIS and 36% reported that women in their families were abused or assaulted by ISIS during liberation. Fewer than 5% reported similar victimization by the Iraqi army though 8% reported being wounded and 16% reported homes being damaged or destroyed during coalition airstrikes.

Figure 3. Victimization by ISIS, the Iraqi Army, Coalition Air Strikes



Table 3 below provides OLS regression estimates of ISIS victimization on experimental treatment effects. Overall, we find strong support for H4 on moderating effects of victimization on power-sharing preferences. Model 1 indicates the basic treatment effects, while Model 2 utilizes combined additive indices of ISIS victimization pre-liberation and victimization during liberation.[5] Comparing Model 1 to Model 2 shows that victimization is a partial mediator of Sunni power grab treatment effects.[6] Model 3 also shows how ISIS victimization moderates treatments effects using interaction terms. Victimization by ISIS pre-liberation is negatively correlated with beliefs about security prospects in the power-sharing treatment but positively correlated with security prospects

[5] The two items capture distinct forms of victimization and are not clearly correlated (Pearson's r = -0.11). See the online appendix for further discussion of index components and construction.

[6] See the online appendix for a formal mediation analysis.

in both in-group/out-group power-grab treatments. Victimization during liberation is associated with stronger support for out-group power-grabbing which could indicate how the Iraqi military and Shia paramilitaries are seen as liberators from ISIS brutality and a potential source of stability. Among the three perspectives on moderating effects discussed in relation to H4, the third perspective on fear and anxiety consequences of traumatic stress seems most in line with our findings. Victims of ISIS violence are especially insecure under the status quo, which includes a potentially volatile mix of local and outside security forces, and seek alternative arrangements to enhance security, including a willingness for either local Sunnis or Baghdad to step-in and assume greater control. The detrimental effects of victimization provide one potential mechanism to explain why power-sharing arrangements could fail to alleviate insecurities. Rather than cooperating, victims are fearful that power-sharing will degenerate into mutual power-struggles consistent with prisoner's dilemma beliefs.[7]

Table 3. Victimization during ISIS occupation (2014-2017, Mosul only, OLS Regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Location	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	security	security
Shia power grab	-0.119	0.0283	-1.246***
	(0.0801)	(0.0783)	(0.191)
Sunni power grab	0.756***	0.306***	-0.0583
	(0.0817)	(0.115)	(0.216)
ISIS Victimization (pre-liberation)		-3.112***	-7.065***
		(0.537)	(0.637)

[7] See online appendix for further information and analysis of victimization effects on power-sharing preferences. We find that fear is especially elevated among victims of ISIS brutality pre-liberation which is consistent with traumatic stress and placing a premium on security which status quo power-sharing is not considered to provide.

Shia pg x ISIS victimization (pre-liberation)			9.066***
			(0.949)
Sunni pg x ISIS victimization (pre-liberation)			5.072***
			(1.011)
Victimization (during liberation)		0.276***	0.400
		(0.0988)	(0.298)
Shia pg x ISIS victimization (liberation)			0.790**
			(0.341)
Sunni pg x ISIS victimization (liberation)			-0.149
			(0.335)
Constant	3.201***	3.438***	3.798***
	(0.0579)	(0.0942)	(0.121)
Observations	537	537	537
R-squared	0.206	0.376	0.490
adj. r2	0.203	0.371	0.482

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion and Conclusion

Power-sharing is considered a vital component to security strategies in many post-conflict environments (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019). However, we find that public support for cooperative inter-group power-sharing is weak, especially among those who have been most victimized by wartime violence who are willing to consider power-grabbing, even by an out-group, as potentially more security-enhancing than a potentially volatile combination of in-group/out-group rivals. For most other respondents, our survey experiment shows that in-group power-grabbing behavior is regarded as superior or equal to joint power-sharing with respect to the impact of local policing on public security, while opposing side power-grabs are regarded as highly destabilizing to security. Hence, public evaluations of power-sharing in the police services in Iraq are more analogous to a classic prisoner's dilemma than a stag hunt (Skyrms 2001). Power-sharing may satisfice security concerns, but there are temptations to defect through one-sided power-grabbing. The problem is that while mutual defection from power-sharing could result in conflict spirals to the detriment of

collective security, many victims of violence also regard power-sharing itself as potentially volatile and unstable.[8]

Our results underscore a key theme in the literature from both conflict and non-conflict environments that power-sharing is difficult and potentially untenable without institutional guarantees to monitor and enforce cooperation and sanction attempts at defection. This is one reason why negotiated settlements, guaranteed by third-party interventions, may be critical to resolving identity-based and center-periphery-type conflicts (Kaplow 2016; Howard and Stark 2018; Hultman et al. 2019).

Unfortunately, Iraq has neither a negotiated settlement with former ISIS insurgents nor a credible third-party guarantor in the form of peacekeepers to prevent power-sharing from collapsing due to reciprocal power-grabbing. As such, we would predict extended tit-for-tat behavior between Mosul and Baghdad over control of local police and security forces. Our results suggest that the infusion of state militias and Shia paramilitary groups like Al-Hashd Al-Shabi are obstacles to resolving power-sharing dilemmas, consistent with an emerging literature on the rise of paramilitary policing within hybrid/fragmented sovereignty-type security regimes (Oppenheim et al. 2015; Staniland 2015; Doyle and Dunning 2018). Like Nanes (2020) in Iraq and Samii (2013) and Karim et al. (2018) in other contexts, our results indicate how local police and security forces need to be based on equitable and accountable power-sharing to be effective security guarantors, ideally with international support and oversight. War-time state militias, in contrast, should be disbanded while offering a path of integration into new security structures for former combatants

[8] An Afghan analogy would be that victims regard power-sharing between the Taliban and a pro-Western government as more disruptive to security than a one-sided victory by either group.

(Staniland 2015). As these problems are not unique to Iraq, we anticipate that our results have wide-ranging implications for public attitudes toward institutional power-sharing and security beyond the domain of local police forces and the Iraqi case. Power-sharing with paramilitaries on matters of security is a model to be avoided rather than emulated.

In summary, our research sheds light on the challenges of achieving cooperative power-sharing, and the prospects through which post-war institutions can devolve into arenas of power contestation. Our findings also underscore the need for further research on micro-level foundations for power-sharing among groups in conflict to include institutional mechanisms to promote cooperation and deter opportunism as part of the reconstruction and peacebuilding process. Future research might build on the approach introduced here in several ways. Our research design—which contrasts power-sharing with the realistic alternative of power grabs—might be deployed where conflicts were resolved through negotiated settlements rather than battlefield victories, as was the case in Iraq, or where paramilitaries were more effectively demobilized and reintegrated into new security structures. Another fruitful avenue of research would be to investigate if the presence of third parties, such as peacekeepers, or credible institutional constraints on power grabs, increase support for power-sharing mechanisms. We know from research in other empirical domains that elite support or opposition can influence public support (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Future research might investigate the degree to which in-group and out-group political elite endorsements of power-sharing influence public support. The role of mediating and moderating variables also requires further examination. Our research finds that conflict victimization amplifies power-grabbing preferences to the detriment of power-sharing. The finding that prospects of an outgroup power-grab leads to improved security prospects is particularly interesting and counterintuitive given the expectation that victimization amplifies in-group cooperation but reduces trust and

cooperation with outgroups (Bauer et al. 2016). This finding suggests that future research could fruitfully investigate how improving security guarantees could help overcome dilemmas of cooperation on security, improve public confidence in power-sharing arrangements, and reduce prospects of renewed cycles of violence.

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Power-sharing versus Power-grabbing in the Aftermath of Insurgent Violence: Evidence from Public Opinion on Local Policing in Mosul, Iraq

Online Appendix Material

Contents

Sampling Locations in Mosul

Neighborhood	Lat Long	Lat DD	Long DD
Al Zanjali	36°20′55.39″N 43°06′33.21″E	36.34872	43.10923
Tal Alraman	36°18′51.02″N 43°05′18.62″E	36.31417	43.08851
Tamwz	36°22′03.96″N 43°04′47.77″E	36.36777	43.07994
Al Yarmuk	36°20′19.64″N 43°04′47.86″E	36.33879	43.07996
Mosul Jdeda	36°20′04.01″N 43°06′15.11″E	36.33445	43.1042
Hay Alsaha	36°20′56.5″N 43°06′19.72″E	36.34903	43.10548
Al Tayaran	36°19′22.75″N 43°08′38.23″E	36.32299	43.14395
Hay Alrafai	36°21′24.89″N 43°05′22.06″E	36.35691	43.08946
Hay Sadam	36°23′07.26″N 43°12′38.02″E	36.38535	43.21056
Hay Alarabi	36°24′02.87″N 43°07′13.14″E	36.4008	43.12032
Hay Alsamah	36°21′56.9″N 43°13′11.36″E	36.36581	43.21982
Hay Somar	36°21′56.9″N 43°13′11.36″E	36.36581	43.21982
Al Quds	36°20′48.12″N 43°13′38.85″E	36.3467	43.22746
Al drkzlea	36°21′17.18″N 43°09′36.26″E	36.35477	43.16007
Al Nur	36°21′49.72″N 43°11′17.73″E	36.36381	43.18826
Hay Alsukar	36°23′28.97″N 43°10′11.46″E	36.39138	43.16985
Al zhur	36°22′38.41″N 43°10′54.29″E	36.37734	43.18175
Al Rahma	36°21′24.89″N 43°05′22.06″E	36.35691	43.08946
Bashiqa	36°27′01.6″N 43°20′59.14″E	36.45044	43.34976
Almjmwt althaqafyt	36°22′34.58″N 43°08′19.52″E	36.37627	43.13876
Hay Al Bakr	36°21′53.55″N 43°12′03.9″E	36.36488	43.20108
Shqq Alhabda	36°24′04.17″N 43°09′39.6″E	36.40116	43.161


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Telkif
شركة الصناعات الدوائية
AR RASHIDIYAH
حي العربي
MOSUL PARK
HAYY NURQAL
حي البلديات
التحرير
٣٠ تموز
الزهور
حي النور
حي البكر
كوكجلي
حي الخضراء
بداله السويس
INDUSTRIAL ZONE
الكرامة
النصر
Mosul
حي الضباط
موصل الجديدة
الدندان
HAYY AL-WAHDA
حي المنصور
اجديدة المفتي
حي فلسطين
السلام
OSM

Sampling Locations in Baghdad

	Lat Long	Lat DD	Long DD
Al Durah	33°14′53.5″N 44°24′32.94″E	33.24819	44.40915
karrada	33°16′49.94″N 44°23′22.18″E	33.28054	44.38949
Hay Alamrya	33°17′58.7″N 44°17′35.41″E	33.29964	44.29317
Algazalya	33°21′01.71″N 44°16′06.03″E	33.35048	44.26834
Zayunah	33°21′01.71″N 44°16′06.03″E	33.35048	44.26834
Alsalhya	33°19′20.35″N 44°23′19.66″E	33.32232	44.38879
Hay Aljamaa	33°19′25.31″N 44°19′33.33″E	33.3237	44.32593
Aljadrya	33°16′57.58″N 44°22′57.15″E	33.28266	44.38254
Almansoor	33°18′44.01″N 44°20′05.11″E	33.31223	44.33475
Al Kazmya	33°23′58.11″N 44°18′33.03″E	33.39948	44.30918
Hay Almagrb	33°21′20.87″N 44°22′42.81″E	33.3558	44.37856
Al Yarmok	33°21′20.87″N 44°22′42.81″E	33.3558	44.37856
Al Bayaa	33°22′19.78″N 44°19′56.45″E	33.37216	44.33235
Al Sanak	33°19′52.94″N 44°24′14.17″E	33.33137	44.40394
Al Saduun	33°19′30.83″N 44°24′54.01″E	33.32523	44.415
Hay Al Adl	33°19′56.26″N 44°18′48.4″E	33.33229	44.31344


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AL SADER / 2
AL SADER / 1
العتبه الكاظميه المقدسه
ADHAMIYA
9 نيسان
الكرخ
الرصافة
AL-RUSAFA
AL KARRADAH
المنصور
Baghdad
Camp Liberty
KARRADA
BGW
AL-KARKH
الرشيد
المهدية
حى آسيا
الصحة
أبو دشير

Balance Tests – (Multinomial Logit)

	Mosul			Baghdad		
VARIABLES	(1) Shia power Grab	(2) Sunni Power Grab	(3) Power-sharing	(1) Shia power Grab	(2) Sunni Power Grab	(3) Power-sharing
Female	0.691***	0.814***		0.117	-0.304	
	(0.266)	(0.275)		(0.235)	(0.256)	
Age	-0.00127	-0.0614***		-0.00969	0.107***	
	(0.0142)	(0.0219)		(0.0178)	(0.0169)	
Education	0.118	0.422		-0.397**	-0.179	
	(0.198)	(0.264)		(0.182)	(0.192)	
Work Type	-0.155***	0.0856		-0.00284	0.00397	
	(0.0502)	(0.0595)		(0.0447)	(0.0494)	
Income	-0.471***	0.436***		0.196	-0.403**	
	(0.134)	(0.142)		(0.201)	(0.202)	
Constant	1.471*	-1.514		0.959	-1.521	
	(0.886)	(1.233)		(1.039)	(1.093)	
Observations	537	537	537	492	492	492
Adj. R^2	0.0977	0.0977	0.0977	0.0823	0.0823	0.0823

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Power-sharing txt group is the comparison group



	Mosul			Baghdad		
Txt	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Shia power grab	2.09	0.68	189	2.28	0.46	164
Sunni power grab	2.13	0.57	175	1.98	0.74	164
Power-sharing	2.11	0.53	173	2.58	0.58	165

Unpaired T-tests	Mosul	Baghdad
Shia vs. Sunni power grab	0.65	4.46***
Shia power grab vs. power-sharing	0.33	5.13***
Sunni power grab vs. power-sharing	0.37	8.20***

Pre/Post-treatment Security Assessments





Principal Component Factor Analysis on Security Index – Mosul Sample

```
Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs    =      1,074
Method: principal factors                        Retained factors =          2
Rotation: (unrotated)                            Number of params =          6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
--------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
Factor1  |      2.26861      2.10836            1.0589       1.0589
Factor2  |      0.16026      0.23226            0.0748       1.1338
Factor3  |     -0.07201      0.14253           -0.0336       1.1001
Factor4  |     -0.21453            .           -0.1001       1.0000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 1954.93 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

-----------------------------------------------
Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness
-------------+--------------------+--------------
ppsecurity |   0.7737   -0.2198 |      0.3531
ppcriminal |   0.8184    0.1354 |      0.3118
pppolicing |   0.7451   -0.1561 |      0.4205
ppeconomy |   0.6671    0.2632 |      0.4857
-----------------------------------------------
```

Principal Component Factor Analysis on Security Index – Baghdad Sample

```
Factor analysis/correlation                       Number of obs    =        986
    Method: principal factors                     Retained factors =          2
    Rotation: (unrotated)                         Number of params =          6

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------
        Factor1  |      3.01916      3.01525            1.0564       1.0564
        Factor2  |      0.00390      0.07714            0.0014       1.0578
        Factor3  |     -0.07323      0.01876           -0.0256       1.0322
        Factor4  |     -0.09199            .           -0.0322       1.0000
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 3300.08 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

    -------------------------------------------------
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness
    -------------+--------------------+--------------
      ppsecurity |   0.8911   -0.0343 |      0.2047
      ppcriminal |   0.9183   -0.0249 |      0.1561
      pppolicing |   0.8609    0.0291 |      0.2580
       ppeconomy |   0.8004    0.0355 |      0.3581
    -------------------------------------------------
```

Robustness Checks for MS Table 2 using Ordered Probit Estimation

MS Table 2 (ordered Probit estimation)

	(1) Baghdad	(2) Mosul
Shia power grab	0.444***	-0.159
	(0.111)	(0.116)
Sunni power grab	-2.877***	0.893***
	(0.209)	(0.131)
Constant cut1	-5.136***	-2.758***
	(0.335)	(0.274)
Constant cut2	-4.759***	-2.409***
	(0.276)	(0.207)
Constant cut3	-4.116***	-2.243***
	(0.232)	(0.174)
Constant cut4	-3.548***	-1.826***
	(0.215)	(0.136)
Constant cut5	-2.855***	-1.511***
	(0.198)	(0.119)
Constant cut6	-2.737***	-1.112***
	(0.199)	(0.115)
Constant cut7	-2.185***	-.724
	(0. 179)	(0.109)
Constant cut8	-2.152***	-.175
	(0.177)	(0.105)
Constant cut9	-1.683***	0.031
	(0.122)	(0.106)
Constant cut10	-1.658***	0.112
	(0.123)	(0.107)
Constant cut11	-1.426***	0.301***
	(0.106)	(0.111)
Constant cut12	-1.304***	0.713***
	(0.106)	(0.116)
Constant cut13	-.856***	1.061***
	(0.097)	(0.122)
Constant cut14	-.451***	1.412***
	(0.093)	(0.126)
Constant cut15	.247***	2.010***
	(0.089)	(0.153)
Constant cut16	.863***	2.329***
	(0.095)	(0.182)
Observations	493	537
Pseudo R^2	0.207	0.0372

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Internal Validity of the Experiment

How confident can we be that our experimental treatments are capturing reactions to power-sharing and power-grabbing as opposed to other signals from our primes? As an internal validity check on these results, we also examine the effects of individual attitudes toward power-relations between Mosul and Baghdad. The table below reports the results of OLS regression on our index of security evaluations. We only include post-treatment analysis as we do not have pre-treatment variants of the mediators. In Baghdad, we have two items that are shown to fully mediate the effect of the Shia power-grab treatment and partially mediate the effect of the Sunni power-grab treatment. The power-sharing treatment is represented in the constant term. First, residents of Baghdad were asked whether they agree or disagree that "It is essential that Iraq remain a unified state" to which over 75% strongly agreed. The second item asks whether respondents agree or disagree that "Mosul should be given more independence from Baghdad" to which 56.6% agreed and 44.4% disagreed, highlighting tension in Baghdad over regional autonomy. Models 1 and 3 are replicated from Table 1 for comparison. Models 5 and 6 show the predicted effect of each variable on our security index. In Baghdad, Model 5 indicates that agreement on essential state unity is negatively associated with security assessments in Mosul, while agreement on Mosul needing more autonomy from Baghdad is positively associated with security evaluations. The mediating effects of these variables on the power-grabbing treatments suggest that preferences regarding center-peripheral control are important to explaining power-grabbing assessments on security.[9]

Next, we find similar mediating effects in Mosul, using different but analogous instruments. In Mosul model 6, we asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with three statements regarding power-distribution: "The government in Baghdad should have more authority over Mosul" which captures an underling attitude toward the expansion of non-local/outgroup power; "Mosul should have more local control over local decision-making" which taps into preferences for expansion of local/in-group power, and finally "Authorities in Mosul and Baghdad should share power equally in the interests of peace" which evaluates preferences for joint power-sharing. To these items 37.5%, 89.9%, and 42.6% agreed respectively, which are consistent with our power-grabbing hypotheses H2 and H3 on preferences for in-group power-grabbing over power-sharing, over out-group power-grabbing. In Mosul, model 6 shows that those who favor more power-sharing and more power to Baghdad have a more positive assessment of security in Mosul, while those who seek more local control (more power to Mosul) evaluate security prospects more negatively. These items fully mediate the Sunni power-grabbing treatment effect in the Mosul sample and amplify the significance of the Shia power-grabbing treatment, thus providing further evidence that the treatment effects we observe in our survey experience are driven by concerns about power-distribution and power-sharing versus power-grabbing specifically. We report additional robustness checks and results from other weaker moderators and independent security correlates online for reference.

[9] See the online appendix for a formal causal mediation analysis of Models 5 and 6.

Analysis of Power-sharing vs. Power-grabbing Treatment-Effect Mediators (OLS Regression)

	Model 1 Baghdad Post	Model 5 Baghdad Post	Model 3 Mosul Post	Model 6 Mosul Post
Shia power-grab	0.198***	0.0715	-0.119	-0.187**
	(0.0466)	(0.0543)	(0.0888)	(0.0746)
Sunni power-grab	-2.112***	-1.608***	0.756***	-0.0101
	(0.0696)	(0.100)	(0.0873)	(0.103)
Essential state unity		-0.217***		
		(0.0390)		
Autonomy for Mosul		0.290***		
		(0.0384)		
More Power to Baghdad				0.288***
				(0.0360)
More Power to Mosul				-0.133***
				(0.0462)
More Joint Power-Sharing				0.306***
				(0.0367)
Power-Sharing (constant)	4.450***	4.336***	3.201***	2.456***
	(0.0391)	(0.106)	(0.0748)	(0.155)
Observations	493	493	537	537
R-squared	0.785	0.809	0.206	0.426

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Causal Mediation Analysis of Power-sharing/Power-grabbing Preferences

For the Mosul sample, among the three potential mediator variables (More power to Mosul, More Power to Baghdad, More Power-sharing), models 3 and 4 are most impactful on Model 1 treatment effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Location	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	Security	Security	Security
Shia power-grab	-0.119	-0.127	-0.183**	-0.133*
	(0.0801)	(0.0801)	(0.0729)	(0.0721)
Sunni power-grab	0.756***	0.716***	0.354***	0.182**
	(0.0817)	(0.0845)	(0.0829)	(0.0895)
More Power to Baghdad		-0.0916*		
		(0.0513)		
More Power to Mosul			0.399***	
			(0.0369)	
More Power-Sharing				0.420***
				(0.0374)
Constant	3.201***	3.520***	2.343***	2.392***
	(0.0579)	(0.188)	(0.0951)	(0.0889)
Observations	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.206	0.211	0.349	0.358
adj. r2	0.203	0.206	0.345	0.354

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A formal causal mediation analysis indicates that including More Power to Mosul in Model 3 mediates 44% of the total treatment effect for the Sunni power grab treatment.

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ACME	-.3602424	-.4481267	-.2779476
Direct Effect	-.4564094	-.6006528	-.3140785
Total Effect	-.8166519	-.9595808	-.6746361
% of Tot Eff mediated	.4411647	.3754165	.5339804

More Power-sharing in Model 4 mediates 69% of the total treatment effect for the Sunni power grab treatment.

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ACME	-.5634101	-.6779429	-.4568747
Direct Effect	-.2524651	-.4136753	-.0933922

```
Total Effect           | -.8158752     -.9572208     -.6747493
% of Tot Eff mediated  |  .6904067      .5885897      .8349923
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In Baghdad, among the three potential mediator variables (Essential state unity and Autonomy for Mosul), model 3 is most impactful on Model 1 treatment effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Location	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad
DV	Security	Security	Security
Shia power-grab	0.198***	0.229***	0.0335
	(0.0604)	(0.0633)	(0.0641)
Sunni power-grab	-2.112***	-2.066***	-1.840***
	(0.0604)	(0.0667)	(0.0730)
Essential state unity		-0.0708	
		(0.0441)	
Autonomy for Mosul			0.216***
			(0.0350)
Constant	4.450***	4.685***	3.828***
	(0.0427)	(0.153)	(0.109)
Observations	493	493	493
R-squared	0.785	0.786	0.801
adj. r2	0.784	0.785	0.799

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A formal causal mediation analysis indicates that including Autonomy for Mosul in Model 3 mediates 83% of the total treatment effect for the Shia power grab treatment.

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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effect                 |  Mean          [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------
ACME                   | -1.035469     -1.199754     -.8762802
Direct Effect          | -.2128656     -.4049046     -.0233727
Total Effect           | -1.248335     -1.443318     -1.050468
% of Tot Eff mediated  |  .8295777      .7174236      .9857228
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Analysis of Other Potential Treatment Moderators/Mediators

Here we consider a range of other plausible moderators/mediators of treatment effects on security to include demographics, social distance and inter-group contact between people from Mosul and Baghdad, sectarianism, ethnocentrism, and religiosity. In most cases, initial treatment effects are partially moderated/mediated by the inclusion of the additional covariates. Regression analysis is conducted using OLS as in the manuscript.

Demographic Correlates of Security

	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)
Location	Baghdad	Baghdad	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	Security	Security	Security
Shia power grab	0.198***	0.177***	-0.119	-0.133
	(0.0604)	(0.0480)	(0.0801)	(0.0880)
Sunni power grab	-2.112***	2.044***	0.756***	0.551***
	(0.0604)	(0.0860)	(0.0817)	(0.0906)
Female		-0.0681		0.180**
		(0.0604)		(0.0741)
Age		-0.00119		-0.0208***
		(0.00483)		(0.00536)
Education		0.0509		0.256***
		(0.0429)		(0.0592)
Professional worker		0.0192		0.311**
		(0.121)		(0.125)
Office worker		-0.139		0.390***
		(0.119)		(0.117)
Manual worker		-0.00276		0.674***
		(0.115)		(0.126)
Famer, self-emp		-0.285		
		(0.218)		
Agricultural worker		-0.147		0.585***
		(0.194)		(0.130)
Armed forces		-0.278		0.658***
		(0.240)		(0.232)
Unemployed		0.0357		0.676***
		(0.142)		(0.119)
Student		-0.126		0.402***
		(0.123)		(0.138)
Pensioner		-0.651***		0.898***
		(0.143)		(0.236)
Other employment		-0.943***		1.085***
		(0.155)		(0.243)
Income		0.0610		0.0839**
		(0.0504)		(0.0394)

Shia		-0.0693		0.332
		(0.0474)		(0.213)
Christian				0.638***
				(0.0905)
Constant	4.450***	1.750***	3.201***	3.715***
	(0.0427)	(0.322)	(0.0579)	(0.283)
Observations	493	492	537	537
R-squared	0.785	0.806	0.206	0.317
Adj. R^2	0.784	0.799	0.203	0.294

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: for employment type: employer or owner of a firm is the comparison group.

The models show limited mediating/moderating effects of demographics on treatment variables in comparing Models 1-2 in Baghdad and Models 3-4 in Mosul.

Victimization during ISIS occupation (2014-2017, Mosul only)

The following table indicates the percentage of respondents (the mean of dummy variables) who experienced victimization by ISIS in some form as self-reported in the survey (post-treatment).

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Punished by ISIS	537	0.47	0.50	0	1
Family punished by ISIS	537	0.09	0.28	0	1
Injured by ISIS	537	0.00	0.04	0	1
Family injured by ISIS	537	0.03	0.16	0	1
Family killed by ISIS	537	0.04	0.21	0	1
Imprisoned by ISIS	537	0.09	0.29	0	1
Fled home because of ISIS	537	0.02	0.15	0	1
Home looted by ISIS	537	0.06	0.24	0	1
Women abused by ISIS	537	0.01	0.12	0	1

ISIS Victimization and Treatment Effects (OLS regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Location	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	security	security	security
Shia power grab	-0.119	0.109	0.0280	-0.606***
	(0.0801)	(0.0744)	(0.0788)	(0.145)
Sunni power grab	0.756***	0.164*	0.507***	0.111
	(0.0817)	(0.0891)	(0.0933)	(0.0908)
ISIS victimization index			-3.487***	-7.128***
			(0.523)	(0.649)
Shia pg x victimization				5.559***
				(0.960)
Sunni pg x victimization				4.836***
				(1.040)
Punished by ISIS		-1.065***		
		(0.0869)		
Family punished by ISIS		-0.103		
		(0.128)		
Injured by ISIS		1.791***		
		(0.399)		
Family injured by ISIS		-0.744***		

		(0.237)		
Family killed by ISIS		-0.0494		
		(0.115)		
Imprisoned by ISIS		-0.0478		
		(0.0930)		
Fled home because of ISIS		-0.949**		
		(0.387)		
Home looted by ISIS		-0.0302		
		(0.190)		
Women abused by ISIS		0.255		
		(0.523)		
Constant	3.201***	3.863***	3.548***	3.910***
	(0.0579)	(0.0817)	(0.0834)	(0.0836)
Observations	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.206	0.494	0.368	0.439
adj. r2	0.203	0.483	0.364	0.434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: model 3 utilizes a combined additive index of ISIS victimization. Comparing Model 1 to Model 2-3 shows that victimization is a partial mediator of Sunni power grab treatment effects using both a series of independent dummy variables for victimization (model 2) as well as from a combined index (model 3).

Formal causal mediation analysis indicates that the ISIS victimization index in Model 3 has a 34% mediating effect on the Sunni power grab treatment in the Mosul. Individual victimization index effects vary.

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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Effect                |  Mean          [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------
             ACME                  |  .3212741      .2414385      .4077812
             Direct Effect         |  .4938293      .3577646        .62809
             Total Effect          |  .8151034      .6783276       .954494
             % of Tot Eff mediated |  .3937894      .3365912      .4736268
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```

Model 4 shows the moderating effects of ISIS victimization through interaction terms with treatment effects. Victimization has a security-reducing effect in the power-sharing treatment and security-enhancing effects in the power-grab treatments both in-group and out-group. It speaks to how victimization can potentially amplify non-cooperative preferences across sectarian divisions.

Victimization during Liberation (2017, Mosul only)

The following table indicates the percentage of respondents (the mean of dummy variables) who experienced victimization during the liberation of Mosul in some form as self-reported in the survey (post-treatment)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Were you Wounded? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.39	0.49	0	1
Were you Wounded? = 2, Iraqi forces	537	0.00	0.04	0	1
Were you Wounded? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.08	0.27	0	1
immediate family members wounded? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.39	0.49	0	1
immediate family members wounded? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.04	0.19	0	1
immediate family members killed? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.37	0.48	0	1
immediate family members killed? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.03	0.16	0	1
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.27	0.44	0	1
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 2, Iraqi forces	537	0.00	0.04	0	1
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.16	0.37	0	1
Detained or imprisoned? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.34	0.47	0	1
Detained or imprisoned? = 2, Iraqi forces	537	0.01	0.09	0	1
Forced to flee home? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.55	0.50	0	1
Forced to flee home? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.01	0.07	0	1
Home or property looted? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.42	0.49	0	1
Home or property looted? = 2, Iraqi forces	537	0.00	0.04	0	1
Home or property looted? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.00	0.04	0	1
Women abused or assaulted? = 1, ISIS forces	537	0.36	0.48	0	1
Women abused or assaulted? = 3, Air strikes	537	0.01	0.10	0	1

Liberation Victimization and Treatment Effects (OLS regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Location	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	security	security	security
Shia power grab	-0.119	-0.0891	-0.0778	-0.127
	(0.0801)	(0.0933)	(0.0851)	(0.122)
Sunni power grab	0.756***	-0.152	0.174	0.343
	(0.0817)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.273)
Liberation victimization index (all sources)			0.706***	0.642*
			(0.111)	(0.378)
Shia pg x victimization				0.221
				(0.391)
Sunni pg x victimization				-0.107
				(0.432)
Were you Wounded? = 1, ISIS forces		1.559***		
		(0.275)		
Were you Wounded? = 2, Iraqi forces		1.129***		
		(0.321)		
Were you Wounded? = 3, Air strikes		-0.124		
		(0.0989)		
immediate family members wounded? = 1, ISIS forces		-0.437		
		(0.307)		
immediate family members wounded? = 3, Air strikes		0.304		
		(0.253)		
immediate family members killed? = 1, ISIS forces		0.299*		
		(0.180)		
immediate family members killed? = 3, Air strikes		0.957***		
		(0.326)		
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 1, ISIS forces		-0.457***		
		(0.122)		
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 2, Iraqi forces		-0.579***		
		(0.0910)		
Was your home damaged/destroyed? = 3, Air strikes		-0.340***		
		(0.0882)		
Detained or imprisoned? = 1, ISIS forces		0.285		
		(0.312)		
Detained or imprisoned? = 2, Iraqi forces		0.612*		
		(0.344)		
Forced to flee home? = 1, ISIS forces		0.0693		
		(0.144)		
Forced to flee home? = 3, Air strikes		0.215		
		(0.250)		
Home or property looted? = 1, ISIS forces		-0.736***		
		(0.149)		

Home or property looted? = 2, Iraqi forces		-0.810***		
		(0.147)		
Home or property looted? = 3, Air strikes		-0.380		
		(0.349)		
Women abused or assaulted? = 1, ISIS forces		0.485		
		(0.325)		
Women abused or assaulted? = 3, Air strikes		0.712		
		(0.484)		
Constant	3.201***	3.079***	3.014***	3.031***
	(0.0579)	(0.0910)	(0.0772)	(0.111)
Observations	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.206	0.555	0.271	0.274
adj. r2	0.203	0.536	0.267	0.267

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: For each victimization category in Model 2, no reported victimization is the comparison group. ISIS forces, Coalition air strikes, and Iraqi forces are listed as the cause of victimization. Victimization by ISIS forces is the most common source. Comparing Models 1- 2 shows how victimization during liberation mediates the effect of the Sunni power grab treatment. Model 3 uses a combined index of victimization (from any source) during liberation (Cronbach's alpha = 0.91). Formal causal mediation analysis indicates that victimization during liberation has a 74% mediating effect on the Sunni power grab treatment in the Mosul. Mediating effects of individual victimization components vary.

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ACME	.6152443	.4448737	.7872307
Direct Effect	.2083401	-.0106565	.4244331
Total Effect	.8235844	.690486	.964302
% of Tot Eff mediated	.7455102	.6380207	.8910331

Model 4 indicates no significant moderating effects of liberation during victimization when interacted with treatments.

ISIS Victimization and Post-Traumatic Stress

Consistent with our discussion of moderating effects of victimization related to H4, we find that victims of ISIS violence have increased feelings of fear and anxiety (worry) compared to non-victims. The dependent variable asks respondents to indicate whether they have had recent feelings of being afraid or worried with response options ranging from 1 = slightly or not at all to 5 = extremely. The following OLS models indicate the effect of pre-liberation and liberation related exposure to violence and victimization on feelings of fear and anxiety. Models 1 and 2 show that victimization by ISIS during liberation is uncorrelated with fear and anxiety, while victimization by the Iraqi military and coalition air strikes is negatively correlated with fear and anxiety. In contrast, Models 3 and 4 show that pre-liberation victimization by ISIS is strongly correlated with feelings of fear and to a lesser extent anxiety, consistent with theoretical expectations of post-traumatic stress. Hence, not all victimization is stress-inducing but pre-ISIS victimization is the strongest moderator of treatment effects and appears to have more detrimental long-term effects than liberation-related victimization.

Relationship between Victimization and Fear/Anxiety (OLS regression).

VARIABLES	(1) afraid	(2) worried	(3) afraid	(4) worried
Victimization by ISIS (pre-liberation)			1.715***	0.978*
			(0.521)	(0.546)
Victimization by ISIS (liberation)	-0.133	0.168		
	(0.0931)	(0.104)		
Victimization by air strikes (lib)	-0.704**	-1.951***		
	(0.335)	(0.357)		
Victimization by Iraqi army (lib)	-2.877**	0.346		
	(1.296)	(1.491)		
Constant	2.033***	2.482***	1.788***	2.367***
	(0.0625)	(0.0745)	(0.0509)	(0.0569)
Observations	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.023	0.038	0.038	0.010
adj. r2	0.0172	0.0328	0.0363	0.00775

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sectarian and Local/Non-Local Social Distance

Social distance to people in Baghdad and Mosul, to Sunni and Shia Iraqis is independently predictive of feelings of security but does not significantly mediate power-sharing treatment effects.

	(1)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(4)
Location	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Mosul	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security			Security		
Shia power grab	0.198***	0.294***	0.269***	-0.119	-0.0384	-0.0569
	(0.0604)	(0.0583)	(0.0805)	(0.0801)	(0.0779)	(0.0726)
Sunni power grab	-2.112***	-2.284***	-2.007***	0.756***	0.253***	0.259***
	(0.0604)	(0.0838)	(0.104)	(0.0817)	(0.0972)	(0.0890)
Close to people in Mosul		0.138***			-0.0285	
		(0.0385)			(0.0417)	
Close to Baghdad		-0.0917***			-0.302***	
		(0.0341)			(0.0325)	
Close to Sunni			-0.0620*			0.408***
			(0.0331)			(0.0415)
Close to Shia			0.0185			-0.285***
			(0.0257)			(0.0452)
Constant	4.450***	4.292***	4.519***	3.201***	4.454***	3.413***
	(0.0427)	(0.093)	(0.082)	(0.0579)	(0.158)	(0.212)
Observations	493	493	493	537	537	537
R-squared	0.785	0.794	0.787	0.206	0.337	0.368
Adj. R^2	0.784	0.792	0.785	0.203	0.332	0.363

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Cognizance of Sunni/Shia majority status in Mosul/Baghdad

Cognizance of Sunni/Shia majority status is independently predictive of feelings of security but does not significantly mediate power-sharing treatment effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Location	Baghdad	Baghdad	Mosul	Mosul
DV	Security	Security	Security	Security
Shia power grab	0.198***	0.173***	-0.119	-0.179**
	(0.0604)	(0.0462)	(0.0801)	(0.0901)
Sunni power grab	-2.112***	-1.925***	0.756***	0.668***
	(0.0604)	(0.0768)	(0.0817)	(0.0983)
Baghdad is majority Shia now		-0.0325		-0.192**
		(0.0459)		(0.0782)
Mosul is majority Sunni now		0.154***		0.146**
		(0.0287)		(0.0684)
Constant	4.450***	4.077***	3.201***	3.427***
	(0.0427)	(0.1911)	(0.0579)	(0.207)
Observations	493	493	537	537
R-squared	0.785	0.795	0.206	0.217
Adj. R^2	0.784	0.794	0.203	0.211

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sunni/Shia Intergroup Contact and Travel between Mosul and Baghdad

Inter-group contact is independently predictive of feelings of security but does not significantly mediate power-sharing treatment effects.

	(1) Baghdad Security	(2) Baghdad Security	(3) Mosul Security	(4) Mosul Security
Shia power grab	0.198***	0.207***	-0.119	-0.261***
	(0.0604)	(0.0447)	(0.0801)	(0.0858)
Sunni power grab	-2.112***	-2.041***	0.756***	0.761***
	(0.0604)	(0.0706)	(0.0817)	(0.0838)
Contact with Mosul		0.155***		
		(0.0370)		
Travel to Mosul		-0.00995		
		(0.0359)		
Contact with Baghdad				0.212***
				(0.0515)
Travel to Baghdad				-0.160***
				(0.0444)
Constant	4.450***	3.941***	3.201***	3.003***
	(0.0427)	(0.158)	(0.0579)	(0.206)
Observations	493	493	537	516
R-squared	0.785	0.794	0.206	0.296
Adj. R^2	0.784	0.792	0.203	0.291

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ethical Considerations about Experimental Treatment Effects

One concern we consider is that our power-sharing vs. power-grabbing treatments could have triggered emotional disturbances in our respondents with detrimental consequences for their attitudes toward out-groups and the peace process. This is a reasonable concern in a volatile environment with a history of sectarian violence and tension. First, we note that respondents were free to refuse to answer any questions in the study and cease participation at any time. Next, we assess the emotional impact of our power-sharing/power-grabbing treatments using a post-treatment emotional battery.

We asked respondents to react to how the vignette they just heard read to them makes them feel emotionally about the security situation in Mosul. The only difference in question wording is that in the status quo power-sharing vignette the item reads: "How does that make you feel about the security situation in Mosul?" while in the attempted power-grab vignettes, the item reads "How would that make you feel about the security situation in Mosul?" Options include [Afraid, Angry, Happy, Sad, Worried, Satisfied/Content] and response options range from 1 = very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4=quite a bit, and 5 = extremely. This item is essentially a modification of the PANAS-X positive and negative emotional affect scale.

The figure below shows the impact of the experimental treatments on feelings of fear. While we do not assess pre-treatment emotional states, the post-treatment effect of experiencing the power-grabbing treatments are actually less fear-inducing than the status quo for both the Baghdad and Mosul samples. In both samples the average expression of fear in the power-grabbing treatments (both in-group and out-group) ranged in the "a little" category. Instead, the power-sharing treatment, which represents the status quo, shows slightly higher fear responses than either of the power grabbing treatments, on the order of "moderately" in Baghdad and "a little" in Mosul. This is not the kind of emotional responses one would expect from an experiment that was psychological or deeply traumatizing. We also find similar limited emotional impact of our treatments on other positive (happiness, satisfaction) and negative emotions (anger, worry, sadness) in a box-whisker plot below. Though emotional responses may be correlated with other variables of interest related, we do not find strong evidence that our treatments had traumatic triggering effects on our respondents that would raise serious ethical concerns about the design. If we or others had observed anything that was concerning, we would have stopped the experiment at the IRB or piloting stage of the study.


Power-sharing vs. Power-grabbing and Fear (Post-Treatment)
mean of post-txt fear
1 = little or not at all
2
3
4
"5=extremely"
Baghdad
Mosul
Shia power grab
Sunni power grab
Power sharing


Power-sharing vs. Power-grabbing and Emotions (post-treatment)
Baghdad, Shia power grab
Baghdad, Sunni power grab
Baghdad, Power sharing
Mosul, Shia power grab
Mosul, Sunni power grab
Mosul, Power sharing
1
2
3
4
5
17a. Afraid
17b. Angry
17c. Happy
17d. Sad
17e. Worried

Emotional Mediators of Treatment Effects

Next, we consider a psychological pathway where our power-sharing and power-grabbing primes increase fear, anxiety, anger, and sadness (negative affect) and/or reduce positive affect (happiness, satisfaction) with consequences for threat perceptions toward outgroups, feelings of insecurity toward outgroups and the peace process in general (Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2021; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Huddy et al. 2005). In the table below we regress emotional responses to the treatment effects against our main dependent variable from the manuscript on security perceptions (post-treatment). However, Models 1 and 2 show that the inclusion of emotional controls has little mediating impact on treatment effects in Baghdad. In Mosul, Models 3 and 4 show emotional controls have a stronger mediating effect on the Sunni power grab treatment.

VARIABLES	Model 1 Baghdad Post Treatment	Model 2 Baghdad Post Treatment	Model 3 Mosul Post Treatment	Model 4 Mosul Post Treatment
Shia power grab	0.198***	0.190***	-0.119	-0.0400
	(0.0466)	(0.0625)	(0.0888)	(0.0574)
Sunni power grab	-2.112***	-1.895***	0.756***	0.0475
	(0.0696)	(0.0839)	(0.0873)	(0.0793)
afraid		-0.0927**		-0.313***
		(0.0366)		(0.0373)
angry		0.187***		0.221***
		(0.0319)		(0.0552)
happy		-0.0299		0.371***
		(0.0484)		(0.0457)
sad		-0.0488		-0.0184
		(0.0314)		(0.0512)
worried		0.139***		0.0924***
		(0.0390)		(0.0349)
satisfied		-0.0183		0.138***
		(0.0421)		(0.0382)
Constant	4.450***	4.058***	3.201***	2.508***
	(0.0391)	(0.193)	(0.0748)	(0.106)
Observations	493	491	537	537
R-squared	0.785	0.831	0.206	0.600
adj. r2	0.784	0.829	0.203	0.594

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To explore how emotional reactions to the Sunni power grab treatment may be impacting treatment effects, we run additional regression models below controlling for each emotional category separately. We see that while fear has a negative effect on security as expected, it does not significantly mediate the treatment effect. Instead, stronger mediating effects are found in anger and sadness on the negative affect side and happiness and satisfaction on the positive affect side. Hence, a combination of negative and positive emotions helps explain treatment effects on security in the Mosul sample, at least in the Sunni power grab treatment.

VARIABLES	(1) Mosul security	(2) Mosul security	(3) Mosul security	(4) Mosul security	(5) Mosul security	(6) Mosul security
Shia power-grab	-0.185**	-0.145*	-0.145*	-0.113	0.0796	0.0115
	(0.0858)	(0.0804)	(0.0751)	(0.0876)	(0.0665)	(0.0659)
Sunni power-grab	0.708***	0.595***	0.473***	0.752***	0.202**	0.306***
	(0.0844)	(0.0862)	(0.0862)	(0.0881)	(0.0881)	(0.0866)
afraid	-0.253***					
	(0.0347)					
angry		0.248***				
		(0.0503)				
sad			0.300***			
			(0.0359)			
worried				0.0628*		
				(0.0340)		
happy					0.549***	
					(0.0410)	
satisfied						0.441***
						(0.0374)
Constant	3.731***	2.849***	2.664***	3.046***	2.299***	2.461***
	(0.104)	(0.0957)	(0.0860)	(0.102)	(0.0822)	(0.0834)
Observations	537	537	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.285	0.262	0.329	0.212	0.459	0.436
adj. r2	0.281	0.258	0.325	0.208	0.456	0.433

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Going a step further, we provide OLS regression models with interaction terms between our experimental treatments and positive/negative affect in Mosul treating emotions as continuous variables. In Model 1 we show that fear has a reductive effect on perceptions of security in the power-sharing treatment, but no effect on the Sunni/Shia power grab treatments. In Model 2 and 3 we show that feelings of anger and sadness are security enhancing in the power-sharing treatment and security reducing in both power-grab treatments. The angrier one is at the thought of one side attempting to seize more power, the less secure they feel. In model 4, the more one worries about the effects of a Shia power-grab the more secure they feel. Finally, Models 5-6 show that happiness

and satisfaction are security enhancing in the power-sharing treatment. If power-sharing makes one happier, they feel more secure. In contrast, people who respond happily to the prospect of a Shia power-grab feel less secure (no effect for satisfaction), while people who are increasingly happy/satisfied with the prospects of a Sunni power grab feel less secure.

VARIABLES	(1) Mosul security	(2) Mosul security	(3) Mosul security	(4) Mosul security	(5) Mosul security	(6) Mosul security
Shia power-grab	-0.284*	0.269	0.221*	-0.495**	0.448***	0.113
	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.128)	(0.192)	(0.137)	(0.148)
Sunni power-grab	0.593***	2.380***	2.343***	1.204***	1.546***	1.795***
	(0.180)	(0.189)	(0.258)	(0.243)	(0.271)	(0.197)
afraid	-0.288***					
	(0.0520)					
Shia pg x afraid	0.0490					
	(0.0731)					
Sunni pg x afraid	0.0567					
	(0.0868)					
angry		0.847***				
		(0.112)				
Shia pg x angry		-0.313***				
		(0.117)				
Sunni pg x angry		-1.049***				
		(0.125)				
sad			0.578***			
			(0.0609)			
Shia pg x sad			-0.208***			
			(0.0639)			
Sunni pg x sad			-0.779***			
			(0.106)			
worried				0.0385		
				(0.0716)		
Shia pg x worried				0.160**		
				(0.0794)		
Sunni pg x worried				-0.177*		
				(0.101)		
happy					0.798***	
					(0.0702)	
Shia pg x happy					-0.218***	
					(0.0840)	
Sunni pg x happy					-0.602***	
					(0.110)	
satisfied						0.732***
						(0.0503)

Shia pg x satisfied						-0.0117
						(0.0997)
Sunni pg x satisfied						-0.662***
						(0.0733)
Constant	3.805***	1.996***	2.166***	3.106***	1.891***	1.974***
	(0.136)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.172)	(0.112)	(0.0947)
Observations	537	537	537	537	537	537
R-squared	0.286	0.437	0.443	0.243	0.517	0.562
adj. r2	0.280	0.431	0.438	0.236	0.512	0.558

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In summary, while we find some moderating/mediating effects of emotional reactions to experimental treatments on perceptions of security, we do not see a clear pathway where our Sunni/Shia power grab treatments were fear-inducing with negative consequences for security. Other negative affect associated with our experimental treatments (anger, sadness, and worry) does have some moderating negative effects on perceptions of security. People who are angry or sad about the prospects of one-sided power-grabbing feel less secure in the present day. However, people who might welcome a one-sided power grab (indicated by increased happiness or satisfaction) also feel less secure compared to those who are happy/satisfied with power-sharing. Hence, the emotional pathways generated by our experimental treatments are multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a simple fear-inducing mechanism, for which we find limited mediating or moderating effect.

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Material and Social-Psychological Motivations

We consider the possibility that power-grabbing is not driven by security concerns but rather by material or social-psychological gains. To examine incentives for material gains, we consider that lower income and unemployed persons might view power-grabbing as a means to increase access to resources, consistent with many greed-based assessments of violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) We interact our power-sharing/power-grabbing treatments with income and unemployment in the models below. We also limit our dependent variable to only assessments about the economic conditions in Mosul before/after treatments. The dependent variable ranges from 1 = economic conditions will get a lot worse to 5 = economic conditions will get a lot better. Income is measured on a 4 point scale using a proxy variable where 1 = income does not provide enough to cover basic expenses to 4 = income covers expenses and provides enough for savings. Unemployment is measured from a dummy variable where 23.0% of the sample is unemployed (25.1% in Mosul vs 20.6% in Baghdad). The table below shows that inside Mosul, people with higher incomes and who are unemployed see greater economic benefit from power-sharing than from power-grabbing which is contrary to arguments that power-grabbing is motivated by underlying material incentives. In Baghdad, we see no impact of income or unemployment when interacted with treatment variables.

VARIABLES	(1) Mosul economy	(2) Mosul economy	(4) Baghdad economy	(5) Baghdad economy
Shia power-grab	0.610	-0.194	0.786*	0.302***
	(0.374)	(0.140)	(0.455)	(0.0843)
Sunni power-grab	2.331***	1.632***	-2.066***	-1.861***
	(0.386)	(0.140)	(0.490)	(0.0961)
income	0.377***		0.149	
	(0.128)		(0.134)	
Shia pg x income	-0.403***		-0.157	
	(0.146)		(0.145)	
Sunni pg x income	-0.372**		0.0592	
	(0.144)		(0.158)	
unemployed		1.317***		0.120
		(0.255)		(0.173)
Shia pg x unemployed		-1.033***		-0.00782
		(0.320)		(0.186)
Sunni pg x unemployed		-1.247***		-0.304
		(0.287)		(0.237)
Constant	1.608***	2.299***	3.988***	4.416***
	(0.332)	(0.118)	(0.422)	(0.0732)
Observations	537	537	493	493

R-squared	0.339	0.377	0.674	0.669
adj. r2	0.333	0.371	0.670	0.665

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In terms of social-psychological explanations, we consider whether groups might view power-grabbing as a means to achieve cultural hegemony over outgroups either in terms of ethnicity or religion. We test this by interacting our treatment variables with measures of the importance of ethnicity and religion (1=not at all important to 4 = very important) while controlling for subject ethnicity and religion. Both models treat importance of ethnicity and religion as continuous variables for simplicity in the interaction models. Models 1 and 2 shows that Arabs with strong attachments to their ethnicity do not have security preferences that support an Arab power-grab over non-Arab outgroups. In fact, both in Mosul and Baghdad, those who might qualify as Arab nationalists (strong attachment to identity) see a Sunni power-grab as destabilizing for security. Ethnic Kurds in Mosul in our sample also tend to see the security situation as better than other groups with Arabs as the comparison group. Models 3 and 4 examine the impact of religiosity on treatment effects by interacting importance of religion (1 = not at all important to 4 = very important). Only in Model 4 do we find any evidence that Baghdad Sunni Muslims who are more strongly religious view a Sunni power-grab as potentially security enhancing. We find no impact in Model 3 in Mosul, where such an event might actually take place, though Shia and Christians in Mosul tend to view the security situation as stronger than Sunni Muslims who are the comparison group. Hence, we find relatively limited evidence that treatment effects are driven by a desire for ethnic or religious dominance over outgroups as primordial theories of security dilemma violence might predict (Posen 1993).

VARIABLES	(1) Mosul security	(2) Baghdad security	(3) Mosul security	(4) Baghdad security
Shia power-grab	-0.151	0.0534	-0.653	0.969*
	(0.396)	(0.304)	(0.484)	(0.581)
Sunni power-grab	1.487***	0.0626	0.937*	-3.331***
	(0.410)	(0.244)	(0.545)	(0.431)
Importance of ethnicity	0.116	-0.0463		
	(0.0736)	(0.0702)		
Shia pg x imp. of ethnicity	0.0117	0.0431		
	(0.116)	(0.0886)		
Sunni pg x imp of ethnicity	-0.202*	-0.538***		
	(0.116)	(0.0759)		
Ethnic Kurd	0.601***			
	(0.0711)			
Ethnic Turkmen	0.336			
	(0.437)			
Importance of religion			0.0340	0.0540
			(0.125)	(0.114)

Shia pg x imp. of religion			0.149	-0.200
			(0.136)	(0.152)
Sunni pg x imp of religion			-0.0483	0.310***
			(0.148)	(0.116)
Shia religion			0.390***	-0.0624
			(0.125)	(0.0481)
Christian religion			0.604***	
			(0.0729)	
Constant	2.742***	4.606***	3.069***	4.280***
	(0.244)	(0.237)	(0.459)	(0.429)
Observations	537	493	537	493
R-squared	0.231	0.787	0.231	0.788
adj. r2	0.221	0.785	0.221	0.785

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Sectarianism and Anti-Sectarianism in Iraqi Society

Sectarian division in Iraq has been well documented (Davis 2005; Blaydes 2018; Marr 2018), some of which may be traced back to precolonial origins (Ceylan 2011; Ray 2019). However, the focus on sectarianism also overshadows grass roots civil society movements that seem to transcend sectarian divisions (Isakhan 2011). Even within ISIS, there was widespread intra-sectarian violence against Sunni Arabs who opposed the movement so sectarianism does not adequately explain cycles of violence in Iraqi politics (Dawisha 2010; Byman 2014; Gerges 2017). Iraq also experienced an 'Arab Spring' that focused on government corruption, economic deterioration and constitutional reforms (Sly 2011). At first, activism was largely constrained along sectarian lines (Haddad 2013) with violent clashes between Sunni opposition groups and Shia supporters of the government of Nouri Al-Maliki (Hauser 2013; Al Jazeera 2013a-b). However, later social movements in 2015 through the present have sought to transcend sectarian divisions and have been more peaceful (Hameed 2016; Constantini 2020). Ali (2021) characterizes this as part of a transition in Iraqi politics away from divisive sectarian politics of 'recognition' to more culturally cross-cutting concerns about economic 'redistribution' or what or what Constantini (2020 p. 16) refers to as a movement seeking "reforms, not revolution". There is also growing concern about foreign influence over Iraqi affairs to include US intervention and Iran's influence which includes support for Shia paramilitary groups like like Hashd al-Shaabi (Franzman 2018; Dodge 2020). This includes widespread anti-government demonstrations in 2019 which called for

pressuring for constitutional reforms to curb sectarianism, fight corruption, improve public services, and limit Iranian and US influence (Mansour 2019; Wilson 2019; Alsaadi 2020). Sectarianism was again resurgent following the January 3, 2020 assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, which created a rift between pro/anti-American and Iranian reformist factions including Hashd al-Shaabi supporters (Dodge 2020).

The larger point we hope to make with this discussion is that politics in Iraq is not purely sectarian in nature and there are competing violent/nonviolent, sectarian/cross-cutting political movements in Iraq today which make it a compelling case for the study of public preferences for power-sharing vs. power-grabbing. It is not a forgone conclusion that Iraqis will universally reject power-sharing for sectarian power-grabs, but like Iraqi society more broadly, there choices remain contentious and both power-sharing and power-grabbing strategies can be destabilizing to security.

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Correlates of Power-sharing Support

What might predict who supports power-sharing and who does not? This is another important question that we will consider in greater detail in subsequent research, but we provide an overview of some of the demographic correlates to power-sharing support using survey times. To measure support for power-sharing between Mosul and Baghdad, we utilize the following dependent variable: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Authorities in Mosul and Baghdad should share power equally in the interests of peace" which evaluates preferences for joint power-sharing." Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. The figure below shows the distribution of responses across Mosul and Baghdad where both distributions are skewed in the direction of disagreement with the statement. Two-sample t-tests indicate that support for power-sharing is greater in Mosul than in Baghdad by this indicator ($t = 9.14$ $p<0.0000$).



Next, we provide OLS and Ordered-Probit regressions with controls for demographics and conflict related victimization on support for power-sharing. Model 1-2 show that ISIS victimization is negatively correlated with support for power-sharing, consistent with our argument in the manuscript in Mosul. We do not have comparable victimization data for Baghdad. Education is positively correlated with power-sharing support in Mosul. Among controls for occupation (unemployed persons being the reference category), employers/managers of firms and professionals are less supportive of power-sharing while pensioners are the most supportive group. Religious Shia and ethnic minorities are more supportive of power-sharing than Sunni Arabs, but we have limited minority representation in our samples. Finally, in Models 3-4 there is a negative correlation between age and power-sharing support and more positive support for power-sharing

among employers/managers of firms and professionals and office workers compared to the unemployed. Both models also show that Shia and minority ethnic groups support power-sharing more than Sunni Arabs. Overall, an brief analysis of correlates of power-sharing support reinforces our finding that conflict victimization undermines power-sharing support.

Correlates of Power-sharing Support

VARIABLES	(1) Mosul	(2) Mosul	(3) Baghdad	(4) Baghdad
ISIS victimization	-2.937***	-3.558***		
	(0.536)	(0.718)		
Female	0.178*	0.193	-0.109	-0.143
	(0.106)	(0.130)	(0.107)	(0.126)
Age	-0.00494	-0.00503	-0.0186***	-0.0217***
	(0.00670)	(0.00862)	(0.00687)	(0.00840)
Education	0.187**	0.254**	-0.0317	-0.0234
	(0.0803)	(0.0986)	(0.0759)	(0.0889)
Employer/manager	-0.554***	-0.691***	0.881***	0.916***
	(0.172)	(0.222)	(0.210)	(0.238)
Professional worker	-0.345**	-0.499**	0.438**	0.483**
	(0.167)	(0.209)	(0.177)	(0.204)
Office worker	0.0884	0.0688	0.666***	0.694***
	(0.137)	(0.172)	(0.216)	(0.245)
Manual worker	-0.0227	-0.0446	0.0486	0.0478
	(0.133)	(0.163)	(0.146)	(0.177)
Famer, self-emp			0.140	0.143
			(0.478)	(0.602)
Agricultural worker	0.00478	-0.0123	-0.344	-0.420
	(0.111)	(0.138)	(0.299)	(0.477)
Armed forces	-0.481	-0.680	0.384	0.394
	(0.432)	(0.586)	(0.259)	(0.286)
Student	0.137	0.210	0.166	0.150
	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.156)	(0.183)
Pensioner	2.058***	2.416***	-0.0247	-0.125
	(0.298)	(0.402)	(0.253)	(0.391)
Other employment	0.0169	0.0694	-0.768***	-4.835***
	(0.441)	(0.472)	(0.156)	(0.225)
income	0.0621	0.0625	-0.00665	-0.0200
	(0.0512)	(0.0650)	(0.0769)	(0.0878)
Shia	1.675***	6.547***	0.240**	0.289**
	(0.254)	(0.375)	(0.0956)	(0.115)
Chrisitan	0.0584	0.0245		
	(0.266)	(0.355)		
Kurd	0.685***	0.819**		
	(0.260)	(0.346)		

Turkmen	1.247**	1.520*	1.067***	1.070***
	(0.570)	(0.822)	(0.313)	(0.404)
Constant 1	1.983***	-0.415	2.328***	-0.744*
	(0.350)	(0.440)	(0.357)	(0.417)
Constant 2		0.809*		0.220
		(0.432)		(0.414)
Constant 3		1.646***		0.930**
		(0.431)		(0.415)
Model	OLS	Oprobit	OLS	Oprobit
Observations	537	537	492	492
adj. r2	0.240	0.113	0.0823	0.0440

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1