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Foreign Interventions and Community Cohesion in Times of Conflict

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Abstract
The success of foreign interventions crucially depends on cohesion within communities as they are relevant partners in counterinsurgency and reconstruction. I exploit a geographic regression discontinuity for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and find that the presence of foreign forces negatively affects community cohesion. Households receive less help from others in their community and are less likely to participate in or rely on community councils. This finding has important implications for foreign policy, in particular in an environment where the community compensates for a lack of formal institutions.

Keywords
Conflict, foreign military interventions, security missions, social cohesion, informal institutions, Afghanistan

JEL Classification
D74, D79, F51, O12, O53

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1. Introduction

2021 marked a year of drastic changes for Afghanistan. Despite a rising level of insecurity, international troops withdrew after 20 years of deployment. In August 2021, the Taliban have taken control of the country. Since then, reports on "lessons learned" issued by *The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction* (SIGAR) and the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (NATO) highlight the ignorance of prevailing political, social, and cultural contexts in the host country as one important factor to failure of the foreign intervention.

In this paper, I investigate how the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) affected these local contexts in Afghanistan. In particular, I focus on social ties within communities, trust towards people and political actors, and traditional forms of local governance. ISAF was one of the largest and most challenging coalitions in history, with more than 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations.[1] To achieve its mission of enhancing security and creating a safe environment for reconstruction and nation-building, ISAF took a counterinsurgency approach (e.g., Dorn, 2011).[2] It is well accepted that local communities are relevant partners in counterinsurgency and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Receiving information about insurgents is an important resource during wars, and civilians are therefore approached and (ab)used to share sensitive wartime information (e.g., Berman and Matanock, 2015; Lyall et al., 2015; Gordon and Young, 2017; Wright et al., 2017). Local and international development actors also rely on communities for the effective implementation of their projects. One prominent example is the National Solidarity Program that implements development projects in cooperation with community councils and thereby tries to strengthen local self-governance. Community level ties are thus a prerequisite for many policy measures to be effective, in particular in an environment where state institutions are unstable or even lacking. In Afghanistan, local entities are governed by local non-state actors in the form of community (village) councils. In particular, in rural areas power tends to be local (Jones and Muñoz, 2010). Stollenwerk (2018, p. 521) argues that while ISAF might have aimed for rendering these councils fairer and more inclusive, "this hope seemed politically naïve and has not been fulfilled." Cohn (2009, p. 3) even claims that ISAF rather "helped to undermine and marginalize the important role played by village elders in Afghan culture." If military interventions undermine social cohesion, it can exacerbate tensions and hinder the prospects for peace and development.

To test ISAF's role for local institutions and community cohesion in Afghanistan, I combine georeferenced data on the presence of ISAF and conflict events with household-level data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), the Afghanistan

[1] See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm, accessed July 22, 2021.

[2] Friis (2010) argues that peacekeeping and counterinsurgency "seem to be converging and share some commonalities," such that a clear distinction is not always possible.

Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR), and the Survey of the Afghan People (SAP). Thanks to the richness of the data, I capture the multi-dimensional concept of social cohesion. Chan et al. (2006, p. 290) summarize it as a "set of attitudes and norms that include trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help." According to Fearon et al. (2009, p. 288), the standard approach in measuring social cohesion "[i]nvolves surveying households to assess levels of trust, patterns of community activity, and the extent of associational life." I cover these dimensions by including indicators as participation in or reliance on local community councils, trust in different actors and, whether households receive help from others in their community.

Conflict in Afghanistan represents an inherently long-term phenomenon and correlates with almost any possible outcome, such as community cohesion and the deployment of international forces. I propose three different estimation techniques, but focus on the most rigorous approach, a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) design, in the main paper. The GRD exploits the mandate enlargement of ISAF from December 2003 until October 2006. The boundary between the northern regional command – where ISAF has been deployed to first – and the rest of the country – where the mandate enlargement took place with a time lag – splits households into a control and treatment area in an "as-if-random" assignment.The GRD comes with two apparent limitations: it is restricted to households near the treatment boundary and measures short-term effects only. The two alternative approaches, summarized in Section 5.3 with details presented in Appendix E, deal with these limitations. First, I consider conditional correlations using the location of military bases to measure presence of international forces across the entire country until ISAF was completed in 2014. Most importantly, I account for the lagged levels of conflict and high-dimensional fixed effects as in Child (2019). Second, I exploit exogenous variation in the need to rely on community cohesion induced by climatic shocks and examine the interaction effect of these shocks with the presence of international military forces.[3] While the latter approach does not allow to analyze direct effects of foreign security missions on community cohesion, it sheds light on the heterogeneous effects of short-term income shocks subject to ISAF presence.[4]

All identification strategies lead to the same finding. ISAF presence has a negative effect on different measures of community cohesion and local traditional institutions. Households are less likely to receive help from the community, participate less often in

[3] There is increasing literature on how income shocks affect conflict. See, for instance, Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and Bazzi and Blattman (2014) for studies at the macro level as well as Berman and Couttenier (2015), Berman et al. (2017), and Gehring et al. (2023) for studies at the micro level. These studies exploit variation in international commodity prices or weather conditions.

[4] Under mild conditions, the interaction effect can be regarded as exogenous as I control for the levels of the interaction term (e.g., Bun and Harrison, 2018; Nizalova and Murtazashvili, 2016). An important critique by Barrett and Christian (2017) is that non-linear trends in the time series of the interacted instruments can be problematic. Since I consider a cross section, I would be rather concerned by omitted variables, that correlate with the outcome, differentially according to the presence of ISAF.

the community councils, rely less on them for dispute-solving, and have less trust in them. I do not find any evidence of a crowding out through the provision of formal institutions. It seems that the main effects can be explained by a general erosion of trust in people. This finding provides empirical evidence of the above-mentioned "lessons learned."

This paper contributes to at least three different strands of the literature. First, it adds to the literature on conflict and social cohesion. Bauer et al. (2016) conclude from a meta-analysis that violence induces cooperation and prosocial behavior across different outcome measures.[5] However, evidence pointing to the opposite finding is growing (e.g., Fiedler, 2023; Kijewski and Freitag, 2018).[6] I augment this literature strand by highlighting an important aspect that has been largely neglected, namely the role of foreign security missions in how community cohesion is affected in times of conflict. One exception is the study by Weidmann and Zürcher (2013), who analyze how fighting between different actors (including ISAF) affects social cohesion and attitudes towards the warring parties in Northern Afghanistan. They find that attitudes change, but that these effects do not extend to changing trust or cooperation within communities, irrespective of who is fighting. While the results provide important insights, the authors do not derive causal estimates and their sample covers only four out of 398 districts over the 2007-2009 period. This paper, on the contrary, considers the presence of foreign forces (conditional on violence), which does not necessarily coincide with violence. What is more, the paper provides evidence for more than 90% of the country's districts over the 2005-2014 period and for a large set of indicators to cover the different dimensions of social cohesion.

Second, the paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of security missions in achieving peace and providing an environment for reconstruction and nation-building. The deployment of external forces in war contexts in the form of security and peacekeeping missions is a common policy tool, but the analyses of these policy measures' effects are limited to economic and political outcomes. Most obviously, many studies focus on violence or peace as the outcome of interest (e.g., Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013; Ruggeri et al., 2013; Abu-Bader and Ianchovichina, 2019; Smidt, 2020).[7] Others analyze how household attitudes towards (and collaboration with) either pro-government forces including international troops or insurgents change when they are exposed to violence by either party (e.g., Lyall et al., 2013; Hirose et al., 2017; Schutte,

[5] The authors include 23 articles of which some exploit (repeated) household questionnaires as I do (see, e.g., Bellows and Miguel, 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015), and others apply incentivized lab-in-field experimental games (see, e.g., Fearon et al., 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014).

[6] The literature also points to in-group and out-group effects. For the Rwandan context, Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) find that within-group ties are strengthened, while ties between (ethnic) groups are weakened.

[7] While Smidt (2020) also considers violence as the outcome, she analyzes how the peacekeepers' activities in community-based intergroup dialogue act as the mechanism. She finds that violence is reduced when peacekeepers organize intergroup dialogue. In another notable exception by Abu-Bader and Ianchovichina (2019), the authors find an effect on conflict through an increasing religious polarization for non-neutral foreign interventions in the MENA region.

2017). Closely related to my analysis is the study by Dell and Querubin (2018), where the authors exploit a discontinuity of two different military strategies applied in the Vietnam War, one relying on overwhelming firepower and the other more on a "hearts-and-minds-oriented" approach. The authors identify worse effects on security and local government administration of the first strategy relative to the latter. I add to this by highlighting an important mechanism of these interventions through their effect on community cohesion. A long list of studies shows, for instance, that social cooperation is beneficial for development (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997), peace (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), recovery (see, e.g., Gilligan et al., 2014), and nation-building (see, e.g., Bazzi et al., 2019). Despite acknowledging that the success of counterinsurgency activities, post-conflict reconstruction, and nation-building efforts depends on community cohesion, evidence on the effects of such missions on social cohesion is scarce. This is also the case for Afghanistan, for which Iyengar et al. (2017, p. 7) conclude from a systematic review that "evidence on community cohesion in the existing literature was too limited to draw a conclusion and in many studies was not even considered." Whereas previous studies have focused on attitudes towards the government versus insurgents and information sharing with either warring party, in this study, I elaborate on how within-community ties are affected, ties which form the "glue that holds society together" (Janmaat, 2011).

Third, I add to the literature on the role of aid in "winning hearts and minds" of the local population in conflict environments (e.g., Berman et al., 2011). Recent studies on Afghanistan elaborate on the effects of military-led aid projects (Sexton, 2016; Child, 2019), aid provided through the National Solidarity Program (Beath et al., 2016), or development aid more broadly (Sexton and Zürcher, 2023; Böhnke and Zürcher, 2013). Studies on Afghanistan and other countries (e.g., Crost et al., 2014), provide mixed results. Theoretically, aid can be effective in building pro-government support from communities, but can also lead to more violence. My study relates to this literature strand since these two strategies, "winning hearts and minds" through aid and approaches based on the deployment of military forces (with different degrees in applying force) must be considered in tandem. The mission of such military interventions is to secure an environment such that reconstruction efforts can be made. In my analysis, I account for aid and reconstruction programs by analyzing heterogeneity in aid effectiveness depending on ISAF's presence. I also examine the role of the newly formed community development councils by the the National Solidarity Program.

I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the theoretical mechanisms at the local level. Section 3 introduces the data and Section 4 the main identification strategy, the geographic regression discontinuity design. Results and robustness checks are presented in Section 5 and potential mechanisms are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes the results and highlights policy implications.

2. Mechanisms at the local level

In many conflict-ridden countries, the community or village level plays a central role as state institutions tend to be unstable or even lacking (e.g., Arjona, 2014). Social and political institutions are therefore often provided by local leaders. In Afghanistan, this role is taken by the shura or jirga,[8] which refers to "meetings by lead representatives of factions, clans, families, militias, or other units relevant to the resolution of a problem or class of problems" and they are "generally convened for the purpose of discussion and collective decision making" (Asia Foundation, 2007, p. 23).[9] Both shuras and jirgas are deeply rooted in Afghan culture. For instance, dispute-solving commonly takes place at this level. Whereas the state is not regarded as legitimate in many regions in Afghanistan, these councils and assemblies of village elders qualify as legitimate protectors.[10] The "custom and informal customary dispute resolution in civil matters is explicitly recognized by Afghanistan's Civil Code (1976) and Civil Procedure Law (1977)," but agreements which are solely concluded through these informal councils are not legally binding (Wardak, 2016, p. 15). Apart from these informal local governing bodies, households exposed to negative shocks are more likely to ask for help from others at the local level when state institutions are not present. Considering that in the 2005-2012 period about 60% of NRVA survey respondents suffer from any type of shock – caused by climatic or price changes but also by insecurity and violence –, there is a high need to rely on the community.

The literature has provided numerous hypotheses about the way communities respond to shocks or external threats. While this study relates to previous work on how threats like conflict affect social cohesion, it focuses on the specific role of foreign interventions. When ISAF enters territory, we can expect different mechanisms, depending on whether the foreign forces maintain or provide an environment of (i) security or (ii) insecurity.

i) ISAF maintains or provides an environment of *security*

Scenario (i) could result in an increased provision of formal institutions and infrastructure via undisturbed reconstruction efforts. This might render informal institutions at the community level less important as more formal (state) institutions crowd them out.

[8] In the following, I will use the term shura to refer to these traditional community councils. While shura is the Arabic word for consultation or council, jirga is the Pashto word and is particularly relevant in Pashtun tribal culture. "Historically, a jirga is a temporary council established to address specific issues, while a shura is a more permanent consultative council. In practice, however, the two terms are often used interchangeably" (Jones and Muñoz, 2010, p. 21). "Unless the village is big Jirga/Shura is usually made up of representatives from more than one village (village cluster, district, valley, or tribal segment)" (Asia Foundation, 2007, p. 23).

[9] This involves development activities, in which shuras became more involved after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Many donors are consulting and working with the traditional shuras (Asia Foundation, 2007).

[10] Communities have set up so-called *Arbakai* or *Chalweshtai*, which are community police forces that implement decisions of the shura and deal with threats (Jones and Muñoz, 2010).

The empirical (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2014; Guiso et al., 2016; Dell et al., 2018; Lowes et al., 2017) and theoretical (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2017) literature, however, provides mixed results on whether strong state capacity is a complement or substitute of governance and cooperation at the community level.

ISAF has been criticized due to a lack of coordination with the locals and due to bypassing the local shuras in decision-making processes, which increases confusion about who has control. This might result in less cohesion if measured by participation and trust in traditional councils.[11] Even assuming that ISAF presence is accompanied by an increase in development aid and reconstruction activities, these activities may be unwelcome for ideological reasons (see Child, 2019). This negative perception likely spills over to foreign personnel in general, be they development workers or military personnel. Böhnke and Zürcher (2013) indeed find that – if at all – development projects lead to a more negative perception of foreigners in Afghanistan. Child (2019) further distinguishes between more political projects, such as education, and health projects, which generate less resistance. Since military forces are clearly linked to a political mission, one can assume more resistance.[12] Even if ISAF lead to an increased provision of formal support mechanisms, households might not rely on these because of negative perceptions. Thus, theoretically, it is unclear whether formal institutions would crowd out or supplement traditional local institutions in an uncontested and secure environment.

ii) ISAF maintains or provides an environment of *insecurity*

Scenario (ii) might be considered more likely as military installations are strategically located in insecure areas and because military bases become the target of Taliban attacks and thus attract violence. According to data from UCDP GED (Pettersson et al., 2021; Sundberg and Melander, 2013) for the observation period, fighting takes place almost exclusively between the Taliban on the one side and pro-government forces, including ISAF, on the other side. Thus, I refer to contestation since two opposing conflict actors fight for territorial control.

Households are affected by the surrounding insecurity and exposed to power shifts at the community and district level. Yet, fights between warring parties could be regarded as a common threat. According to Jennings and Sanchez-Pages' (2017) theoretical model, an "external threat stimulates social capital as there now exists a protective reason to invest in it" (p. 158). Just like for common negative income shocks, one could expect that social cohesion is increasing.

[11] It might also raise skepticism towards ISAF. It has been criticized that favoritism occurred and that the way ISAF spends money has not been transparent, which caused – perceived – rising inequalities. Another related critique is that ISAF's interpreters are usually not representatives of the population. Rather they are commonly from educated and wealthy households.

[12] Child (2019) backs this concern with insights from field interviews which point to projects causing more resistance when they are tied to the military.

Whereas the threat can be regarded as common as it introduces a higher level of insecurity, it may differ by actor and among community members. In particular, in the context of foreign interventions, households face an entirely new conflict actor. For this reason, one could expect the opposite effect of contestation if cleavages between community members begin to emerge or become more intense. Weidmann and Zürcher (2013) argue that the exposure to conflict between pro-government forces and insurgents can lead to an erosion of the community's social glue. One mechanism is via wartime information seeking in communities by the different conflict parties (e.g., Berman and Matanock, 2015; Lyall et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2017). Households may be unsure whom they can trust as they do no longer know whom their neighbors report to, thus likely also affecting the legitimacy of village leaders and the shura. On top of that, households in contested areas face higher uncertainty about who will control the area in the future. They can neither rely on the government nor the rebel leaders for longer-term support. A new actor, even though considered pro-government, introduces even more uncertainty. In this regard, General David Richards, ISAF commander in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007, stated that "[i]f you are an Afghan who has spent 30 years fighting, you have learned not to put faith in the wrong side, because it comes back to haunt you" (RUSI, 2007, p. 30).

To get control, conflict actors "need the support of the population to win" (Jones and Muñoz, 2010, p. 5) and might thus increase the provision of public goods (Arjona, 2014) and protection (Tilly, 1985).[13] The increased support by anti-government elements and pro-government groups (including ISAF) could affect the relevance of the traditional local institutions and could weaken the informal ties between community members. Because of these different theoretical mechanisms, the net effect remains to be empirically tested.

3. Data

All variables and sources listed in the following are described in more detail in Appendix C, with descriptive statistics being presented in Appendix D.

3.1. Measuring social cohesion

I construct different indicators for community cohesion based on the three different surveys, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) for the waves 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12, the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) for 2008-2014, and the Survey of the Afghan People (SAP) for 2007-2014.[14]

[13] Grasse et al. (2022) analyze how the provision of rebel services in Afghanistan affects public opinion and rebel fighting capacity.

[14] Given that the latter two datasets are only available from 2007/08, I can only use them for the fixed-effects pseudo-panel analysis and not for the geographic regression discontinuity design which is based

One major advantage of using these different surveys is that they are carried out by different local contractors, including those that are associated with the government, foreign military forces, or private actors. Since results are robust across these surveys, this alleviates some concerns about reporting bias.

Bauer et al. define six dimensions of social cohesion based on their 2016 meta-analysis: (1) social group participation, (2) community leadership and participation, (3) trust, (4) prosocial behavior in experimental games, (5) voting, and (6) knowledge of and interest in politics. I cover (1)-(3) and (4) to the extent that I measure prosocial behavior, but not in experimental games.[15]

Community help is an indicator taking the value of one if the household received help from others in the community.[16] Similar to this variable, I build a wider measure including both *Community help* and whether the household received a loan from friends or family, *Community help+loans*. Both variables are derived from the NRVA and depict dimensions (2) and (4).[17] Note that I cannot differentiate between different motivations of a community member to provide help. Whether the decision is motivated by altruism or reciprocity is not possible to disentangle from this analysis. Besides this dimension, I construct *Council member* that is based on the participation in community councils representing dimensions (1) and (2), which is available only for the 2005 wave.[18] Across the three NRVA survey waves only 4-11% of households received help from others. When including those that have received a loan from friends or family, this share increases to 12-44%. In 2005, 22% of all households have a member in the shuras or CDCs. Finally, I capture another important dimension listed in Bauer et al. (2016), which is trust. Based on the SAP, I measure trust in the shura (*Trust shura*), in people (*Trust people*), and in NGOs (*Trust NGO*), thereby capturing dimension (3).[19] Between 73-88% of households trust in the shura, but only about half of this share trust in people in general. Following Iyengar et al. (2017), I build a measure on whether the community shura is asked for

on a policy change that leaves no treatment variation after 2006.

[15] Theoretically, I could also cover the final two dimensions (5)-(6), though I refrain from these due to a lack of data representing the local and community level, which is the focus of this analysis.

[16] From the SAP, I construct *Perceived solidarity* based on the question "Do you believe that in most instances people are only thinking about themselves or do you believe that in the most instances people try to help others?"

[17] These questions belong to a section on shocks and coping mechanisms covering 26 measures, with some being suitable to proxy community cohesion. When using these variables I control for the household having experienced a shock to account for the survey design. Without doing this, my results could be driven by differences in the exposure to shocks and not by the coping behavior.

[18] The question in the survey is: "Is anyone in your family a member of the following decision making bodies in your community?"

[19] Another way of classifying outcomes could be into an input and output side. While *Community help* and *Community help+loan* represent the output (supply) side, *Council member* or *Trust shura* represent the input side. By controlling for different shocks that households experienced, I account for the demand of community support. In particular, I also account for covariate shocks induced by climate shocks, which usually demand the community rather than single households to cope with it. This is due to the fact that most households are working in agriculture and are dependent on the surrounding households because of, for instance, irrigation systems.

dispute solving mechanisms (*Dispute shura*) contrary to official state courts based on the ANQAR.[20] About a third of individuals say they would go to the shura. None of these survey measures follow a clear downward or upward trend over time.

3.2. Measuring ISAF presence

The main explanatory variable of interest, *ISAF* presence, is proxied by three different indicators. First, I exploit the stage-wise mandate enlargement as illustrated in Figure A1 in Appendix B and create an indicator variable (*Mandate district*) taking the value one if a districts falls within a regional command where the mandate has already been expanded to. While ISAF was originally in and around Kabul exclusively, its mandate was subsequently expanded to gradually cover the whole country after UNSC Resolution 1510 in 2003.

Second, I construct a binary variable indicating whether a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is located in district d. PRTs are "small teams of military and civilian personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to provide security for aid works and help humanitarian assistance or reconstruction tasks in areas with ongoing conflict or high levels of insecurity."[21] Both measures come at the cost that they do not vary after 2006, except for the creation of one PRT in 2010. I account for this by focusing on the cross section for the year 2005 in two of the three estimation strategies. In the fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions, the variation comes only from switches between the first and second survey wave (2005 and 2007/08) within those districts, where ISAF has been deployed. While being under NATO's (ISAF's) authority, the aim of the 26 joint civil-military units goes beyond the military domain. They provide support for local partners and ministries in governance issues and, according to NATO (2008), take part in meetings of community councils. Since PRTs include a military component and are often even placed within military bases of the respective ISAF lead nation, I use them as another proxy for the presence of foreign military personnel. One of the most common criticisms is that their civilian personnel appears in the same uniform as the military personnel, and thus it is impossible to distinguish between the different purposes.[22] However, Eronen (2008) states that, on average, civilians represent only 5% of the personnel in PRTs.

Third, I follow Sexton (2016) and Hirose et al. (2017) and use the presence of a military base in a district as an alternative measure, which varies over time. I provide two proxies since the exact geographic locations of many bases are kept secret. First, I

[20] The question in the survey is: "If you had a legal dispute, would you take it to an Afghanistan state court or a local Shura/Jirga?" While this type of question appears in all three surveys, the number of missing responses in the other two surveys is too large.

[21] See https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/art2.html, accessed July 22, 2021. Depending on the lead nation, PRTs differ in size, structure, and guidance.

[22] "NGOs have been hesitant to work with the PRTs and have called for their roles to be clarified." (Asia Foundation, 2007, p. 30)

focus on the more well-known large military bases as described in Gehring et al. (2023). *Large base neighbor* is defined as one if a large base is located either in district d or its neighboring districts. Second, *Any base district* takes a value of one in case there is any military base in district d, not focusing on large bases only.[23] In analogy to this, I define the presence of a PRT within district d only and within district d and its neighboring districts. For military bases and PRTs this could conceptually lead to different effects on the outcome. Consider, for instance, the following quote by Parker (2007, p. 10) "another PRT dug wells in a village as a reward for providing information. The team did not conduct a water table analysis and the new wells caused wells in a neighboring village to dry up. The village with the dry wells thought the United States did it intentionally and was no longer supportive of the new Afghan government or U.S. efforts in the area." More information on ISAF's involvement in Afghanistan is provided in Appendix B.

3.3. Confounding factors

I proxy for the level of contestation, one of the most obvious confounding factors, using data on conflict from three different sources. UCDP GED provides geocoded data on battle-related deaths derived from media reports (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). As described before, about 95% of the events within the 2005-2014 period are classified as fighting between pro-government forces and the Taliban. I, therefore, refer to *Contest* because it is likely that in districts where the two groups are fighting, they fight for control. Given the concerns with media-based conflict data (as discussed in Weidmann, 2015, 2016), I also rely on conflict events recorded by international forces, secured by Shaver and Wright (2016). This dataset covers significant activities (SIGACTS), classified into three types of events, direct and indirect fire attack (DF and IDF), and improvised explosive device (IED). Besides these objective conflict measures, I use information from the NRVA on household-level insecurity shocks and aggregate this to shares of households affected at the district level.[24] Other than used as a pure control, I am also interested in heterogeneous effects given the level of contestation, motivated by the theoretical considerations of Section 2.

A potential compound treatment is the provision of development aid. One important development program was the National Solidarity Program (NSP) created by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and funded by the World Bank as well as bilateral donor countries. It has been introduced in some parts of the country in 2003 and thus around the same time as ISAF's mandate had been enlarged to

[23] Note that this measure is not restricted to bases under ISAF command but also covers bases under the command of the US-led coalition "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF). For more details on OEF, see Appendix B.

[24] Averages of the objective and subjective conflict measures are presented in Appendix G. This comparison also serves to verify the conflict data that I apply. As can be seen, both objective and subjective conflict indicators are highly correlated.

the north. The NSP created so-called Community Development Councils (CDC) to implement infrastructure or agriculture projects in collaboration with the community and to strengthen community-level governance. The NSP worked together with different international groups and NGOs that support CDCs in implementing these development projects.[25] According to Beath et al. (2016, p. 8), the program served as an "implicit state-building function in establishing the government as a benevolent provider of public goods and services." By 2008, the program covered two-thirds of the communities in the country (Nixon, 2008). The extent to which CDCs complement (or substitute) traditional shuras differs across districts and time, and the success depends on how they cooperate with the traditional governing and decision-making bodies. According to anecdotal evidence from 2005 in Nangahar, "CDCs are different from other shuras or jirgas in that they plan and organize development projects" (Nixon, 2008). It has also been stated that they are involved in dispute resolution. However, in communities where a traditional shura exists, the CDCs engaged in dispute-solving mostly in collaboration with them (Nixon, 2008). Still, problems of opposition from the traditional shura or powerful individuals have been reported (Asia Foundation, 2007). The 2005 NRVA wave includes data on the villages that participated in the program, households reporting on the existence of a CDC in their community and whether they participated in it. Already in 2005, 32% of households across the country state that there is a CDC in their community.[26] Besides CDCs, I also account for geocoded aid (in logarithms) provided by AidData at the yearly level. More precisely, this includes aid commitments provided by the World Bank and aid provided by all donors as reported by the Afghanistan Recipient System. A common goal of ISAF's mission and the NSP or development aid more broadly is to promote education in the country, which can have far-reaching implications for both individuals and society as a whole. Thus, I analyze the role of the CDCs, aid in general, and education in Section 6.

4. Identification strategy: Geographic regression discontinuity

I follow Card and Krueger (2000), Dell (2010), and Dell et al. (2018) and exploit a geographic boundary as a regression discontinuity with the main assumption that this boundary assigns households to a treated and control area "in an as-if random fashion" (Keele et al., 2015, p. 127).

I exploit the sequential enlargement of ISAF's mandate as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement, first to the north of the country (including 9 out of 34 provinces) and later

[25] See http://www.afghanwarnews.info/development/NSP.htm for more details, accessed July 22, 2021.
[26] The corresponding share of traditional shuras and jirgas in 2005 is 68%.

to the remaining country. After NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003, UNSC Resolution 1510 on October 13, 2003, announced the enlargement of ISAF's mandate to the north to support the government beyond the capital Kabul. As shown in Figure A1 and discussed in more detail in Appendix B, the process of taking command over the entire country was split into four stages, with stages 2 to 4 being implemented after the NRVA household survey in 2005 had been conducted. The first step of the expansion marked the pilot project of the Kunduz PRT, which was placed under ISAF command. By October 2004, four other PRTs were established in the north of the country (in Mazar-e Sharif, Meymaneh, Feyzabad and Baghlan). The area of operation then covered around 3,600 square kilometres in the north.[27] While the decision of starting in the north has likely not happened at random, the provincial borders that form the treatment boundary can be regarded "as-if random" to the extent that they have not been systematically placed according to the level of conflict and social cohesion. Besides this, they are also not overlapping with the homelands of different ethnic groups, which would be a concern since ethnicity is an important determinant of community cooperation (Dell et al., 2018). According to Giustozzi (2008, p. 21), "[p]rovincial boundaries were drawn in such a way as to divide communities and create multi-ethnic and multi-tribal administrative units." Additionally, the timing of the subsequent stages can be regarded as random since "[t]here is unlikely to be further expansion of ISAF until more assets are available in country for it, namely, close air support, fixed-wing and rotary-wing lift capability, special forces capability and logistical support" as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of the UN in December 2003 (UNSC, 2003).

I am restricted to the cross section of the NRVA survey wave in 2005 since later waves of this survey do not include sampling location points. Additionally, the later NRVA waves and the two alternative surveys (SAP and ANQAR) are only available after the mandate had been expanded to the entire country, thus there would be no differential treatment assignment left. However, with more than 200,000 individuals, the NRVA 2005 was the largest household survey that has ever been carried out in Afghanistan (MRRD and CSO, 2007). I discuss alternative estimation strategies to the GRD design in detail in Appendix E, which include larger parts of the country, a longer time coverage, and exploit outcome measures from three distinct survey sources. The estimation equation for the GRD is the following:

$$CC_{i,v,d} = \alpha + \beta ISAF_d + f(geo\ location_v) + \boldsymbol{X'}_d\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \boldsymbol{H'}_{i,v,d}\boldsymbol{\mu} + \sum_{s=1}^{n} seg_v^s + \epsilon_{i,v,d}. \quad (1)$$

$CC_{i,v,d}$ represents one of the measures for community cohesion of household i in village v of district d. $ISAF_d$ takes a value of one if the district is in one of the northern provinces, i.e., where ISAF has been present at the latest since the end of 2004. $f(geo\ location_v)$

[27] See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm, accessed October 18, 2023.

is the RD polynomial, which takes on different functions of the geographic location of household i in village v. Based on information on longitude and latitude at the village-level, I assign all households of a village to the same distance to the boundary.[28] Following Gelman and Imbens (2018), I use local linear (and quadratic) RD polynomials rather than polynomials of higher order, and limit the analysis to households within different bandwidths of the boundary varying between 30km and 100km.[29] I chose the optimal bandwidth "in a data-driven, automatic way to avoid specification searching and ad-hoc decisions" (Cattaneo et al., 2017, p. 52).[30] Results are robust to using alternative bandwidths, as discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.

While the boundary forms a multi-dimensional discontinuity in longitude and latitude, I also apply a one-dimensional forcing variable, which is defined as the linear distance between the border and the household's village. In Appendix F, I restrict the analysis to households in districts that are direct neighbors on the border rather than taking all households of villages that fall within the different bandwidths. Following Dell (2010) and Dell et al. (2018), I include border segment fixed effects seg_v^s. They split the entire border into equally-sized segments and take on a value of one if the village is closest to segment s and zero otherwise. I apply segments of 100 and 200km. This allows comparing households in treated and control groups within the same segment of the border. Figure 1 shows where the boundary is located along with the 200km segments and different bandwidths. The figure also highlights districts not included in the 2005 survey wave, as shaded by the grey dotted areas.[31]

Since households in the Kabul province fall within the larger bandwidths and ISAF has been present there since 2001, I also present results for a *restricted sample* where I exclude Kabul.[32] Along with Kabul, the *restricted sample* also excludes households in a few more areas where Western forces have been present prior to the official mandate enlargement, which otherwise could flaw my results (see detail in Appendix B Eronen, 2008).[33] X_d and $H_{i,v,d}$ are vectors of predetermined district-level control variables and household level

[28] Having information on the more precise locations of households at the village rather than the district level allows for a much higher number of mass points (as discussed in Cattaneo et al., 2017).

[29] Due to household survey weights, I do not account for triangular or Epanechnikov kernel weights. Effectively, I apply a uniform kernel. According to Cattaneo et al. (2017, p. 50), "[e]mploying a local linear estimation with bandwidth h and the uniform kernel is therefore equivalent to estimating a simple linear regression without weights using only observations whose distance from the cutoff is at most h." Compared to a global RD, I do not include households far away from the boundary and thus need no differential weighting of the observations according to their distance since all are relatively close. For robustness, I disregard household survey weights (Appendix F, Table A30).

[30] To identify the optimal bandwidth for all outcome measures via rdbwselect I ignore survey weights.

[31] In Appendix G, I show that these missing districts are not particularly prone to conflict.

[32] In analogy, in the fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions that include the period after 2010, I exclude districts-years where the transition from ISAF to Afghan forces already took place.

[33] I cannot rule out that military forces have been present in other areas for which I do not have data. In these cases, at least for ISAF, it is not in the form of a permanent base or PRT. Consequently, I would not expect strong effects on community cohesion. For robustness, I exclude segments of the boundary at the time.

FIGURE 1
Boundary, segments, and bandwidths



Notes: The boundary splits the country into the northern command (treated), where ISAF's mandate was extended to in December 2003 (completed end of 2004), and the rest of the country (control), where ISAF has been deployed to after the 2005 survey has been conducted. Highlighted are the six boundary segments à 200km, three different bandwidths, and the districts with no survey data available in the 2005 survey wave.

control variables. X_d includes aid, VHI, nightlight, and contestation (logarithm of battle-related deaths from UCDP GED), all measured in $t-1$. I cannot apply pre-determined household-specific characteristics and rather aggregate each household control over all households at the district level and exclude household i.These variables include household living standards measured by household food consumption, whether households earn income from agricultural work, receive remittances, and whether they have taken a loan or experienced any type of shock including income and insecurity shocks. The latter is of particular importance as to proxy for the need to rely on community support and are therefore measured at the individual household-level instead of district-level averages that exclude the household. Following Dell et al. (2018), I also account for household characteristics as age and sex of household head, the number of all household members, and the number of children living in the household. As some of these variables could be transmission channels and therefore bad controls, their inclusion can cause a bias of the estimates of interest. Therefore, in the baseline regressions, I rely on predetermined district-level control variables and those two controls that proxy for the need to rely on others (household-specific shock and loan). Standard errors are clustered at the district level in the baseline RD regressions and at the village- and province-level for robustness

(see Appendix F).

Three main assumptions have to be fulfilled to validate the RD design. First, the main identifying assumption is that all relevant factors besides ISAF treatment vary smoothly at the treatment boundary, which creates a discontinuity in the treatment of interest. The most obvious concern would be differences relating to security or territorial control. These factors likely correlate both with the outcome and the placement of the troops. While it is likely that many factors are not balanced across all northern districts as compared to all remaining districts of the country, I can show that households close to the border can indeed be regarded as comparable (according to a large set of observable factors). To test this, I regress pre-determined household-level variables, pre-determined district-level time-varying variables, and district-level time-invariant variables on the treatment. I do not rely on simple mean comparisons for treatment and control group given that the geographic heterogeneity in this RD requires a different strategy (e.g., Keele and Titiunik, 2015; Dell et al., 2018). This is due to the fact that the balance is likely to change as one moves along the boundary. Therefore, I apply the local linear estimation as in equation 1 by using pre-treatment and time-invariant (geographic) characteristics as the outcome variables. The pre-treatment period should be before the deployment, though the earliest survey data I have is the 2003 NRVA survey. Given that US and ISAF forces have been present before 2003 in some districts, most obviously (and in this case even permanently) in Kabul, I consider the *restricted sample*. While all regressions include segment fixed effects, I ignore control variables since some of those are the outcome variable in the balancing test. Results on household-specific characteristics based on the 2003 NRVA wave are reported in the left Panel of Figure 2, while the right Panel reports results on pre-determined or time-invariant characteristics at the district level.

It is reassuring to see that variables at the household and district level all show no significant differences at conventional levels according to the treatment.[34] All the results as presented in Figure 2 support the fact that these factors vary smoothly at the treatment boundary.

[34] There is one exception at the district-level, the presence of Pashtuns is significant at the 10% level. However, controlling for it does not affect the results (see Table A18).

FIGURE 2
Balancing tests



(A) Household level, NRVA (2003)

(B) District level

Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates (along with 90-99% confidence intervals) of the treatment effect on pre-determined outcomes for 27 separate regressions with outcomes as indicated on the left-hand side. The outcome variables are standardized to have a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. Corresponding results based on non-standardized outcomes are presented in Appendix F, Tables A16-A17.

Second, one has to rely on the assumption that the province borders are relevant to the treatment of interest. According to Fetzer et al. (2021, p. 16), "ISAF forces were also constrained by district boundaries," rendering administrative borders relevant for the security provision. ISAF is split into broad regional commands (north, south, east, west), which are again split into commands of the different NATO and partner nations. Forces of one nation did not cross regional commands of others – with few exceptions, for instance, in case of consultations of the lead personnel – because of their own risk and for not getting into the responsibilities of other lead nations. At the same time, while being relevant for the treatment, administrative boundaries might come along with other compound treatments (as discussed in Keele and Titiunik, 2015). The baseline GRD results rely on households from 55-78 districts from 14 provinces. Thus it seems rather unlikely that in all these political units reforms took place at the same time, which furthermore coincide with the timing of the mandate expansion. For robustness, I exclude 100km-segments (covering treated and non-treated) of the boundary at the time so that results can not be driven by a single area where a potential compound treatment could

actually explain the discontinuity. To the extent that potential but *irrelevant* (in that regard that they are not of interest to this analysis) treatments occur in both periods, before and after the *relevant* treatment, balancing tests for the pre-treatment period allow one to infer whether these *irrelevant* treatments cause a potential bias. As stated before, ISAF gets involved in the reconstruction, for instance, through PRT or NSP projects. While I can control for aid and show that it is not distributed differently across the treatment boundary, the treatment effect can still result from a combined treatment. Section 6 discusses how aid and military presence relate to each other.

Third, one has to rule out selective sorting. Taliban insurgents could move across the border as a response to the deployment of ISAF forces to the north. If this was the case, one would assume that along with the insurgent relocation, violent attacks would be relocated. We could misinterpret the treatment effect to the extent that changes in community cohesion would stem from shifts in conflict rather than because of the presence of foreign military forces. To rule this out, I replace the outcomes of community cohesion with different measures of conflict relying on measures from NRVA, UCDP GED, and SIGACTS for the year 2005. Results are presented in panel D of Table 3 in Section 6. I find no evidence in support of this concern. None of the conflict outcomes are affected by the treatment close to the boundary in the year 2005. Apart from testing the major assumptions of a GRD, I discuss further RD-specific falsification and placebo tests as suggested by Cattaneo et al. (2017) and Cattaneo and Titiunik (2022) in Section 5.2.

5. Results

5.1. Baseline results

Based on three different outcome measures, Table 1 turns to the treatment effects on community cohesion in districts close to the boundary.

Panels A to B differ in the way the RD polynomial is specified as indicated in the panel headings. Results are provided for outcome-specific bandwidths. In all regressions, I include border segment-fixed effects in line with Dell (2010) and Dell et al. (2018) and a minimum set of control variables. Even columns differ from odd columns to the extent that I exclude households of districts that have potentially been exposed to the presence of foreign forces prior to the mandate enlargement. The *restricted sample* most importantly excludes Kabul province, which differs not only because of the presence of ISAF since 2001. In particular, for the first two outcome measures in columns 1-4, the same picture emerges. ISAF presence reduces community cohesion measured by *Community help* and by *Community help+loan*. Households are 6-9 percentage points less likely to receive help from others in their community. The effect on *Community help+loan* is higher, which is not surprising as *Community help+loan* is comprised of receiving help from others in the

TABLE 1
GRD: Different outcomes (NRVA), 2005

	Comm. help		Comm. help+loan		Council member	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.094*	-0.102**	-0.223***	-0.226***	-0.108	-0.167*
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Adj. R-squared	0.091	0.108	0.229	0.264	0.155	0.186
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.062**	-0.080***	-0.171***	-0.187***	-0.058	-0.107
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.078)
Adj. R-squared	0.092	0.107	0.229	0.263	0.154	0.185
Observations	3113	2787	2764	2495	3743	3325
Number of districts	64	57	61	55	78	67
Bandwidth	45	45	40.6	40.6	52.5	52.5
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. In the regressions on *Council member*, I additionally control for the presence of a council. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

community (*Community help*) and receiving loans from family or friends. Households in the north are 17-22 percentage points less likely to receive this type of support. Results also point towards a negative effect when using the outcome measure *Council member* being comprised of membership in the shura (community council) or community development council (CDC), though only significant in one out of four regressions.

FIGURE 3
Regression discontinuity plots for main outcomes (NRVA), 2005



(A) Community help (B) Community help+loan (C) Council member

Notes: The figure shows regression discontinuity plots for the key outcome variables. The Distance to Boundary on the x-axis measures the linear distance between the household's village and the treatment boundary in km. Negative values represent control and positive values treated households. The estimation is based on local first-order polynomials with data-driven bandwidths for the restricted sample. The dots display binned means of the respective dependent variable.

The same picture emerges when looking at the corresponding regression discontinuity plots of the three main outcomes in Figure 3, which ignore controls and segment-fixed effects. The plots are based on the first-order polynomial in the distance to the boundary based on the outcome-specific and data-driven bandwidths.

5.2. Placebo and robustness tests

One concern is that social cohesion already differed across the border prior to the mandate enlargement. As discussed in the context of the balancing tests at the household level I can only rely on the first NRVA wave in 2003, which comes with two limitations. First, there is evidence of the presence of international forces in some areas at the time of the 2003 survey. Ideally, I would have survey data from before 2001. Second, the 2003 wave substantially differs from the 2005 wave, including number of surveyed households, the sampling design, and available variables.[35]

Despite these concerns, I continue with multiple tests based on the differences in levels of the outcome in 2003, noting that I cannot control for the differences in trends. Given this limitation, I refer the reader to the results of the two alternative identification strategies described in the following subsection (details in Appendix E). The findings from both alternative approaches consistently support the findings of the GRD.

First, in Figure 2 both outcome variables available in 2003 (*Community help* and *Community help+loan*) turn out to be indistinguishable from zero before treatment. Although statistically insignificant, one might still express concern due to the negative nature of the coefficient estimates. When considering the effect size by maintaining the model constant between 2003 and 2005, coefficient estimates clearly become more negative in 2005.[36] This finding could imply that the intervention intensified pre-existing differences rather than caused lower levels of community cohesion in the north, which would be in line with the argumentation in Section 2 that a new conflict actor might exacerbate existing cleavages within villages. Second, in Table 2 I run the baseline model controlling for the 2003 district-level average outcome measure and find the effect size of the 2005 treatment to become stronger in seven of eight cases as compared to Table 1.

Third, I compare effect sizes between the unrestricted and restricted sample. One would expect that the treatment effect in the unrestricted sample is diluted as some districts have been exposed to western military presence prior to the mandate enlargement. There is a constant pattern across all specifications in Tables 1 and 2 in line with this expectation.

[35] Because of these reasons, I refrain from a difference-in-difference approach.

[36] This pattern persists across models with different outcome variables, with and without covariates, and with varying definitions of the RD polynomial (linear distance versus longitude and latitude). Depending on the specification, the change from the 2003 coefficient to 2005 coefficient varies between 14% to 117%, always resulting in a more negative value. Given the above-mentioned limitations of 2003 as a true placebo treatment, these results have to be interpreted with caution.

TABLE 2
GRD: Controlling for pre-determined differences, 2005

	Comm. help		Comm. help+loan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary			
ISAF	-0.107*	-0.122**	-0.214***	-0.244***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.081)
Adj. R-squared	0.085	0.104	0.222	0.259
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude			
ISAF	-0.067**	-0.087***	-0.155***	-0.195***
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.061)
Adj. R-squared	0.086	0.102	0.222	0.257
Observations	2888	2562	2539	2270
Number of districts	59	52	56	50
Bandwidth	45	45	40.6	40.6
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan, and the respective pre-determined (2003) outcome measure. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Fourth, I replace the actual cutoff with placebo cutoffs, i.e., I shift the actual boundary by x km to the south-west ("left") and to the north-east ("right") respectively. Following Cattaneo and Titiunik (2022) I avoid treatment contamination by implementing this method for units below or above the actual cutoff separately. Results of 22 alternative boundary locations are presented in Figure A5. To keep the sample size comparable I always include observations within 45km-distance to the respective placebo boundary. Reassuringly, none of these placebo tests results in a significant effect.

I continue with probing robustness using alternative bandwidths as suggested by Cattaneo et al. (2017) and Cattaneo and Titiunik (2022). The main results as presented in Section 5 are robust to using alternative bandwidths (50km, 75km, and 100km) and turn, on average, even more negative as can be seen in Tables A19, A20, and A21 in Appendix F.[37] Coefficient estimates also turn more negative and remain significant in a donut-hole RDD as presented in Table A22, where I exclude those observations closest to the cutoff.

Results are also robust to further alterations of the RD estimation equation. In Tables A23 (45km bandwidth) and A24 (50km bandwidth), I first exclude segment-fixed effects in column 1, and second, I apply shorter segments of 100 rather than 200km in column 2. Third, I exclude control variables (most importantly also lagged conflict). Fourth, I

[37] Results using half the bandwidth (around 25km), are under-powered due to the reduced sample size.

account for a larger set of covariates in column 4, including household characteristics. Fifth, I include the interaction of the treatment with the forcing variable in Panel C, which allows for different slopes at both sides of the boundary. In Table A25, I define the treatment by the direct neighborhood of a district to the treatment boundary. I account for the pre-determined level of contestation, and interact it with the treatment as presented in Table A26.[38] I do so for the different measures of conflict using data from NRVA, UCDP GED, and SIGACTS. In Table A27, I cluster standard errors at alternative levels and consider a wild-cluster bootstrap approach in Figure A6. Lastly, I consider outliers. I exclude the western and eastern regional command at a time in Table A28. In Table A29, I look at heterogeneity across lead nations responsible for the respective district. I can only test this for four nations (Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Norway) that fall within the bandwidths of the GRD. No clear pattern emerges, as the negative effect remains irrespective of the lead nation. If at all, Norway seems to have the least negative effect. This could be partially driven by the fact that Norway more clearly separated civilian from military activities while NATO followed a "comprehensive approach."[39] Third, I apply a jackknife procedure and drop households of both treatment and control groups within a boundary segment one by one (Figure A7).[40]

5.3. Alternative estimation techniques

Most importantly, the results of the previous section are robust to applying the two alternative estimation techniques as presented in detail in Appendix E: (i) fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions and (ii) heterogeneous effects analysis conditional on weather shocks. This is reassuring for a number of reasons. First, results are robust across different identification strategies that all come along with their own identifying assumptions. Second, results are not limited to the local effects around the boundary and are rather representative for the entire country and over a longer time period. Third, in light of a possible reporting bias, findings are not dependent on outcome measures derived from a single survey, but remain robust to using survey data carried out by diverse local contractors. Fourth, social cohesion can be captured by a wider definition and is thus not limited to the outcomes as presented in Section 5.1. Fifth, results are robust to using other measures of the main explanatory variable, ISAF presence. This allows to distinguish the effects of military bases and PRTs, which are military-civilian units. Moreover, it also allows to account for the transition period beginning in 2011, when ISAF started to pass over responsibility to the Afghan forces.

The fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions show that the link persists over a longer

[38] The interaction terms of contestation with the treatment do not provide evidence for a clear pattern.
[39] See https://www.cmi.no/news/1711-a-good-ally-norway-in-afghanistan, accessed August 22, 2021.
[40] While in Panel A, the 45km bandwidth results turn insignificant in three cases, this looks different when the bandwidth is extended by only 5km.

time period and point to the same negative direction for outcomes such as reliance on and trust in traditional councils (see Tables A6 and A7). The second approach shows that the presence of ISAF significantly affects how households cope with negative shocks. While they rely more on the help from others in their community in districts where ISAF is not present, the effect is reversed where ISAF is present. This difference becomes even more pronounced as the level of insecurity increases (see Figure A3). A detailed explanation of these two alternative identification strategies along with results and robustness can be found in Appendix E.

Taken together, results of the three different estimation techniques are robust to a large battery of falsification and sensitivity tests. All results point to the same finding. ISAF presence, measured by the enlargement of the mandate to the north, the presence of PRTs or military bases, is negatively related to community cohesion. This is in line with anecdotal evidence that ISAF erodes institutions at the local level.

6. Mechanisms and other outcomes

In this section, I turn to potential mechanisms and other outcomes. Since the GRD gets closest to measuring causal effects, I continue by relying on this estimation technique whenever data availability allows it.

6.1. Formal institutions, living standards, and conflict intensity

In a first step, in Table 3, I replace the dependent variable with a long list of alternative outcome variables in 2005. In particular, I consider four different types of mechanisms, (A) government employment and support (versus informal agricultural activities), (B) increased living standards, (C) provision of aid and infrastructure, and (D) the intensity of the conflict. Theoretically and following the reasoning of Section 2, one could argue that improvements in most of these categories render the community support less important. At the same time, making a difference in the lives of the local population is part of the goals of counterinsurgency. Thus the erosion in social cohesion could simply result from an effective counterinsurgent strategy that established legitimacy through improving governance and the provision of public services.

According to Table 3, Panels A-D, there is hardly any evidence of a treatment effect on these variables. As discussed before, community cohesion does not seem to be affected because of changes in insecurity. I find no robust effect on the different measures of contestation or insecurity in Panel D. The treatment does not turn out to be significant for any of these variables. I also find no evidence for a positive effect on households relying on the state as a coping strategy, which I proxy by either worked on relief programs from the government, NGOs, or international organizations or joined the military (column 1, Panel

TABLE 3
GRD: Mechanisms (NRVA), 45km bandwidth, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Panel A: Government employment + coping				
	Cope state military	Loan	Gov. employ.	Agricult. income	Opium eradication
ISAF	-0.023	-0.153	-0.058	0.190	0.022
	(0.024)	(0.143)	(0.049)	(0.134)	(0.029)
Observations	2891	2787	2729	2729	2891
Adj. R-squared	0.076	0.096	0.058	0.066	0.207
	Panel B: Living standards				
	Wheat consumpt.	Food expend.	Dietary diversity	Food insecurity	Sum of assets
ISAF	-5.407	-390.212	0.151	-0.114	0.104
	(4.383)	(330.475)	(0.640)	(0.228)	(0.305)
Observations	2891	2891	2853	2818	2891
Adj. R-squared	0.032	0.082	0.232	0.082	0.016
	Panel C: Aid + Economic improvement				
	Cash for work	Any CDC	Aid WB	Nighlight	Economic improve
ISAF	-0.102**	-0.116	-0.065	0.484	0.175
	(0.048)	(0.205)	(0.200)	(1.027)	(0.207)
Observations	2863	2891	2891	2891	2812
Adj. R-squared	0.018	0.180	0.083	0.525	0.090
	Panel D: Conflict + insecurity				
	Insecurity		Theft	UCDP	SIGACTS
	individual	district	individual	BRD	events
ISAF	-0.011	0.008	0.004	0.181	0.505
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.132)	(0.382)
Observations	2891	2891	2891	2891	2891
Adj. R-squared	0.037	0.205	-0.001	0.241	0.159
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column headings. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

A). Furthermore, there is no significant effect on loans that households take (including formal loans from banks or NGOs). Assuming that night light proxies for development and thus infrastructure, there is also no significant improvement because it is the case for different measures of household living standards. The only significant finding is that households participate less in any cash-for-work program from the National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP), National Solidarity Program (NSP), or other cash-for-

work and income generation projects.[41] When keeping in mind that these programs often involve foreign staff, the negative or even non-finding would be in line with what Böhnke and Zürcher (2013) and Child (2019) argue. However, the significance vanishes when correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni-Holm, Sidak-Holm, or Westfall-Young).

6.2. Aid effectiveness

I further investigate the effectiveness of aid programs. I do so to rule out that my results are driven by an out-crowding of rather informal (traditional) ties in the community because of an improved quality of formal alternatives and thus a reduced need to rely on the former. First, I investigate the effectiveness of aid from the World Bank interacted with the treatment to identify potential heterogeneities. While the treatment did not infer changes in aid volumes according to Table 3, Panel C, aid might be more or less effective when ISAF is present. ISAF's mission states to increase security "so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment."[42]

I consider household living standards as the outcome in the aid effectiveness analysis. As can be shown in Figure 4, however, ISAF seems to reduce the effectiveness of development aid provided by the World Bank according to a variety of outcome measures. The marginal effect of aid is more negative for all outcome measures when the household lives in the treated area where ISAF is present. It turns significant in three of these cases (wheat consumption, expenditures, and food security). This result is in line with anecdotal evidence provided by Child (2019) from his field interviews, which points to projects causing more resistance when they are tied to the military.[43] This again relates to the discussion of the compound treatment with military presence and the provision of aid as two parts of the treatment. Both represent the presence of foreign personnel, which is – and perceived to be – aligned with the government. Neglecting the role of foreign interventions can lead to mixed findings on how violence affects community cohesion and on how development aid can effectively win hearts and minds and achieve reconstruction efforts.

[41] Since this can simply be due to the fact that there are fewer programs, I control for the presence of a CDC and lagged aid. Results remain robust to this. However, the effect turns insignificant (it remains negative), when I include the self-reported statement that there was no such program or that the household did not know of it.

[42] See https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf, accessed July 22, 2021.

[43] Egnell (2010, p. 295) points to another explanation: "Since these units early on had very few resources for reconstruction these expectations were not met. [...] There are also complaints about corruption of PRTs as well as of government officials, and of much too limited consultation with local communities."

FIGURE 4
GRD: Heterogeneity in aid effectiveness, 45km bandwidth, 2005



Notes: The figure plots the marginal effects along with 95% confidence intervals of logged aid from the WB in (t-1) on various outcome variables (as indicated on the y-axis) depending on whether ISAF is present (Treatment, in red) or not (Control, in blue). The effects are measured in standard deviations. The regressions follow the baseline GRD estimation strategy as presented in Table 1, column 2. The outcome is replaced with measures of living standards in 2005, and the treatment is interacted with Aid from the WB in (t-1).

6.3. Newly installed versus traditional local councils

I have a closer look at my outcome variable *Council member*, which is composed of the membership in the traditional shuras and the CDCs initiated by the NSP, with the latter being linked to the government and the involvement of foreign staff. So far, I analyzed the participation in any of the two councils jointly as both represent community participation. The distinction allows me to derive conclusions about the acceptance of the NSP, which aims to strengthen local governance but also to increase government control. Table 4 presents results for participation in the CDCs in Panel A and the traditional shuras in Panel B. While columns 1 and 2 refer to the baseline sample of the GRD, columns 3 and 4 restrict the analysis to those villages which have a CDC or shura.[44] Households are even less likely to be a member in the newly installed CDCs, whereas the effect does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels for the traditional shuras and is much smaller in size.

These findings all suggest that community support is not crowded out by formal state support or by the increased effectiveness of development aid projects, which render community support less important. They also indicate that institutions set up by the state

[44] While the country-average of a CDC in the community is at 30%, the share is much higher for the GRD sample around the boundary with about 50-60%.

TABLE 4
GRD: Council member (NRVA), 2005

	Full sample		If council=1	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Panel A: CDC		
ISAF	-0.153**	-0.096**	-0.377***	-0.243*
	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.123)	(0.122)
Observations	3089	3089	1731	1731
Adj. R-squared	0.168	0.168	0.120	0.120
Bandwidth	48.7	48.7	48.7	48.7
		Panel B: Shura		
ISAF	-0.023	-0.061	-0.074	-0.158
	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.106)	(0.163)
Observations	4545	4545	2655	2655
Adj. R-squared	0.139	0.146	0.138	0.144
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bandwidth	64	64	64	64
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GRD type	Linear	Long & Lat	Linear	Long & Lat

Notes: The dependent variable is membership in either the CDC or traditional shura. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

often in partnership with foreign NGOs or military personnel seem less welcome. These results support the general picture derived from the literature that considers attitudes and either violence committed by ISAF (e.g., Lyall et al., 2013; Weidmann and Zürcher, 2013; Schutte, 2017) or aid provision (e.g., Child, 2019).[45] It also aligns with anecdotal evidence. General Stanley McChrystal, ISAF commander between 2009 and 2010, for instance, notes "we face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community – that undermines our credibility" (Jones and Muñoz, 2010, p. 8). In analogy, Giustozzi (2008, p. 35) points out that the deployment of troops has been interpreted as increased repression by local communities.

[45] Beath et al. (2016) identify generally positive effects of the NSP program on economic outcomes and support for the government, but not in regions close to Pakistan, where external insurgents are involved, which do not rely on the local population for support. In my analysis, ISAF is also an external force, though different from the external insurgents discussed by Beath et al. (2016). The difference between my and their finding for regions not close to Pakistan could be driven by the different time horizons. While I account only for the short-term effects, Beath et al. (2016) consider longer-term effects. Also, anecdotal evidence points to skepticism among communities, which later turned into trust in this program (Nixon, 2008).

6.4. Role of education

Education intersects with various aspects of social cohesion. For instance, educated households are considered more resilient and adaptable to change. Between 2001 and 2021, Afghanistan witnessed significant improvements in its educational system, including girl's participation, overall increased access to schooling, technical and vocational training.

In 2005, 67% of household heads could not read and only 38% had their kids enrolled in schools within the 45km bandwidth of the boundary. Already in the short-run, ISAF presence has a positive impact on the number of kids enrolled in schools (see Table A32, column 5). The time frame is too short to expect any effects on the education of the household head (columns 1-4).

In Table 5, I report interaction effects of ISAF presence with different indicators of education. In columns (1)-(4) there is a clear pattern indicating that the negative short-term treatment effect seems to be stronger for less educated household heads, with the interaction and the level term being jointly significant in all columns. Put it differently, more educated households indeed seem to be more resilient, though the overall effect is still negative. This effect is not visible for the last column, which focuses on kids enrolled. Both results, considered together, point to a long-term process. With more kids enrolled, there will be more educated household heads in the future, which in turn can have the potential to mitigate the negative effects of political changes on social cohesion. This is an important insight that can guide policy-making, international support, and conflict resolution efforts.

Table 5
GRD: Community help (NRVA), Role of education, 45km bandwidth, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	No School	Can Read	Primary	Secondary	Kids enrolled
ISAF	-0.053	-0.128**	-0.133**	-0.129**	-0.118**
	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)
ISAF*X	-0.096**	0.039*	0.055	0.060	-0.007
	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.032)
Observations	1809	2518	1809	1809	2135
Adj. R-squared	0.112	0.110	0.114	0.107	0.107
Jointly Significant	.004	.037	.02	.041	.042

Notes: The dependent variable is Community help. ISAF is interacted with X as indicated in the column headings and the level of X is controlled for. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), and contestation(t-1). All regressions are based on the first-order polynomial the in the distance to the boundary and on the restricted sample. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

6.5. Attitudes, perceptions, and trust

While I cannot analyze the role of attitudes, perceptions, and trust towards different actors in the preferred model, I can test conditional correlations by turning to fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions. Results are reported in Figure 5 using the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) and Figure 6 using the Survey of the Afghan People (SAP) by the Asia Foundation. I always report results based on the two time-varying definitions of ISAF presence: whether there is any military base in district d (*Any base district*) or if a large base is located either in district d or its neighboring districts (*Large base neighbor*). Both can theoretically differ in how they impact the outcomes of interest.

FIGURE 5
FE OLS: Attitudes towards actors (ANQAR), 2008-2014



Notes: The figure plots results of 20 separate regressions with ISAF measured either by any base in district d or large base in district d and/or its neighboring districts. All outcomes are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Coefficient estimates are reported along with 95% confidence intervals. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), and contestation(t-1). All regressions include district-, wave- and year-fixed effects (Panel B in the right figure excluded wave-fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

In Figure 5, I find clear evidence that households exposed to any of the two would less likely take a legal dispute to the shura or jirga. Results on their perceptions who most brings security to their area are less clear but indicate that a large base rather reduces approval of ISAF. Also I do not find any evidence for households' responses to whether the government, including ISAF or any Anti-Government Elements (AGE as the Taliban,

Al Qaeda, or Mukhalafeen-e Dawlat), respect the religion or traditions of Afghanistan. Though, being exposed to a any military base in district d leads to less approval of ISAF.[46] In this regard, General David Richards, ISAF commander in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007, stated that "[u]ntil we demonstrated that we had the resolve and the capability to beat the Taliban decisively, we were not going to be able to win the hearts and minds." (RUSI, 2007, p. 30).

In Figure 6 I find a negative link between the presence of large bases and measures of trust towards other people in general, the shura, or NGOs. There is also evidence for a reduced perceived solidarity by others.

FIGURE 6
FE OLS: Perceptions and trust (SAP), 2006-2012



Notes: The figure plots results of 10 separate regressions with ISAF measured either by any base in district d or any large base in district d and/or its neighboring districts. All outcomes are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Coefficient estimates are reported along with 95% confidence intervals. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. All regressions include district-, wave- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Taken together, it seems that households do not know whom they can trust anymore,

[46] *Hatred of ISAF* takes a value of one if listed as one of the three main reasons why people support the Taliban and *ISAF Blamed* takes a value of one if households list ISAF when asked "Who do you think is to blame when Afghan civilians are killed by IEDs?."

be it their neighbors, traditional local institutions like the shuras, institutions related to the government, or foreigners. My findings contribute to the literature by highlighting that not only the perceptions of and collaboration with the insurgents or the government can change, but also that ties within communities are adversely affected.

7. Conclusion

This paper analyzes whether and how the presence of foreign military forces affects community cohesion in times of conflict. I consider Afghanistan, which has been exposed to conflict for decades and where households had to adopt coping strategies to deal with the never-ending insecurity. In an environment where state institutions are unstable or even lacking, community cohesion and cooperation play a central role as a coping mechanism. This is not only relevant from the perspective of households, but also concerning the success of security missions and development projects. In particular, I consider the role of one of the largest military coalitions in NATO's history, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

I propose different estimation techniques to get as close as possible to estimating causal effects relying on household-level quasi-panel data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), the Survey of the Afghan People (SAP, from the Asia Foundation), and the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR). The preferred technique is a geographic regression discontinuity design, where I make use of the step-wise enlargement of ISAF's mandate as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. UNSC Resolution 1510 on October 13, 2003, announced the enlargement of ISAF to the northern regional command to support the government beyond the capital Kabul. While the first stage was completed in October 2004, stages 2 to 4 have been implemented after the NRVA household survey in 2005 had been conducted. The 2005 NRVA household survey wave allows the comparison of households close to the boundary between the northern regional command (treated area) and the rest of the country (control area) as if they were randomly assigned. The second technique relies on a fixed-effects pseudo-panel analysis. I capture an important part of the omitted variable bias by accounting for high-dimensional fixed effects and predetermined control variables as lagged conflict. Finally, I investigate whether exogenous income shocks affect the level of community cohesion differently according to the presence of ISAF.

The findings suggest that households in districts where foreign military forces are present receive less help from others in their community, have less trust in community councils, and participate less in those institutions. This finding is robust across the different estimation techniques and to numerous robustness checks. I provide evidence that this is not due to a crowding-out of informal institutions by an increased provision or improved quality of formal institutions. We rather see a general erosion of trust. However,

my findings do not allow to derive conclusions about the longer-run effects given that the observation period ends in 2014 and the most rigorous specification is based on 2005 only. Still, they can be helpful to derive implications for foreign security missions in general and to understand the dynamics before and after withdrawal in the specific case of Afghanistan. For instance, I find that education can buffer the negative impact of the presence of international forces on community cohesion, already in the short-run. This important heterogeneity should be investigated in more detail in future work.

Prior work has focused on attitudes and collaborative behavior with either insurgents or pro-government groups, including foreign military personnel. The role of ties within communities has received much less attention, despite that it is well accepted that local communities are relevant partners in postwar reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and peace-building. When the community's social glue is eroded because of the foreign military intervention, this can harm the effectiveness of security missions, development projects, and consequently nation-building.

> *"[T]he narrow conception of legitimacy has meant that counter-insurgents have had preconceived ideas about what needs and grievances to address rather than to actually listen to the local population. [...] if the main objective really is to win hearts and minds and legitimacy in Afghanistan, reforms and activities should ideally imitate local existing values and perceptions of legitimate governance [...]."* Egnell (2010, p. 292f)

APPENDICES

Foreign Interventions and Community Cohesion in Times of Conflict

SARAH LANGLOTZ

A. Origins of administrative borders

Historical origins: Afghanistan has a long history of military occupations and interventions by foreign countries, including Great Britain (colonial empire), the Soviet Union, and more recently, the United States.[47] After the attempts by the British to control the country through the first (1839-1842) and second (1878-80) Anglo-Afghan War, the British decided to turn the country into a buffer state. By the end of the 19th century, the British pushed for a formal border between Afghanistan and British India (today, it marks the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan). Mortimer Durand negotiated the Durand Line Treaty with Abdur Rahman, who was the Emir of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901. The Durand line forms a boundary that is largely not recognized by Afghanistan and divided the Pashtun population in half. With regard to the northern border, agreements with the Russian government took place in 1885. The greater part of the northern border is demarcated by rivers (Oxus river, now known as the Amu Darya) (Omrani, 2009). According to Giustozzi (2008), Abdur Rahman set the basis for what became Afghanistan's administration. Abdur Rahman also introduced smaller provinces than before and replaced local rulers with his own representatives. "Abdur Rahman was also the first ruler to start the policy of deporting whole communities to far-off regions" (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 5), a practice that has been continued until 1959. The rulers aimed at creating a mix of ethnicities in order to regain support for the central government. In particular, Pashtun tribes have been exposed to this practice and have been deported to the northern regions.

In general, administrative units within Afghanistan have been repeatedly reorganized. King Nadir Shah, who reigned Afghanistan from 1929 to 1933, split the country into eight provinces, which were under the central government's power. The command was going from province to district and sub-district level. This system was dominant until a major reform of the administrative boundaries was undertaken in 1963 (Gopalakrishnan, 1982). This reform reorganized the country into 28 provinces and set the basis for today's administrative divisions.[48]

[47] Figure A15 plots the directions and major fighting territories of the Soviet invasion from 1979-1989.

[48] See http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/afghanistan-xi-admin and pahar.in/wpfb-file/1985-historical-and-political-gazetteer-of-afghanistan-vol-6-kabul-and-se-afghanistan-s-pdf/, both accessed June 8, 2018.

The historical and political gazetteers for Afghanistan indicate that the borders have often been demarcated by geographic features such as rivers or mountains. According to Giustozzi (2008), the Afghan state throughout tried to apply "divide and rule" tactics: "Provincial boundaries were drawn in such a way as to divide communities and create multi-ethnic and multi-tribal administrative units, making it difficult for the local population to come together and influence or oppose government" (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 21). This indicates that the administrative units are not a construct of ethnic or tribal homelands and have rather been constantly changed.

Recent reorganization: A more recent reorganization took place in June 2005, where the Afghan Ministry of the Interior assigned 398 districts to 34 provinces. Prior to this change, the country was divided into 329 districts and 32 provinces.[49] In most cases, province boundaries have not been affected by this new reorganization, except for the creation of two new provinces (Daikondi and Panjshir). In most cases, districts have been split, and in few cases, reassigned to another (new) province. Only in the case of two districts did a transfer occur at the GRD treatment boundary, shifting these two districts from treatment to control group. I rerun my analysis based on this new boundary and results remain robust as can be seen in Table A31. The two districts Kahmard and Sayghan have first been part of Baghlan province (northern command) and then in 2005 been assigned to Bamyan province (eastern command).[50] Given that NATO was deployed to the north before the administrative reform took place, I assume these two districts to be treated in 2005 since they have belonged to the Baghlan province and thus have been part of the first stage of the mandate enlargement to the north.[51] However, for robustness, I first exclude them and the province Bamyan and, second, rerun all regressions using the *new treatment boundary* based on this shift of the two districts.[52] Apart from these administrative units, no other units have been shifted in a way that they crossed the *treatment boundary* given the administrative reorganization in 2005.[53]

This change occurred just right before the NRVA 2005 wave has been conducted. While starting from this wave, households have been assigned to the new list of districts. This was not so the case for the 2003 wave, which I use for balancing tests. In the latter case, I used the village geocodes (longitude and latitude) and matched those to the new administrative units, i.e., the 398 districts.

[49] See http://www.aims.org.af/services/mapping/geo_codes/398_dist_matching_to_329.xls and http://www.statoids.com/uaf.html, accessed June 11, 2018.

[50] See http://www.aims.org.af/services/mapping/geo_codes/398_dist_matching_to_329.xls. I compared the shapefiles for 329 and 398 districts provided by e.g., https://esoc.princeton.edu/country/afghanistan, accessed June 9, 2018.

[51] On June 28, 2004, the establishment of 4 PRTs in the north has been announced, including Baghlan (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm, accessed June 9, 2018).

[52] The new boundary is plotted for comparison in Figure A8.

[53] Note that Bamyan province is excluded in the most rigorous specifications because there are indications of ISAF presence before the mandate enlargement to the east officially took place.

B. NATO involvement in Afghanistan

General facts: Following the Bonn Agreement in 2001, ISAF was tasked to support the Afghan government in securing Kabul and its surroundings exclusively.[54] At the time, it was under the leadership of individual NATO allies, with the leadership being based on a six-month national rotation. NATO took the lead of ISAF in Afghanistan on August 11, 2003, with the main objective "to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe heaven for terrorists."[55] ISAF supported the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in conducting security operations and in counterinsurgency activities, with the aim to increase the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan forces. Another objective was to improve governance and socio-economic development and to create sustainable stability. Fifty-one NATO and partner nations were involved, with 130,000 strong troops at their height. Originally the international forces were deployed to Kabul, though the presence was subsequently enlarged as described in the following: UNSC Resolution 1510 "[a]uthorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement."[56] At the end of 2006, the expansion over the entire country has been completed.

Mandate enlargement: In the following, I summarize the enlargement of ISAF's mandate split into four stages according to the four regional commands as presented in Figure A8, with stage 1 starting in the north of the country to stage 4 (covering the entire country).[57]

[54] The Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) with Hamid Karzai as Chairman.
[55] See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm, accessed April 9, 2018.
[56] See https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf, accessed April 9, 2018.
[57] See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm, accessed July 23, 2021.

FIGURE A1
ISAF mandate expansion

Notes: This figure presents the expansion of ISAF's mandate. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-work-in-afghanistan/the-uks-work-in-afghanistan, accessed July 23, 2021.

Stage 1: To the North	
December 31, 2003	Taking command over PRT in Kunduz as a pilot
June 28, 2004	Announced establishment of 4 PRTs in the North
	(Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad, Baghlan)
Oct. 1, 2004	Process completed: present in 9 northern provinces
Stage 2: To the West	
February 10, 2005	Announced enlargement to the West
May 31, 2006	Process began
	Taking command over PRT/bases in Herat and Farah
September, 2006	Two more PRTs become operational (Ghor, Baghdis)
	Present in 50% of Afghanistan's territory:
	9 northern provinces + all western provinces
Stage 3: To the South	
December 8, 2005	Plan for stage 3 endorsed
July 31, 2006	Process began
	Command expanded over 6 provinces including 4 PRTs
	(Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan,Zabul)
	Covering 3/4 of Afghanistan's territory (total of 13 PRTs)
Stage 4: To the East	
October 5, 2006	Final stage implemented
	Responsibility of entire country

There is some mixed evidence regarding the exact timing when stage 2 (west) began. The earliest date mentioned is May 2005, which would be just shortly before the NRVA survey has been conducted (June to August 2005). This date is in contrast to what is noted on the NATO website and to official numbers of when PRTs fall under the command of ISAF or when they were opened by ISAF. To still eliminate any concerns, I exclude these western provinces in the GRD for robustness (see Table A28). Results are not affected by this. Note also that even if ISAF started to be present earlier than what the official numbers claim, I do not expect effects to occur within a month (when the survey has been conducted). Moreover, most of the questions I use from the NRVA refer to the last 12 months.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT): This unit was created by a program called Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells before the first stage of the mandate enlargement took place. They were then assigned to NATO command and renamed PRT, with different nations taking the lead of the 26 units. Originally, PRTs were US-funded and directed, and "[t]hese cells were made up of five to ten Army Civil Affairs Officers who manned small outposts in the provinces of Afghanistan where Coalition Forces were present."[58] Because of the different lead nations, they lack an overarching strategy and differ in size, structure, and guidance. In general, these units were set up to support other actors for reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect was to build Afghan capacity, support the growth of governance structures and promote an environment in which governance can improve. Since some PRTs have been active before the mandate enlargement began, I account for this in my analysis when looking at the *restricted sample*. According to Eronen (2008), the first PRTs were established in 2003 in Gardez, Kunduz, Bamyan, and Mazar-e Sharif. I exclude the regions for robustness in the untreated group.[59]

Transition to Afghan forces: ISAF started in 2011 to pass over responsibility to the Afghan forces, with the transition being completed at the end of 2014. The gradual transition process, in Pashtu and Dari called "Inteqal", was split into five tranches. The process is displayed in Figure A2 below. I digitilized Fetzer et al.'s (2021) map of the transition process. Because of a lack of information on the exact transition ceremonies, the authors use President Karzai's announcement of the transition stages. For more details on this process, see Fetzer et al. (2021), who analyze the effects of the transition from international lead to Afghan lead on insurgent activity and counterinsurgent effectiveness. In this paper, I account for that by excluding districts where the transition already took place. Note that this is only relevant for the fixed-effects pseudo-panel analysis.

[58] See http://www.understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prts, accessed April 6, 2018.
[59] For the Bamyan province, this is also stated in other sources, for instance, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/2013/20130405-codbma.htm, accessed May 22, 2018.

FIGURE A2
Security transition from ISAF to Afghan Army



Notes: This figure illustrates the security transition tranches from ISAF to the Afghan Army starting in 2011 and completed in December 2014 with the transition ceremony (end of ISAF involvement). Highlighted are President Karzai's announcements of the transition tranches, not the actual completion of the respective transition based on Fetzer et al. (2021).

The transition process included the phasing out of all PRTs by the end of 2014, with their functions being handed over either to the government, development actors, or private sector. After ISAF's mission was completed when the transition ended, a new non-combat mission was launched already in January 2015, the so-called *Resolute Support* mission (RSM). This mission's objectives were to provide further training, advise and support to Afghan security forces. Western forces were therefore continuously present: "As of August 2020, RSM had around 10,000 personnel from 36 NATO Allies and partner countries, operating in one hub (Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes (Mazar-e Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Laghman in the east)." [60]

Final troop withdrawal: While a large share of military bases have been closed or handed over to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014, including the physical withdrawal of many troops, the basis for the final withdrawal was set in an agreement between the United States and the Taliban in February 2020. The United States and NATO decided to continue support Afghanistan by other means. On 14 April, 2021, all allied forces decided to start the withdrawal of troops as part of ISAF'S follow-up mission, Resolute Support. On May 1, 2021, the withdrawal began with a rapid completion only a

[60] see, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm, accessed August 22, 2021.

few months later. In the meanwhile, the Taliban increased its territory, and took control of the country in August 2021.[61]

Apart from ISAF

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): In October 2001, the US-led coalition OEF started a military campaign. Dorn (2011, p. 18) describes OEF's main goal to defeat terrorists, particularly al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and that it "uses primarily a warfighting strategy." It is different from ISAF for other reasons, for instance, with regard to its lacking authorization by the UNSC. Neither the invasion nor the creation of OEF have been authorized. However, several UNSC resolutions acknowledged OEF, such that it became clear that the intervention is not illegal.[62] Within the first two years where ISAF was a rather small force composed of 5,000 and restricted to Kabul, "OEF continued operating throughout the country, though its permanent presence was limited to the Kabul region and a few bigger cities in the east and southeast of the country" (Eronen, 2008, p. 3). Since this could bias my results, I exclude those locations where I have information on their presence before the 2005 survey wave has been conducted (again only for the control group). In Table A28, I also exclude the eastern command from the GRD for robustness. Note that the south where, they have the most bases, is not included in the GRD because it is outside of the applied bandwidths. US facilities as of January 2005 are plotted in Figure A10. While the first couple of PRTs were under the lead of the OEF –according to Eronen (2008) Gardez, Kunduz, Bamyan, and Mazar-e Sharif – their lead has been passed to ISAF throughout its mandate expansion. As noted before, I exclude Bamyan province in the regression analysis when I refer to the restricted sample since it would be part of the GRD but in the control group.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): The UNAMA was established by the UNSC (Resolution 1401 of March 28, 2002). It aims at strengthening the foundations of constitutional democracy in Afghanistan. Unlike ISAF and OEF, around 80% of the staff are Afghan nationals (Dorn, 2011). It, therefore, does not represent an entirely foreign intervention. Besides that, "UNAMA, for its part, has at present only a small cadre of uniformed personnel in Afghanistan and very little ability to use force" (Dorn, 2011, p. 18). It works with the foreign military, development and humanitarian agencies, and the Afghan government, though it "does not dictate security policy, and focuses instead on developing governing capacity, democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and sustainable development."[63]

[61] See, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm, accessed August 22, 2021.
[62] See http://pom.peacebuild.ca/AfghanistanPeaceOperation.shtml, accessed July 23, 2021.
[63] See http://pom.peacebuild.ca/AfghanistanPeaceOperation.shtml, accessed July 23, 2021.

C. Definitions and sources

Definitions and sources

Aid: Data on aid is derived from AidData (2017). I use data on World Bank aid (WB Aid), which includes IBRD and IDA, as well as on aid by all donors coded by the Afghanistan Recipient System (Total Aid) (Goodman et al., 2016). AidData provides aid commitments. I include all sectors and all location types and take AidData's geographical exactness of 1 and 2 for both types of aid. The mean of aid by all donors is about three times as high as WB aid only. Both measures are correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.68. I also construct "High Aid" (WB), which takes a value of one if the district receives more WB aid than the mean district in a particular year.[64] I use amounts in logarithms.

Age/Sex (household head): From the NRVA (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). Sex takes a value of 1 for female HH heads.

Any CDC/shura: The dummy equals 1 if the household lives in a village/community with a shura/CDC. From the NRVA (CSO, 2005).

Agricult. income: The dummy equals 1 if the household receives any income from agriculture or works in agriculture. From the NRVA (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12).

Cash for work: The dummy equals 1 if the household participates in any cash (or income-generating) for work programs. From the NRVA (CSO, 2005).

Contest: I derive measures on conflict (contestation) from different sources. Battle-related deaths (*BRD*) are from UCPD/GED (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). IED, Direct Fire and Indirect Fire are from SIGACTS, provided by Shaver and Wright (2016) at the district-year level.[65] I construct the sum of all SIGACTs events as an alternative indicator (*total events*). While direct fire attacks are close combat events characterized by the use of weapons as small arms or rocket-propelled grenades, indirect fire attacks can be launched from great distances and, because of that, are also likely to be less precise. The latter includes mortars and rockets and can be heard within a large surrounding, thus creating broader attention. Whereas the first two types involve fighters, improvised explosive devices are associated with less risk for the perpetrators. They are often placed

[64] For more information, see, https://www.aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2 and https://www.aiddata.org/data/afghanistan-aims-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-1-1, accessed July 23, 2021.

[65] Note that the SIGACTS version I use does not distinguish between the conflict sides as it covers the total events per district-year for each of the three types. To get information on Western casualties from hostile encounters involving Western ISAF forces or US forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, I also refer to data from iCasualties.org (2016). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Taliban often hits Western soldiers on their daily ways to and from the military bases. One could, therefore, also use it to proxy the presence of Western forces. The correlation between the two variables is, however, only 0.2. This could also be driven by the availability of the casualty numbers at the province level only. iCasualties.org provides some information on more precise locations, though this covers only a small subset of events, which I regard as too incomplete to exploit this variation at the district level.

around roads and directed against moving targets, for instance, pro-government convoys. These definitions follow Fetzer et al. (2021) and Sonin and Wright (2022). *Insecurity shock* is a subjective conflict measure from the NRVA survey on whether households have experienced an insecurity shock within the last 12 months (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). All measures are used in logarithms apart from *Insecurity shock*, which measures the share of households per district or takes a value of one for households exposed to this shock.

Community help(+loan): From the NRVA survey (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). *Community help* equals 1 if the household received help from others in the community. Similar to this variable, I build a wider measure including both *Community help* and whether the household received a loan from friends or family, *Community help+loans*. These questions belong to a section on shocks and coping mechanisms covering 26 measures, with some being suitable to proxy community cohesion. When using these variables I control for the household having experienced a shock to account for the survey design. Without doing this, my results could be driven by differences in the exposure to shocks and not by the coping behavior.

Council member: From the NRVA survey (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). The question in the survey is: "Is anyone in your family a member of the following decision making bodies in your community?" *Council member* is dummy which equals 1 if a household member is part in the traditional shura/jirga or in a CDC. I also create separate measures for these two types of councils.

Dietary diversity: According to Wiesmann et al. (2009), "Dietary diversity is defined as the number of different foods or food groups eaten over a reference time period, which in my case is one week, not regarding the frequency of consumption." I categorize food items into eight food groups following Wiesmann et al. (2009) and the World Food Programme. These groups are staples, pulses, vegetables, fruit, meat/fish, milk/dairy, sugar, and oil/fat. The variable varies between zero and eight, with eight indicating a high food diversity and thus higher living standards.

Dispute shura: From the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR, 2008-2014, quarterly level). I build a measure on whether the community shura is asked for dispute solving mechanisms contrary to official state courts based on the ANQAR. The question in the survey is: "If you had a legal dispute, would you take it to an Afghanistan state court or a local Shura/Jirga?"

Economic improve: From the NRVA (CSO, 2005,2007/08,2011/12). This variable refers to the question "How do you compare the overall economic situation of the household with 1 year ago?" 1 indicates much worse, 2 slightly worse, 3 same, 4 slightly better, and 5 much better. This is a self-reported measure of the household.

Employment: From the NRVA survey (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12) on whether the household is employed by the military, state or NGOs. *Employed by State/NGO* takes a value of one if the household "Worked on relief programs from

Government/NGOs/International Organisations." *Employed by state+military* takes a value of one if the household "Joined military" or if a household member is employed by or receives benefits/pension from the government.

Ethnicity/Language: I derive information on ethnicity and languages from two different sources. One is the NRVA 2003 survey wave (CSO, 2003), which includes a question on the native language spoken by the household. I include the shares of households speaking one of the three main languages (Dari, Pashto, Uzbeki). The second source is the "georeferencing of ethnic groups" (GREG) dataset from Weidmann et al. (2010). It relies on maps from the "Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira" from 1964. It contains the coordinates of the group boundaries of ethnic groups. I define two variables from the latter dataset; one indicator variable taking the number of one if Pashtuns are in the districts and another variable counting the number of ethnic groups.

Food expenditure: As discussed in Deaton and Zaidi (2002), consumption- or expenditure-based measures are regarded to be more appropriate than income because they are smoother and less variable (e.g., due to seasonality). Besides that reason, income sources among the poor are usually more spread and thus difficult to measure, especially when households draw income from self-employment or are subsistence farmers (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 14; Jolliffe et al., 2004, p. 558). Finally, households might be more willing to give information about their expenditures than their income situation (Jolliffe et al., 2004, p. 558). Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), I include food items from all possible sources (purchased, gifts, etc.). The NRVA survey includes a separate section of local prices at the district level which are merged to the household level dataset on food consumption (section 15, women's questionnaire). I adjusted for spatial price differences, since households in different districts face different prices. I use Paasche and Laspeyre's Price indices to account for that. As underlined in the literature (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 42), the median is preferred to the mean due to its lower sensitivity to outliers, which might have been caused by misunderstandings about values etc. For missing values regarding district prices, I have generated the province median, which has been replaced by the national median price in case of missing values. For almost all the reported food items in the women's questionnaire, the district questionnaire contains those prices. Food expenditure is measured in constant prices (I use both 2005 and 2011/12 prices). While the 2005 wave includes more districts, the 2011/12 wave is more complete with price data availability for each food item.[66] I only include food items surveyed in all three waves to allow for comparability across waves. I add expenditures (adjusted for inflation and regional price differences) of food and drinks consumed outside the home from the men's questionnaire.[67] I could not account for guest meals since it is not clear of which food

[66] When using constant 2005 prices, I replace missing prices for few food items with the 2011/12 data.

[67] Unfortunately, no amounts and sources on drinks consumed at home are provided in the 2005 survey such that I also disregard those for the 2007/08 and 2011/12 surveys as well.

items they are composed. As for the calorie intake, I measure per capita expenditures by dividing the total household food consumption measure with i) the number of households (resident and ate at least dinner regularly in the household during the last seven days), and ii) the number of resident household members adjusted by guest meals.

Food security: I restrict the construction of the calorie intake on information provided in section 15 of the NRVA household survey, which is part of the woman's questionnaire and contains amounts, frequencies, and sources of a large set of food items. Unfortunately, I could not include, for instance, how much food they received in the course of food-for-work programs as no amounts are provided.[68] I use kcal values provided by the CSO and The World Bank (2011).[69] Amounts consumed are then multiplied by kcal values for that type of food, and the sum represents the total household calorie intake. Besides including calorie intake as a continuous variable, I construct a binary indicator of food insecurity. For an individual, the reference value would be 2100 calories per day as recommended by the FAO. To evaluate whether each individual in the household would reach the threshold, I divide the total household daily calorie intake by the number of resident members and ate at least dinner regularly in the household during the last seven days. I adjust this number of resident household members by how many guest meals have been reported and how many person-meals have been eaten outside the home.

Hatred ISAF: From the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR, 2008-2014, quarterly level). Based on the question: "In your opinion, what are the top three reasons why some Afghans choose to support the Taliban instead of the Government of Afghanistan?" Dummy 1 if Hatred of foreign force is one of 3 major reasons why Afghans support Taliban.

Household loan: From the NRVA (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). The dummy is equal to one if the household responds with yes to the following question: "Have you or any household member taken a loan in the last year?"

Household members/children: From the NRVA (CSO, 2003, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). Number of household members in total and number of children in the household.

Household shock: From the NRVA (CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12). I use the following shocks to construct the binary indicator variable measuring *Climate shock*: Earthquakes, Landslides/avalanches, Flooding, Late damaging frosts, Heavy rains preventing work, Severe winter conditions, Hailstorms. Households have been asked whether they experienced any shocks (including insecurity, climatic shocks, price shocks, etc.) within the last 12 months, called *Any shock*. I also create a separate indicator for *Insecurity shock*.

[68] Note, however, that only a few households participated in any such programs.

[69] For a few items, i.e., number of eggs, naan pieces, and maize(corn), I use kcal values reported in http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1326909014678/8376871-1334700522455/NRVA0708-Quality.pdf, accessed June 30, 2018.

ISAF: I construct three different measures. *Mandate* enlargement takes a value of one for the northern region from 2005 on, the value switches to one for the remaining regions from 2006 on, i.e., for the survey wave of 2007/08.[70] This indicator is based on the mandate enlargement as presented in Figure A1. I do not code the following stages as I only use this measure for the NRVA survey data, where the second wave already happens after all stages were completed. Data on the location, opening, and lead nations of PRTs is derived from https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/index.html and https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_69366.htm (both accessed June 26, 2018). Data on large military bases is the same used in Gehring et al. (2023). As described in Gehring et al. (2023), we use information from Wikipedia's GeoHack program for information on rather well-known bases and rely on news articles, Wikimapia, and Google Maps satellite data for the less well-known ones. Due to the lack of complete information because of security reasons, this dataset does not capture all existing locations and therefore it introduces some measurement error. However, as Gehring et al. (2023) discussed, there is no reason to believe that the measurement error is non-normal. For more details, see, Gehring et al. (2023). In order to proxy for the number of any military base, I complement the list of large military bases with all smaller bases coded along the same procedure as in Gehring et al. (2023) and add all bases from the wkipedia's list of NATO installations in Afghanistan (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_installations_in_Afghanistan). Missing information on the location or opening time have been filled by searches in Google Maps, Wikileaks, Wikimapia, Open Street or newspaper articles. All sources are documented at the base level. In case additional bases have been listed in newspaper articles along the one searched for, we add these after cross-checking that it has not already been coded in Gehring et al. (2023) or appeared under a different name in any of the other sources (more details on the coding are available upon request). For PRTs and bases, I construct measures on whether they are present in district d only or in district d or its neighboring districts.

ISAF blamed: From the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR, 2008-2014, quarterly level). Based on the question: "Who do you think is to blame when Afghan civilians are killed by IEDs?" Dummy 1 if foreign force are blamed when Afghan civilians are killed by IED.

ISAF/People/Shura/Government brings insecurity: From the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR, 2008-2014, quarterly level). The question is: "And who most brings insecurity to your area?" where ISAF/People/Shura/Government is possible response among 18 possible options. The variable is coded missing if none of the 18 options is selected.

[70] My sample starts in 2005 because of data availability, such that I cannot code the first stage to begin in 2004.

Night light: Data on night light varies at the district-year level. Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights composites from AidData (2017). I use night light in logarithms.

Opium revenue: Opium revenues are derived from cultivation in hectares and the respective yields. Cultivation data at the district-year level is an estimate from the data at the province level. After multiplying cultivation with yield, I constructed opium revenues by multiplying opium production in kg with the fresh opium farm-gate prices at harvest time in constant 2010 EU/kg. From the Annual Opium Poppy Survey (UNDCP, various years) and Afghanistan Opium Survey (UNODC, various years).

Perceived solidarity: From the Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation, 2007-2014). The dummy variable is based on the question "Do you believe that in most instances people are only thinking about themselves or do you believe that in the most instances people try to help others?"

Population: Population count (UN adjusted values) from Gridded Population of the World v4 (GPWv4) (AidData, 2017). GPWv4 depicts the distribution of the human population across the globe.

Remittances: From the NRVA (CSO, 2005, 2007, 2011/12). The dummy is equals 1 if the household receives any remittances.

Respect traditions (Government/ISAF/AGE): From the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR, 2008-2014, quarterly level). The question is: "Does ... respect the religion and traditions of Afghans? Do they completely respect, somewhat respect, don't respect very much or don't respect it at all?" The dummy equals 1 for completely respect and somewhat respect.

Ruggedness: The data on terrain ruggedness comes from Nunn and Puga (2012). For more details, see, http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ (accessed June 30, 2018). I define it by 1000 to keep coefficients in a readable size.

Satisfied CDC: From the Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation, 2007-2014) based on the following question: "How satisfied are you with the job your Community Development Council is doing?" Codes as one if household responded with very or somewhat satisfied with CDC.

Share rural: From the NRVA 2003 survey wave to get pre-determined values at the district level (CSO, 2003). District level shares of the rural population.

Sum assets: Rather than applying principle component analysis, I use the number of assets the household possesses (constant over waves). This set consists of Radio/Tape, Refrigerator, TV, VCR/DVD, Sewing Machine, Thuraya (any phone), Bicycle, Motorcycle, Tractor/Thresher, Car. This is done without using any weights representing the quality of the asset because of a lack of information. Therefore, I prefer this transparent and easy-to-interpret measure.

Territorial control: The data comes from Dorronsoro (2005), who provides a map on the territorial control of the Taliban in 1996 and of other major groups of the Northern

Alliance (Dschunbisch-o Islami, Dschamiat-i Islami, Hizb-i Wahdat). More details on the georeferencing of this variable can be found in Gehring et al. (2023).

Travel time: Estimated travel time to the nearest city of 50,000 or more people in the year 2000 (Nelson, 2008). Global Environment Monitoring Unit - Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, Ispra Italy. Available at http://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/ (AidData, 2017).

Trust shura/people/NGOs: From the Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation, 2007-2014) based on the following question: "I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and organizations in our country. I will read these out to you. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in each of the institutions and organizations and officials to perform their jobs. Do you have a great deal of trust, a fair amount of trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all in ...." The variables take a value of one if the household has a great deal of trust or a fair amount of trust, zero if not very much trust or no trust at all in one of the groups (shura or people or NGOs), and missing if refused or do not know.

Vegetation Health Index (VHI): I use the Vegetation Health Index (*VHI*) provided by the FAO (Van Hoolst et al., 2016) as an objective indicator of climatic shocks. The index can be used as a proxy for droughts as low values indicate drought conditions. For more details, see, Gehring et al. (2023).

Wheat/Opium suitability: The FAO-GAEZ (2012) model provides for each crop/Land Utilization Type a comprehensive soil suitability evaluation for all the soil units contained in the Harmonized World Soil Database. Source: Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0) by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO-GAEZ 2012). Details are provided on the website http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/about-data-portal/agricultural-suitability-and-potential-yields/en/ (accessed July 9, 2018). Opium suitability comes from citetKienberger2016 and is conceptually comparable to other suitability indices from FAO-GAEZ.

Wheat consumption: Afghan food consumption is, to a large extent, based on wheat consumption. I construct a continuous variable representing the per capita wheat consumption within a household. According to D'Souza and Jolliffe (2013), calorie intake from wheat makes up more than half of total calorie intake.

NRVA dataset

The data were collected at three different levels; the household level (with both male and female questionnaires), the community level (shura), and the district level for price data. The surveys are statistically representative to the provincial level, which is not the unit of analysis that I apply. Following Child (2019), I regard the data at the district level to yield reasonable approximations for district level inference since sample sizes at the

district level are quite large. For randomization, Afghanistan was divided into strata (the 34 provinces plus the urban areas), and in each stratum, several clusters (primary sample units - PSU) of 12 households were randomly selected to achieve a balanced sample across strata. The large difference of the population size across strata has required a deviation from the balanced sample (for very large and very small strata) as controlled for by the use of sampling weights. The household selection follows a quasi-random process: The total number of dwellings in a community (PSUs) was divided by 12. The resulting number accounted for the distance between two interviewed households to spread the information collected within a PSU. For more details, see, CSO (2005, 2007/08, 2011/12).

D. Descriptive statistics

TABLE A1
Descriptives: Main variables of interest 2005-2012

	Observations	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Community help	56045	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Community help+loans	56045	0.25	0.44	0.00	1.00
Council member	29594	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
Any shock	56045	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00
Climate shock	56045	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Insecurity shock	56045	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
(log) BRD	56045	1.22	1.64	0.00	6.63
(log) All SIGACTS	56045	1.81	1.67	0.00	7.58
(log) IED	56045	1.07	1.26	0.00	6.11
(log) DF	56045	1.27	1.43	0.00	7.39
(log) IDF	56045	0.92	1.27	0.00	6.07
ISAF Mandate	56045	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
PRT	56045	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
No. Bases	56045	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Large Base	56045	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
(log) AID WB	56045	0.56	0.68	0.00	3.19
(log) AID AFG	56045	1.39	1.17	0.03	4.91
VHI	56045	119.48	20.27	52.92	183.83
(log) Night light	56045	-3.65	3.55	-6.91	3.67

Notes: Sample based on Table A6, panel B. For the definition of the variables, see, Appendix C.

TABLE A2
Descriptives: Main variables of interest 2005, bandwidth 45km

	Observations	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Community help	3113	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Community help+loans	3113	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Council member	3113	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00
Any shock	3113	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
Climate shock	3113	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Insecurity shock	3113	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00
(log) BRD	3113	0.06	0.40	0.00	4.04
(log) All SIGACTS	3113	0.24	0.54	0.00	4.14
(log) IED	3113	0.04	0.18	0.00	1.61
(log) DF	3113	0.12	0.35	0.00	3.71
(log) IDF	3113	0.12	0.44	0.00	2.94
Mandate	3113	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
PRT	3113	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Any Base district	3113	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00
Large base neighbor	3113	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
(log) AID WB	3113	0.49	0.33	0.03	1.24
(log) AID AFG	3113	1.88	1.02	0.31	4.46
VHI	3113	126.02	18.41	78.12	164.05
(log) Night light	3113	-5.31	2.63	-6.91	1.46

Notes: Sample based on Table 1, column 1. For the definition of the variables, see, Appendix C.

TABLE A3
Descriptives: Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR)
2008-2014

	Observations	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Dispute shura	127052	0.43	0.49	0.00	1.00
People bring security	165396	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Shura brings security	165396	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
ISAF brings security	165396	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
Gov. brings security	165396	0.62	0.48	0.00	1.00
ISAF respects traditions	23579	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
AGE respect traditions	29137	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00
Gov. respects traditions	24731	0.83	0.38	0.00	1.00
Hatred of ISAF	124772	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
ISAF Blamed	124772	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
(log) BRD	165396	2.05	1.85	0.00	8.20
(log) All SIGACTS	165396	2.96	1.90	0.00	7.97
(log) IED	165396	1.86	1.58	0.00	6.35
(log) DF	165396	2.50	1.80	0.00	7.72
(log) IDF	165396	1.21	1.37	0.00	6.07
Any bases	165396	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Large base neighbor	165396	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
(log) AID WB	134100	0.34	0.36	0.00	2.45
(log) AID AFG	165396	0.75	0.81	0.00	4.65
VHI	165332	134.66	18.02	63.70	189.90
(log) Night light	120978	-4.11	3.34	-6.91	3.88

Notes: Sample based on Table A7, columns 1-2. For the definition of the variables, see, Appendix C.

TABLE A4
Descriptives: Survey of the Afghan People (SAP) 2007-2014

	Observations	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Trust Shura	29427	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00
Trust People	11855	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Trust NGO	28259	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
Satisfied CDC	9493	0.84	0.36	0.00	1.00
Perceived solidarity	12031	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
(log) BRD	29427	2.02	1.91	0.00	6.32
(log) All SIGACTS	29427	2.65	1.88	0.00	8.72
(log) IED	29427	1.65	1.55	0.00	6.74
(log) DF	29427	2.08	1.71	0.00	8.55
(log) IDF	29427	1.41	1.47	0.00	6.07
No. Bases	29427	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Large Base	29427	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
(log) AID WB	29427	0.53	0.54	0.00	2.41
(log) AID AFG	29427	1.16	1.06	0.04	4.91
VHI	29427	128.03	26.58	61.30	191.99
(log) Nighlight	29427	-3.23	3.78	-6.91	3.90

Notes: Sample based on Table A7, columns 3-4. For the definition of the variables, see, Appendix C.

TABLE A5
Descriptives: All variables, 2005, bandwidth 45km

	Observations	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Loan	3113	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Remittances	3113	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Agricult. Income	2995	0.76	0.43	0.00	1.00
Any CDC	3113	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00
Any Shura	3113	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
CDC Member	3113	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Shura Member	3113	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Age (hh head)	2792	44.78	13.12	0.00	99.00
Sex (hh head)	2827	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00
HH Members	3098	7.37	2.68	1.00	22.00
HH Children	2808	7.36	2.60	1.00	22.00
Cope state military	3113	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00
Employed by Gov.	2995	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00
Cash for Work	3088	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Theft	3113	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
Pashtuns	3113	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
No. Ethnic Groups	3113	2.21	0.99	1.00	4.00
Language: Dari	2888	0.64	0.39	0.00	1.00
Language: Pashto	2888	0.13	0.24	0.00	0.97
Language: Uzbeki	2888	0.15	0.30	0.00	1.00
Kuchi	3113	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Economic Improve	3052	2.76	0.90	1.00	5.00
Wheat Consumption	3113	22.93	12.37	0.00	99.00
Food expenditure	3113	1329.28	816.25	0.00	9729.89
Dietary Diversity	3094	6.47	1.51	1.00	8.00
Food Insecurity	3057	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Sum Assets	3113	1.28	1.05	0.00	8.00
Ruggedness	3113	422.72	213.95	17.21	855.89
Wheat Suitability	3113	0.42	0.23	0.01	0.84
Opium Revenue	3113	494.41	926.30	0.00	3361.81
Opium Eradication	3113	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Travel Time	3113	556.02	376.74	88.52	1965.92
Share Rural	3113	0.97	0.09	0.57	1.00

Notes: Sample based on Table 1, column 1. For the definition of the variables, see, Appendix C.

E. Alternative identification strategies

E.1. Fixed-effects pseudo-panel regressions

Identification strategy

I apply a pseudo-panel structure at the household level since households are not being tracked over the survey waves. I pool the independent cross sections, include household survey weights, and account for time- and district-fixed effects. I apply Linear Probability Models (LPM) in all regressions. The baseline empirical panel data model is the following:

$$CC_{i,d,t} = \beta ISAF_{d,t} + \theta Contest_{d,t-1} + \boldsymbol{X'}_{d,t-1}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \boldsymbol{H'}_{i,d,t}\boldsymbol{\mu} + \tau_t + \delta_d + \epsilon_{i,d,t}. \quad (2)$$

$CC_{i,d,t}$ represents one of the measures for community cohesion of household i in district d in year t from one of the three surveys, as described in Section 3.1. $ISAF_{d,t}$ measures ISAF presence in the district by either the mandate enlargement, the presence of PRTs, or military bases, as described in Section 3.2. The variable $Contest_{d,t-1}$ captures the degree of contestation in the previous year. $X_{d,t-1}$ is a vector of predetermined district-level control variables, including aid, VHI, and night light. $H_{i,d,t}$ is a vector of household-level covariates.[71] Due to the structure of the surveys, I cannot apply pre-determined household-specific characteristics. I, therefore, aggregate each household control over all households at the district level and exclude household i.[72] These variables include household living standards measured by household food consumption, whether households earn income from agricultural work, receive remittances, and whether they have taken a loan. The latter is of particular importance as to proxy for the need to rely on community support. Following Dell et al. (2018), I also account for household characteristics as age and sex of household head, the number of all household members, and the number of children living in the household. As some of these variables could be transmission channels and therefore bad controls, their inclusion can cause a bias of the estimates of interest. Therefore, in the baseline regressions, I rely on predetermined district-level control variables and fixed effects only. I also run regressions without any covariates to test robustness (see Table A23).

τ_t and δ_d are time- and district-fixed effects. They are important to the extent that I must control for the need to rely on the community. Due to the lack of data on social institutions, district- and year-fixed effects control for some part of that variation. For

[71] In the case of SAP and ANQAR, I do not control for $H_{i,d,t}$ since these surveys do not provide comparable questions to the NRVA.

[72] Since this captures variation over time, it is conceptually different from a district-fixed effect. In a cross section, it does, however, get very close to a district-fixed effect. Notwithstanding, I prefer this technique to including these variables at the household level to avoid concerns about bad controls. However, I make one exception and include whether households in a district have taken a loan (or experienced a shock) to proxy for the need to rely on help from others.

example, district-fixed effects account for the distance to major cities, which is used as a proxy for the presence or legitimacy of central government institutions (e.g., Lind et al., 2014). In more rigorous specifications, I also control for regional command-specific nonlinear time effects in line with Fetzer et al. (2021). These regional commands are relevant organizational units for ISAF, with different lead nations responsible for the four commands. This strategy allows me to rule out an important part of the omitted variable bias, though I cannot claim causality.

Main results and robustness

Panel A of Table A6 presents results for the two NRVA waves (2005 and 2007/08), and Panel B reports results for all three waves until 2012. I define ISAF presence according to three variables, *Mandate* (enlargement), *PRT*, and military *Base*. For the last two measures, I consider variation in the districts only (columns 2 and 4) and alternatively in the district and its neighboring districts (columns 3 and 5). However, in column 5, I restrict the type of bases to large bases since I would otherwise be left with only little variation due to a large number of any type of military bases across the country. After the end of 2006, all stages of the mandate enlargement have been completed. Thus, the variable *Mandate* takes a value of one for all observations after 2006. On the contrary, the presence of a military *Base* still varies over time. Concerning PRTs, only one has been established later than 2006, which is under the command of Turkey in the district Shibirghan of province Jawzjan. When interpreting results based on the presence of PRTs, one has to keep in mind that it captures basically no variation after 2006 because it is the case for the variable *Mandate*. Thus, results are driven by switches in ISAF presence in the earlier years of the panel. For robustness, I run the same regressions but exchange district-fixed effects with province-fixed effects to allow for a comparison across districts but within provinces. Results are reported in Table A11 and support the negative finding of the presence of a PRT on community cohesion. This is one reason why I restrict the analysis to the two waves of the NRVA in Panel A. The second reason is that starting from 2011, the transition from ISAF command to Afghan forces began (see for more details Appendix B and Figure A2). I account for this by excluding those districts which have already been part of the transition process in Panel B.

TABLE A6
FE OLS: Community help (NRVA)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mandate	**PRT**		**Any base**	**Large base**
	district	**district**	**neighbor**	**district**	**neighbor**
			Panel A: 2005-2008		
ISAF	-0.084***	-0.087**	-0.067***	-0.030	-0.027
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	50303	50303	50303	50303	50303
Adj. R-squared	0.336	0.335	0.335	0.334	0.334
			Panel B: 2005-2012		
ISAF	-0.060**	-0.078*	-0.055**	-0.035	-0.005
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	56045	56045	56045	56045	56045
Adj. R-squared	0.324	0.324	0.324	0.324	0.323
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. ISAF presence is defined according to the column heading. All regressions include district- and year-fixed effects. The set of control variables includes contestation (t-1) measured by the logged number of SIGACT events, aid (t-1), night light (t-1), VHI (t-1), household shock, and household loan. Panel B excludes district-years where the transition to Afghan forces already took place. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

In all specifications, I find a negative relationship between ISAF presence and the likelihood that a household receives help from the community. The coefficient does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels for military bases, though.

Table A7 turns to alternative measures derived from the SAP and ANQAR. Given that both datasets only begin after 2006, I define ISAF presence according to the existence of a military *Base*. Odd columns use an indicator for the number of any type of *Base* in the district, and even columns refer to large bases in the district or its neighboring districts. Columns 1-2 indicate that for both ways of measuring ISAF presence, we find that people rely less on the shura for dispute solving. Large military bases are also significantly negatively related to trust in shuras (column 4).

TABLE A7
FE OLS: Other outcomes (ANQAR, SAP)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dispute shura		**Trust shura**	
	ANQAR: 2008-09 (quarters)		**SAP: 2007-2012 (years)**	
ISAF	-0.121***	-0.173***	0.032	-0.177***
	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Observations	13171	13171	29427	29427
Adj. R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.070	0.070
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District, Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base Type	Any	Large	Any	Large

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. ISAF presence is defined according to the presence of a military base with odd columns using *Any base district* and even columns *Large base neighbor*. All regressions include district- and year-fixed effects (columns 1-2 also include wave fixed effects at the quarterly level). The set of control variables includes contestation (t-1) measured by the logged number of SIGACT events, aid (t-1), night light (t-1), and VHI (t-1). Columns 3-4 exclude district-years where the transition to Afghan forces already took place. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Results are robust to including less or further covariates. With the exception of the measure *Community help* results are also robust to including stronger sets of fixed effects as presented in Tables A8, A9, and A10. Despite controlling for different fixed effects and pre-determined control variables, the coefficient estimates presented in this section can, however, not be interpreted as causal.

TABLE A8
FE OLS: Community help (NRVA)

	2005-2008			2005-2012		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Panel A: Mandate enlargement			
ISAF	-0.165***	-0.096***	0.000	-0.129***	-0.082***	0.000
	(0.037)	(0.032)	(.)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(.)
Contest (t-1)		-0.023**	-0.019*	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.024***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Adj. R-squared	0.262	0.341	0.344	0.258	0.334	0.342
			Panel B: PRT (District)			
ISAF	-0.145*	-0.076**	-0.030	-0.138*	-0.069*	-0.019
	(0.076)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.077)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Contest (t-1)		-0.029***	-0.019*	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.024***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Adj. R-squared	0.256	0.340	0.344	0.255	0.333	0.342
			Panel C: PRT (Neighbor)			
ISAF	-0.130***	-0.056**	-0.011	-0.103***	-0.043*	0.006
	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Contest (t-1)		-0.027**	-0.019*	-0.028***	-0.031***	-0.024***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Adj. R-squared	0.258	0.340	0.344	0.256	0.333	0.342
			Panel D: Any base district			
ISAF	-0.117***	-0.027	-0.028	-0.072*	-0.028	-0.037
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Contest (t-1)		-0.028***	-0.017*	-0.029***	-0.031***	-0.022**
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Adj. R-squared	0.255	0.339	0.344	0.253	0.332	0.342
			Panel E: Large base neighbor			
ISAF	-0.054	-0.026	0.050	-0.015	0.003	0.056
	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Contest (t-1)		-0.029***	-0.018*	-0.034***	-0.032***	-0.024***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Adj. R-squared	0.259	0.345	0.350	0.258	0.338	0.348
Observations	51260	41289	41289	56995	46781	46781
Control variables	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District, Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R.Command*Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Transitioned districts	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The set of control variables includes aid (t-1), VHI (t-1), night light (t-1), and household characteristics (shock, food insecurity, agricultural income, remittances, and loan). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A9
FE OLS: Dispute shura (ANQAR quarterly), 2008-2009

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Panel A: Any base district		
ISAF	-0.076***	-0.105***	-0.151***
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Contest (t-1)	0.016	0.016	0.010
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Observations	13171	13171	13171
Adj. R-squared	0.042	0.043	0.048
	Panel B: Large base neighbor		
ISAF	-0.159***	-0.155***	-0.159**
	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.064)
Contest (t-1)	0.015	0.015	0.007
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Observations	13171	13171	13171
Adj. R-squared	0.042	0.043	0.048
Control variables	No	Yes	Yes
District,Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R.Command*Year FE	No	No	Yes

Notes: The set of control variables includes aid (t-1), VHI (t-1), and night light(t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A10
FE OLS: Trust shura (SAP yearly), 2007-2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Panel A: Any base district		
ISAF	0.027	0.027	0.033	0.033
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.049)
Contest (t-1)	0.007	0.007	0.008	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Observations	48998	48998	48998	29427
Adj. R-squared	0.063	0.063	0.067	0.075
		Panel B: Large base neighbor		
ISAF	-0.099***	-0.100***	-0.069**	-0.192***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.053)
Contest (t-1	0.008	0.008	0.009	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Observations	48998	48998	48998	29427
Adj. R-squared	0.063	0.063	0.068	0.075
Control variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
District,Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R.Command*Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Transitioned districts	No	No	No	No

Notes: The set of control variables includes aid (t-1), VHI (t-1), and night light(t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A11
FE OLS: Community help (NRVA), province FE

	2005-2008		**2005-2012**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ISAF	-0.020*	-0.020***	-0.021*	-0.021***
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Contest (t-1)	-0.012**	-0.012***	-0.016***	-0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Observations	50123	50123	55865	55865
Adj. R-squared	0.314	0.314	0.304	0.304
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province,Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE cluster	District	Robust	District	Robust
Transitioned districts	No	No	No	No

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. ISAF presence is defined according to the presence of a PRT in district i or its neighboring districts. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level in columns 1 and 3 and robust standard errors in columns 2 and 4.). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A12
FE OLS: Community help (NRVA), alternative conflict measures, 2005-2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mandate	**PRT**		**Any Base**	**Large base**
	district	**district**	**neighbor**	**district**	**neighbor**
			Panel A: (log) Battle-related deaths		
ISAF	-0.072**	-0.066*	-0.056**	-0.042	-0.021
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.027)
Contest (t-1)	-0.020**	-0.025***	-0.023**	-0.028***	-0.028***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Adj. R-squared	0.336	0.335	0.336	0.335	0.335
			Panel B: IED explosion		
ISAF	-0.075**	-0.073**	-0.055**	-0.017	-0.028
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Contest (t-1)	-0.053***	-0.058***	-0.055***	-0.059***	-0.060***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Adj. R-squared	0.338	0.337	0.337	0.337	0.337
			Panel B: Direct fire		
ISAF	-0.085***	-0.092**	-0.070***	-0.036	-0.035
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Contest (t-1)	-0.015	-0.023**	-0.020*	-0.021*	-0.023**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Adj. R-squared	0.335	0.335	0.335	0.334	0.334
			Panel C: Indirect fire		
ISAF	-0.087***	-0.077**	-0.068***	-0.035	-0.016
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Contest (t-1)	-0.015	-0.017	-0.017	-0.020*	-0.021**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Adj. R-squared	0.335	0.334	0.335	0.334	0.334
Transitioned districts	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: Conflict measures are derived from UCDP GED for panel A and from SIGACTS for panels B-E. The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. ISAF presence is defined according to the column heading. All regressions include district- and year-fixed effects. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A13
FE OLS: Community help (NRVA), alternative conflict measures, 2005-2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mandate	**PRT**		**Any Base**	**Large Base**
	district	**district**	**neighbor**	**district**	**neighbor**
			Panel A: (log) Battle-related deaths		
ISAF	-0.056**	-0.063	-0.051*	-0.054	-0.008
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Contest (t-1)	-0.020***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Adj. R-squared	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.322
			Panel B: IED explosion		
ISAF	-0.055*	-0.067*	-0.049*	-0.030	0.004
	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.036)
Contest (t-1)	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.047***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Adj. R-squared	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.324	0.324
			Panel B: Direct fire		
ISAF	-0.059**	-0.084**	-0.057**	-0.041	-0.017
	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Contest (t-1)	-0.028***	-0.032***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.031***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Adj. R-squared	0.324	0.324	0.324	0.323	0.323
			Panel C: Indirect fire		
ISAF	-0.063**	-0.065	-0.055**	-0.044	0.000
	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Contest (t-1)	-0.022**	-0.023**	-0.022**	-0.023**	-0.026***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Adj. R-squared	0.323	0.322	0.323	0.322	0.322
Transitioned districts	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: Conflict measures are derived from UCDP GED for panel A and from SIGACTS for panels B-E. The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. ISAF presence is defined according to the column heading. All regressions include district- and year-fixed effects. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

E.2. Heterogeneous effects given an exogenous shock

Identification strategy

As discussed, $ISAF_d$ can lead to heterogeneous effects that can be further amplified by the level of conflict in a district. I exploit exogenous variation in the need to rely on others and consider the triple interaction between $ISAF_d$, contestation $Contest_d$, and an exogenous income shock as shown in equation 3:

$$CC_{i,d} = \beta S_{i,d} * ISAF_d * Contest_d + \boldsymbol{X'}_d\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \boldsymbol{H'}_{i,d}\boldsymbol{\mu} + \epsilon_{i,d}. \tag{3}$$

$ISAF_d$ and $Contest_d$ are defined as in equation 2. $S_{i,d}$ measures whether a household is exposed to an exogenous income shock induced by climatic shocks. It is a binary indicator variable taking on the value of one if the household has been hit by one of the following climatic shocks: Earthquakes, landslides/avalanches, flooding, late damaging frosts, heavy rains preventing work, severe winter conditions, and hailstorms. A clear majority of the Afghan population receives at least some part of their income from agricultural activities. Climatic shocks thus represent a major threat to household income, especially in rural areas. In the three waves of the NRVA, this share varies between 60 and 80% for rural households and between 50 and 65% for all households. Given that these exogenous income shocks increase the need to rely on support from either formal or informal institutions, I exploit this variation to consider heterogeneous effects depending on the presence of ISAF and the degree of contestation.

I restrict this analysis to the 2005 cross section for three reasons. First, it is the most detailed wave with respect to variables that proxy community cohesion. Second, this wave is characterized by the most significant variation of the main variable of interest across space. Third, I can only apply the GRD for this wave, and I want to allow for a comparison of the results between these two techniques that get more closely to causal analyses..

I control for the same set of variables as in equation 2 supplemented by the levels and interacted pairs of the triple interaction term ($ISAF_d$, $Contest_d$, and $S_{i,d}$), respectively. Again standard errors are clustered at the district level. While I cannot infer the direct effect of foreign security missions on community cohesion from these results, this empirical strategy allows me to interpret the coefficient estimates of the interaction with the shock as exogenous. This is because I control for the endogenous level of the interaction term (ISAF presence) (e.g., Nizalova and Murtazashvili, 2016; Bun and Harrison, 2018). However, in order to deduce the effect of ISAF presence independently from the exogenous income shock, I proceed with the third estimation technique.

Main results and robustness

For ease of interpretation, I show plots along with regression results (Table A14 for the full regression results). Figure A3 presents marginal effects of the exogenous shock given the level of contestation. In Panel A, contestation is measured by the (logged) number of total events reported in SIGACTs, and in Panel B, I report heterogeneous effects for the (logged) number of battle-related deaths from UCDP GED. The left graphs present marginal effects for districts where ISAF has not yet been present, and the right graphs do so for districts in the North where ISAF's mandate has already been extended. In areas without ISAF presence, the marginal effects are positive irrespective of the intensity of contestation. On the other hand, the interaction effect points in the opposite direction in the north of the country. With a higher intensity of contestation, it becomes less likely that households can rely on help from others in their community. While the effects are imprecisely measured based on data from SIGACTs, results based on UCDP GED are highly significant. This result aligns with the negative findings of ISAF presence on community cohesion in the panel regressions. While the left graph is in line with the summary drawn by Bauer et al. (2016) that violence is positively associated with cooperation, this must not be true in the case of a foreign military intervention, as can be seen in the right graph. Results are robust to replacing the outcome measure with *Community help+loan* and to using the *restricted sample* (Figure A4 and Table A15).[73]

[73] There is no significant triple interaction effect for *Council member*.

FIGURE A3
Triple interaction, Community help, 2005



Notes: The figure presents four regression results with the triple interaction of a climatic shock, contestation, and ISAF presence. Corresponding regression results are reported in Table A14 Panel B, columns 1-2. In Panel A contestation is measured by the log of the total number of events (SIGACTS) and in Panel B by the log of battle-related deaths (UCDP GED). ISAF is measured by the mandate enlargement to the north. Shock is the indicator variable of whether a household has been exposed to a negative climatic shock. All graphs show the marginal effect of the shock as contestation changes for the two types of districts (ISAF versus no ISAF). Marginal effects are plotted along with 90% confidence intervals.

TABLE A14
Triple interaction: Community help (NRVA), different conflict measures, 2005

	UCDP	**SIGACTS**			
	BRD	**Total events**	**IED**	**DF**	**IDF**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A: No control variables		
Shock	0.073***	0.054***	0.081***	0.051***	0.069***
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)
ISAF	-0.013**	-0.020***	-0.018***	-0.018**	-0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Shock*ISAF	0.009	0.033	0.005	0.031	0.014
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Contest	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.009***	-0.007*	-0.006***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Shock*Contest	0.034*	0.032*	0.024	0.050**	0.040
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.028)
ISAF*Contest	-0.001	0.005	0.010*	0.006	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Shock*ISAF*Contest	-0.095***	-0.048*	-0.042	-0.050	-0.159***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Observations	30916	30916	30916	30916	30916
Adj. R-squared	0.048	0.049	0.045	0.051	0.049
			Panel B: Control variables		
Shock	0.070***	0.056***	0.080***	0.051***	0.070***
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
ISAF	-0.009	-0.010	-0.015**	-0.012	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Shock*ISAF	0.011	0.031	0.008	0.030	0.012
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Contest	0.005	0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.011
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.013)
Shock*Contest	0.031	0.028	0.020	0.046**	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.026)
ISAF*Contest	-0.011	-0.004	-0.000	-0.003	-0.016
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.016)
Shock*ISAF*Contest	-0.092***	-0.047*	-0.043	-0.047	-0.155***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Observations	29785	29785	29785	29785	29785
Adj. R-squared	0.053	0.053	0.048	0.055	0.054
Restricted sample	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. Panel B includes as control variables aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A15
Triple interaction: Community help (NRVA), different conflict measures, 2005

	UCDP	**SIGACTS**			
	BRD	**Total events**	**IED**	**DF**	**IDF**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A: No control variables		
Shock (t-1)	0.085***	0.056**	0.089***	0.060***	0.073***
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)
ISAF	-0.016***	-0.020**	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Shock*ISAF	-0.003	0.031	-0.003	0.022	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Contest	-0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Shock*Contest	0.037*	0.047***	0.050*	0.058***	0.074***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)
ISAF*Contestt	-0.003	0.003	0.008	0.004	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Shock*ISAF*Contest	-0.097***	-0.063**	-0.068*	-0.058	-0.194***
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Observations	26596	26596	26596	26596	26596
Adj. R-squared	0.054	0.058	0.051	0.058	0.063
			Panel B: Control variables		
Shock (t-1)	0.084***	0.055**	0.086***	0.059***	0.070***
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)
ISAF	-0.011*	-0.015*	-0.018***	-0.013*	-0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Shock*ISAF	-0.002	0.033	0.002	0.021	0.013
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Contest	0.003	-0.003	-0.009	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Shock*Contest	0.035*	0.046***	0.051*	0.056***	0.074***
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.020)
ISAF*Contest	-0.007	0.000	0.007	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Shock*ISAF*COntest	-0.096***	-0.064**	-0.073*	-0.057	-0.203***
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.031)
Observations	25774	25774	25774	25774	25774
Adj. R-squared	0.057	0.061	0.054	0.061	0.066
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. Panel B includes as control variables aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

FIGURE A4
Triple interaction: Community help+loan, 2005



Notes: The figure presents four regression results with the triple interaction of a climatic shock, contestation, and ISAF presence. In Panel A contestation is measured by the log of the total number of events (SIGACTS) and in Panel B by the log of battle-related deaths (UCDP GED). ISAF is measured by the mandate enlargement to the north. Shock is the indicator variable of whether a household has been exposed to a negative climatic shock. All graphs show the marginal effect of the shock as contestation changes for the two types of districts (ISAF versus no ISAF). Marginal effects are plotted along with 90% confidence intervals.

F. Additional results on the GRD

TABLE A16
GRD: Balancing tests at the household level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Panel A: Shocks and household characteristics (2003)				
	Any	Shock Insecurity	Climate	Wheat consumption	Log Food expenditures
ISAF	-0.100	-0.019	-0.053	-0.570	-0.154
	(0.092)	(0.014)	(0.139)	(2.799)	(0.681)
Observations	1050	501	1315	1227	635
Adj. R-squared	0.042	-0.007	0.040	0.022	0.193
Bandwidth	45.1	28.1	54.1	51.8	34.7
	Panel C: Ethnicity and household size (2003)				
	Native Language			Kuchi	Number
	Dari	Pashto	Uzbeki		members
ISAF	-0.268	-0.097	0.162	-0.032	0.171
	(0.200)	(0.177)	(0.160)	(0.021)	(0.651)
Observations	726	526	1278	799	855
Adj. R-squared	0.561	0.572	0.457	0.077	0.049
Bandwidth	37.2	28.6	52.3	39.4	41.4

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. Individual data-driven bandwidths based on rdbwselect are reported. All regressions are based on the first-order polynomial the in the distance to the boundary and on the restricted sample. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A17
GRD: Balancing tests at district level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A		
	UCDP	SIGACTS	Active	AID	
	BRD	events	bases	WB	total
ISAF	0.354	0.288	0.181	-0.006	0.943
	(0.224)	(0.281)	(0.155)	(0.259)	(0.952)
Observations	78	49	42	40	77
Adj. R-squared	0.109	-0.048	0.139	-0.148	0.151
Bandwidth	70.3	49.6	40.4	39.1	69
			Panel B		
	log	VHI	Rugged-	Suitability	
	Night light		ness	wheat	opium
ISAF	-0.600	-5.998	-105.991	0.284	0.137
	(0.654)	(7.795)	(109.382)	(0.175)	(0.099)
Observations	30	46	62	37	49
Adj. R-squared	-0.208	0.125	0.423	0.225	0.224
Bandwidth	29.2	47.5	57.7	34.7	49.6
			Panel C		
	log Pop-	Travel	Territory	Pashtuns	No. Ethnic
	ulation	time	control		groups
ISAF	-0.352	59.899	0.114	0.669*	0.840
	(0.503)	(179.644)	(0.217)	(0.340)	(0.604)
Observations	65	69	43	31	47
Adj. R-squared	0	0	1	0	0
Bandwidth	60.1	62.5	41.3	29.7	47.6
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. Individual data-driven bandwidths based on rdbwselect are reported. All regressions are based on the first-order polynomial in the distance to the boundary and on the restricted sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A18
GRD: Different outcomes (NRVA), controlling for Pashtuns, 2005

	Comm. help		Comm. help+loan		Council member	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.091*	-0.100**	-0.220***	-0.222***	-0.115	-0.190**
Adj. R-squared	0.092	0.108	0.230	0.264	0.156	0.191
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.067**	-0.082***	-0.179***	-0.190***	-0.053	-0.098
Adj. R-squared	0.092	0.107	0.230	0.264	0.155	0.188
Observations	3113	2787	2764	2495	3743	3325
Number of districts	64	57	61	55	78	67
Bandwidth	45	45	40.6	40.6	52.5	52.5
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, household loan, and district-level presence of pashtuns. In the regressions on *Council member*, I additionally control for the presence of a council. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A19
GRD: Community help (NRVA), alternative bandwidths, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bandwidth 50		**Bandwidth 75**		**Bandwidth 100**	
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.098**	-0.126**	-0.087**	-0.095**	-0.054	-0.068*
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Adj. R-squared	0.080	0.096	0.074	0.076	0.066	0.066
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.063***	-0.085***	-0.052*	-0.057**	-0.036	-0.045
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Adj. R-squared	0.079	0.094	0.074	0.075	0.066	0.065
Observations	3554	3148	7495	5882	11810	8426
Number of clusters	74	64	120	103	166	144
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A20
GRD: Community help+loan (NRVA), alternative bandwidths, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bandwidth 50		**Bandwidth 75**		**Bandwidth 100**	
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.257***	-0.296***	-0.222***	-0.223***	-0.150***	-0.170***
	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Adj. R-squared	0.202	0.226	0.176	0.180	0.161	0.160
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.166***	-0.189***	-0.158***	-0.158***	-0.132***	-0.148***
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Adj. R-squared	0.198	0.219	0.175	0.178	0.163	0.161
Observations	3554	3148	7495	5882	11810	8426
Number of clusters	74	64	120	103	166	144
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help+loan*. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A21
GRD: CDC/Shura member (NRVA), alternative bandwidths, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bandwidth 50		**Bandwidth 75**		**Bandwidth 100**	
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.083	-0.142	-0.163**	-0.181**	-0.122	-0.156
	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.098)
Adj. R-squared	0.160	0.192	0.093	0.108	0.040	0.039
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.048	-0.103	-0.095	-0.111*	-0.062	-0.082
	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.076)
Adj. R-squared	0.160	0.191	0.091	0.107	0.041	0.038
Observations	3554	3148	7495	5882	11810	8426
Number of clusters	74	64	120	103	166	144
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Council member*. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. I additionally control for the presence of a council. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A22
GRD: Donut hole (NRVA), 2005

	Comm. help		Comm. help+loan		Council member	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
ISAF	-0.157**	-0.186**	-0.303***	-0.337***	-0.150	-0.224*
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.121)
Adj. R-squared	0.098	0.117	0.237	0.275	0.152	0.182
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
ISAF	-0.080***	-0.102***	-0.192***	-0.211***	-0.079	-0.126
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.080)	(0.086)
Adj. R-squared	0.096	0.114	0.235	0.272	0.151	0.180
Observations	2840	2537	2491	2245	3470	3075
Number of districts	64	57	61	55	78	67
Bandwidth	45	45	40.6	40.6	52.5	52.5
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. In the regressions on *Council member*, I additionally control for the presence of a council. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). All households living in villages up to 10km away from the boundary are dropped to create a donut hole. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

FIGURE A5
GRD: Placebo boundaries



Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates of the placebo treatment variable for 12 separate regressions. The cutoff and boundary are shifted by x km along the forcing variable. To keep sample sizes comparable and to avoid contamination from the actual treatment effect I start by shifting the cutoff by 50km and go up to 100km to the "left" (south-west) and to the "right" (north-east) as indicated on the x-axis respectively. The regressions only include households of villages within a 45km bandwidth of the respective placebo boundary to keep sample size comparable to the baseline regression.

TABLE A23
GRD: Community help (NRVA), alternative specifications, 45km bandwidth, 2005

	Segment FE		**Covariates**	
	No	**12 à 100km**	**No**	**Long Set**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary			
ISAF	-0.097*	-0.105**	-0.085	-0.088*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.052)
Adj. R-squared	0.104	0.116	0.075	0.118
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude			
ISAF	-0.062**	-0.070**	-0.049*	-0.105***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.039)
Adj. R-squared	0.104	0.115	0.074	0.124
	Panel C: Distance to boundary interacted with treatment			
ISAF	-0.102**	-0.108**	-0.085	-0.096*
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Adj. R-squared	0.105	0.116	0.074	0.119
Observations	2787	2845	2891	2175
Number of clusters	57	58	57	57
Bandwidth	45.2	45.8	45	45
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. Individual data-driven bandwidths based on rdbwselect are reported. The long set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), military bases(t-1), presence of a CDC, distance to Kabul, contestation(t-1), and household characteristics (shock, head age, head sex, members, number of children, food insecurity, agricultural income, remittances, and loan). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A24
GRD: Community help (NRVA), alternative specifications, 50km bandwidth, 2005

	Segment FE		**Covariates**	
	No	**12 a 100km**	**No**	**Long set**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary			
ISAF	-0.113**	-0.126**	-0.107**	-0.103**
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Adj. R-squared	0.092	0.105	0.067	0.111
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude			
ISAF	-0.065**	-0.086***	-0.061**	-0.100***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.035)
Adj. R-squared	0.090	0.103	0.064	0.114
	Panel C: Distance to boundary interacted with treatment			
ISAF	-0.113**	-0.124**	-0.107**	-0.107**
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Adj. R-squared	0.092	0.105	0.067	0.111
Observations	3148	3148	3262	2446
Number of clusters	64	64	64	64
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The long set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), military bases(t-1), presence of a CDC, distance to Kabul, contestation(t-1), and household characteristics (shock, head age, head sex, members, number of children, food insecurity, agricultural income, remittances, and loan). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A25
GRD: Community help (NRVA), direct neighboring districts, 2005

	Segment FE		**Covariates**	
	No	**12 a 100km**	**No**	**Long set**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ISAF	-0.094***	-0.114***	-0.081*	-0.143***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.049)
Adj. R-squared	0.121	0.180	0.114	0.172
Observations	1986	1986	1986	1599
Number of clusters	28	28	28	28

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The long set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), military bases(t-1), presence of a CDC, distance to Kabul, contestation(t-1), and household characteristics (shock, head age, head sex, members, number of children, food insecurity, agricultural income, remittances, and loan). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A26
GRD: Community help (NRVA), alternative measures for contestation, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	NRVA Insecurity			SIGACTS		
	District	HH	Events	DF	IDF	IED
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
	Control for contestation					
ISAF	-0.096*	-0.095*	-0.106**	-0.099*	-0.092*	-0.113**
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.051)
Contestation (t-1)	0.371	-0.037	0.034	0.012	0.021	0.105***
	(0.549)	(0.094)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.022)
Adj. R-squared	0.104	0.102	0.108	0.102	0.103	0.125
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary					
	Control for contestation and interaction with treatment					
ISAF	-0.102*	-0.095*	-0.122**	-0.107**	-0.095*	-0.114**
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Contestation (t-1)	0.338	-0.036	0.024	-0.056	0.005	0.107***
	(0.577)	(0.105)	(0.030)	(0.093)	(0.042)	(0.022)
ISAF*Contestation	1.391	-0.004	0.051	0.091	0.072	-0.037
	(2.114)	(0.116)	(0.041)	(0.107)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Adj. R-squared	0.104	0.101	0.109	0.103	0.106	0.125
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
	Control for contestation					
ISAF	-0.069**	-0.073**	-0.085**	-0.075*	-0.073**	-0.091***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Contestation (t-1)	0.377	-0.033	0.034	0.009	0.021	0.106***
	(0.536)	(0.094)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.023)
Adj. R-squared	0.103	0.101	0.107	0.101	0.103	0.124
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude					
	Control for contestation and interaction with treatment					
ISAF	-0.074**	-0.073**	-0.113**	-0.086**	-0.089**	-0.091***
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.032)
Contestation (t-1)	0.345	-0.033	0.021	-0.089	0.003	0.107***
	(0.565)	(0.105)	(0.033)	(0.119)	(0.045)	(0.022)
ISAF*Contestation	1.226	-0.007	0.072	0.136	0.080	-0.026
	(2.066)	(0.112)	(0.071)	(0.154)	(0.078)	(0.067)
Adj. R-squared	0.103	0.101	0.110	0.103	0.106	0.124
Observations	2787	2787	2787	2787	2787	2787
Number of clusters	57	57	57	57	57	57
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), household shock, and household loan. 200km segments included in all regressions. Contestation is measured as indicated in the column heading (columns 2-6 are in logarithms). All regressions are for the data-driven optimal 45km bandwidth. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A27
GRD: Community help (NRVA), different ways of clustering SE, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)
SE Cluster:	District	Village	Robust
	Panel A: First-order polynomial in distance to boundary		
ISAF	-0.102**	-0.102**	-0.102***
	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.020)
	Panel B: First-order polynomial in longitude and latitude		
ISAF	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.080***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Observations	2787	2787	2787
Adj. R-squared	0.107	0.107	0.107
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. All regressions are for the data-driven optimal 45km bandwidth. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

FIGURE A6
GRD: Wild-cluster bootstrap



Notes: All panels show the distribution of bootstrapped estimates for province-level clustered standard errors with the null imposed with 1'000 replications. The panel heading indicates the dependent variable. Results are shown for the most rigorous specification, including 200km segment-fixed effects and the set of control variables for the restricted sample as in column 4 of Table 1. The numbers indicate the left and right 95% confidence interval. The Null hypothesis at the 5% level is whether this interval contains 0.

TABLE A28
GRD: Community help (NRVA), exclude western/eastern command, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No western Command		No Eastern Command	
		Panel A: Bandwidth 45		
ISAF	-0.146***	-0.102***	-0.037	-0.054***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.016)
Observations	2459	2459	1249	1249
Adj. R-squared	0.115	0.115	0.053	0.053
		Panel B: Bandwidth 50		
ISAF	-0.183***	-0.149***	-0.061**	-0.065***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.014)
Observations	2785	2785	1483	1483
Adj. R-squared	0.110	0.108	0.053	0.054
		Panel C: Bandwidth 75		
ISAF	-0.104***	-0.053**	-0.075***	-0.063***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Observations	5148	5148	3373	3373
Adj. R-squared	0.077	0.075	0.057	0.057
		Panel D: Bandwidth 100		
ISAF	-0.086***	-0.066***	-0.031**	-0.028**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Observations	7456	7456	5105	5105
Adj. R-squared	0.068	0.067	0.052	0.053
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GRD type	Linear	Long & Lat	Linear	Long & Lat

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A29
GRD: Community help (NRVA), lead nation heterogeneity, 2005

	Germany	Hungary	Sweden	Norway
		Panel A: Bandwidth 45		
ISAF	-0.095*	-0.061	-0.094*	-0.128*
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.076)
ISAF*X	0.006	-0.070	0.005	0.067
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.072)
Observations	2787	2787	2787	2787
Adj. R-squared	0.102	0.104	0.102	0.104
Jointly Significant	No	No	No	No
Joint Effect	-.089	-.131	-.089	-.061
		Panel B: Bandwidth 50		
ISAF	-0.126**	-0.089*	-0.126**	-0.169**
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.070)
ISAF treat*X	0.013	-0.079*	-0.007	0.080
	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Observations	3148	3148	3148	3148
Adj. R-squared	0.096	0.100	0.096	0.099
Jointly Significant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint Effect	-.113	-.169	-.133	-.09
		Panel C: Bandwidth 75		
ISAF	-0.096**	-0.089**	-0.099**	-0.083
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.056)
ISAF treat*X	0.042**	-0.013	-0.063***	-0.022
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.037)
Observations	5882	5882	5882	5882
Adj. R-squared	0.077	0.076	0.077	0.076
Jointly Significant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint Effect	-.054	-.102	-.163	-.105
		Panel D: Bandwidth 100		
ISAF	-0.067*	-0.078**	-0.072**	-0.068
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.044)
ISAF treat*X	0.016	0.019	-0.072***	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Observations	8426	8426	8426	8426
Adj. R-squared	0.066	0.066	0.067	0.066
Jointly Significant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint Effect	-.052	-.059	-.143	-.067

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. All regressions are done for the restricted sample and using first-order polynomial in the distance to boundary. All regressions include an interaction between ISAF presence and the lead nation X as indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

FIGURE A7
GRD: Community help (NRVA), drop a boundary segment at the time, 2005



Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates of the treatment variable for 12 separate regressions. Panel A reports results based on the data-driven bandwidth and panel B on the 50km bandwidth. Regressions are as in Table 1, panel B, column 2.

TABLE A30
GRD: Community help (NRVA), no household weights, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Community help		**Community help+loan**		**Council member**	
ISAF	-0.094*	-0.102**	-0.253***	-0.277***	-0.112	-0.179*
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.098)	(0.103)
Adj. R-squared	0.091	0.108	0.219	0.246	0.178	0.211
Observations	3113	2787	3113	2787	3113	2787
Number of clusters	64	57	64	57	64	57
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. 200km segment-fixed effects are included. All regressions are including households within the 45km bandwidth using the first-order polynomial in the distance to boundary. The set of control variables include aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A31
GRD: Community help (NRVA), new boundary, 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1st-order polynomial:		Distance			Longitude and latitude	
ISAF	-0.096**	-0.108**	-0.102**	-0.062**	-0.077***	-0.080***
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Observations	3156	2843	2787	3156	2843	2787
Adj. R-squared	0.088	0.104	0.108	0.088	0.103	0.107
200km segments	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Restricted sample	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Exclude 2 districts	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Border	New	New	Old	New	New	Old

Notes: The dependent variable is community cohesion measured by *Community help*. The set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Columns 1, 2, 4, 5 apply the new boundary after administrative reorganization. Columns 3 and 6 apply the old boundary but exclude two districts (Kahmard and Sayghan), which have been shifted across the border after the change of administrative units in 2005. For more details on the administrative reorganization, see, Appendix A. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

TABLE A32
GRD: Education (NRVA), 2005

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Household Head			Kids
	No School	Can Read	Primary	Secondary	Enrolled
ISAF	-0.127	-0.016	0.064	-0.003	0.450**
	(0.131)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.186)
Observations	1809	2518	1809	1809	2135
Adj. R-squared	0.173	0.113	0.125	0.029	0.211

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated in the column heading. The set of control variables includes aid(t-1), VHI(t-1), night light(t-1), contestation(t-1), household shock, and household loan. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

G. Additional maps

FIGURE A8
Regional commands and province names



Notes: The boundary splits the country into the northern command (treated), where ISAF's mandate was extended to in December 2003 (completed end of 2004), and the rest of the country (control), where ISAF was deployed to after the survey wave of 2005 was conducted. I plot the new boundary after the administrative reorganization in 2005 as described in Appendix A. Highlighted are the four regional commands as described in https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_orbat_isaf_091000.htm (accessed July 23, 2021). The shapefile for the 34 provinces is from https://data.humdata.org/dataset/afg-admin-boundaries, accessed June 27, 2018.

Figure A9
Presence of military bases and PRTs



Notes: The boundary splits the country into the northern command (treated), where ISAF's mandate was extended to in December 2003 (completed end of 2004), and the rest of the country (control), where ISAF was deployed to after the survey wave of 2005 was conducted. Highlighted are the six boundary segments of 200km, and the districts with no survey data available in the 2005 survey wave. Districts highlighted in red (and surrounded by red) are characterized by a military base (any time within my sample period), and districts marked in green show the location of a PRT. Note that in some districts, for instance, Masar-e Scharif, both a PRT and a military base are present. While the data on PRTs is complete, the data on military bases has to be considered with some caution since it covers not the entire spectrum. For more details on the collection of this data, see, Gehring et al. (2023).

Figure A10
OEF bases before 2005



Notes: The map highlights districts with US facilities (including minor facilities) from OEF as of January 1, 2005. See https://www.globalsecurity.org, accessed March 25, 2018.

FIGURE A11
Battle-related deaths: Mean value 2005-2012



Notes: The figure plots the distribution of the number of battle-related deaths (no logarithms) from UCDP GED in averages per district over the 2005-2012 period.

FIGURE A12
Alternative conflict measures: Mean values 2005-2012



(A) Insecurity (NRVA)



(B) IED (SIGACTS)



(C) IDF (SIGACTS)



(D) DF (SIGACTS)

Notes: The figures plot the distribution of alternative conflict measures provided by NRVA (panel A) and SIGACTS (panels B-D). While panel A shows a subjective conflict measure (Insecurity: share of households per district that experienced an insecurity shock), panels B-D cover events tracked by the military and provide numbers (no logarithms) of three types of events: IED, Indirect Fire (ID), and Direct Fire (DF). All values are averages per district over the 2005-2012 period.

FIGURE A13
Conflict and missing survey data



Notes: The boundary splits the country into the northern command (treated), where ISAF's mandate was extended to in December 2003 (completed end of 2004) and the rest of the country (control), where ISAF was deployed to after the survey wave of 2005 was conducted. Highlighted are the six boundary segments a 200km, and the districts with no survey data available in the 2005 survey wave. Districts in dotted grey are missing in the NRVA dataset. The red dots present the conflict intensity measured by the number of battle-related deaths (BRD). The dots present the mean BRD per district over the four prior years to 2005 (2001-2004).

FIGURE A14
Territorial control 1996



Notes: The source for the classification of territorial control in 1996 is Dorronsoro (2005).

FIGURE A15
Soviet invasion 1979-1989



Notes: I georeferenced the map on the soviet invasion from http://www.zmsbw.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/0592404.pdf (accessed June 26, 2018) and overlaid it with the shapefile from https://esoc.princeton.edu/country/afghanistan for the 398 districts. This allows for the inclusion of the treatment boundary in this original map on the soviet invasion. The red arrows show the main directions of the invasion and the fighting (orange arrows, as indicated in the legend, are not on the map because they show the direction of refugee flows out of the country). Helicopters present bigger airborne landing operations, and battle tanks show main troop concentration during the occupation. The red dashed areas are the focal points of fighting between soviets troops and the Mujaheddin.

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